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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Information Exchange in the Supply Chain 
The cost-effective, timely, and accurate exchange of information allows today’s 
supply chains to efficiently deliver innovative solutions.  Using the latest technology and 
supply chain strategies, a consumer in the U.S. can order a laptop computer online direct 
from the manufacturer.  The manufacturer is able to custom build the laptop in Malaysia, 
coordinate the manufacture of the docking station and monitor stand in China, and have 
the entire order delivered within six days.  In order to efficiently deliver this level of 
service to customers, multiple manufacturers and logistics providers are coordinated into 
a single virtual business entity. 
A key component of any business’s success is its ability to balance the costs and 
benefits of maintaining relationships with their trading partners.  Exchanging information 
with trading partners is a central element in maintaining relationships.  The cost of 
exchanging information includes the technology infrastructure as well as the gathering 
and formatting of the data.  Sharing the wrong information with the wrong trading chain 
partner may cost the firm its competitive advantage and allow opportunistic actions by 
customers, suppliers, and competitors.  Sharing the right information at the right time 
with the right trading chain partners can reduce costs and enhance competitive advantage. 
  Not all supply chain relationships are equal and each requires unique amounts 
and types of information.  Some business-to-business (B2B) exchanges are defined by 
closely integrated seamless relationships while others are defined by arms-length market 
relationships.  Simple arms-length market relationships may require only the most basic 
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exchange of cost and quantity information.  These loose relationships exist when the 
buyer requests a specific catalog item, quantity, and delivery date.  The supplier responds 
with the cost, item availability, and payment terms.  The exchange is coordinated based 
on a minimal exchange of information to support the order cycle process.  Other more 
tightly integrated relationships may require ongoing real-time exchanges of production 
plans, point-of-sale demand data, inventory quantities, and shipping schedules.  The 
exchange of additional information allows for the coordination of production and logistic 
functions above and beyond the order cycle process.  Information exchange that is 
tailored to meet the needs of the relationship benefits performance by getting the right 
information to the right trading partner at the right time in order to support interfirm 
decision making.  
Supply chain relationships differ in their characteristics as well as their outcomes.  
The degree of trust, level of commitment, use of shared knowledge, access to systems 
and information, and use of shared goals vary among B2B supply chain relationships.  
Most firms do not build close supply chain relationships just for the sake of integration; 
they develop close relationships for the positive outcomes that are created.  For example, 
when interviewing the regional sales manager for a large cable manufacturer, he cited 
specific outcomes from building close relationships with customers.  Both the firm and its 
customers experienced benefits from the relationship.  Its customers experienced positive 
supply chain performance outcomes, including reductions in average inventory, increased 
inventory availability, access to R&D resources, greater flexibility to adjust order 
quantities inside manufacturing lead time, and access to enhanced emergency response 
services.  The cable manufacturer benefited from increased flexibility in managing its 
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order backlog, improved accuracy of forward production planning, better cost control 
through level production loading, and the avoidance of switching costs.  This 
manufacturer noted that these benefits become possible when information flows 
seamlessly between organizations within the context of close supply chain relationships. 
Firms can identify the unique types and volumes of information exchange 
necessary to build and maintain each relationship.  At a basic relational level, 
procurement and sales personnel from two distinct firms coordinate quantity, price, 
payment terms, and delivery information to support the exchange of products.  At the 
other end of the relational spectrum, marketing and engineering personnel in distinct 
firms may exchange complex information to coordinate joint R&D efforts for the 
development of next generation products and services.  In both situations, firms make 
decisions about the types of information that are exchanged in order to efficiently and 
effectively coordinate their resources. 
Direct modes of information exchange such as face-to-face, teleconferencing, and 
telephone contacts allow for immediate feedback among the parties.  Due to the 
interactive nature of these modes, the exchange parties need to be available at the same 
time in order to coordinate the information exchange.  Scheduling constraints in supply 
chains that extend across time zones serve to further decrease flexibility and increase the 
cost of using these traditional modes of information exchange.  When immediate 
feedback and interaction are not required, information can be exchanged through email, 
electronic data interchange (EDI), voice mail, or web-based applications.  These indirect 
information exchange modes support the efficient transfer of large amounts of 
information without both exchange parties being available at the same time.   Email text 
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and attachments are sent by one firm and stored by the recipient firm until the 
information is needed.   Although lacking in immediate feedback mechanisms, these 
technology-based information exchange modes have the advantage of conveying large 
amounts of information in a form that can be accurately stored and shared with others 
(Subramani 2004; Vickery et al. 2004).  Firms may choose the mode of information 
exchange that best suits their situation. 
1.2 Strategic Use of Supply Chain Relationships 
Increased competition makes the management of supply chain relationships a 
strategic issue for firms.  Researchers note that supply chains exist whether they are 
managed or not (Mentzer et al. 2001).  However, the successful management of supply 
chains can be a source of competitive advantage for firms (Dyer and Ouchi 1993; 
Houlihan 1985).  Supply chain management (SCM) is described as the strategic 
management of individual firms as a single entity in order to bring a product or service to 
the market (Vickery et al. 2003).  The American Production and Inventory Control 
Society (APICS) provides a process oriented definition of SCM:  
The design, planning, execution, control, and monitoring of supply chain 
activities with the objective of creating net value, building a competitive 
infrastructure, leveraging worldwide logistics, synchronizing supply with demand, 
and measuring performance globally. (APICS, 2006) 
Collectively, these two definitions of SCM create a holistic view of SCM recognizing 
that the individual firms in a supply chain are distinct entities that share a common 
interest in operating as a single vertically integrated system. 
The linking of internal firm processes to external customers and suppliers is 
recognized as a key element in the management of supply chains.  Through an empirical 
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test of five integration strategies, researchers found a correlation between firms with 
higher performance and their increased use of integration (Frohlich and Westbrook 
2001).  Their survey-based study asked firms to rate the degree of integration with both 
their customers and suppliers.  The highest performing strategy was found to be linking 
closely with both customers and suppliers.  In their study, information exchange was a 
key indicator of integrated relationships.  Integrated relationships are characterized by the 
sharing of production plans and the use of shared information systems. 
Information technology (IT) facilitates the exchange of information in the supply 
chain.  Inherent in the traditional model of a supply chain are the flow of products toward 
the end customer and the flow of information toward the raw materials suppliers.  In its 
most basic form, information only flows upstream from the end customer toward the raw 
materials supplier.  This type of information flow often consists of only basic order 
information that informs the supplier to ship a specific item to the requesting customer. 
Today’s advanced IT capabilities support the fast and efficient flow of large 
volumes of diverse information both upstream and downstream in the supply chain.  To 
enhance the coordination of the supply chain among customers and suppliers, firms often 
share inventory information, quality reports, demand forecasts, production schedules, and 
marketing research with both customers and suppliers.  These bi-directional flows of 
information go against the traditional model of the supply chain information flow but are 
recognized in both academic literature and business practice (Spekman et al. 1998). 
Technological advances enhance the ability of firms to gather, store, and transfer 
information.  The ability of a firm to use IT is recognized as a source of firm performance 
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advantage (Bharadwaj 2000; Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Zhu and Kraemer 2002).  
Beyond the mere presence of IT, researchers find that technology facilitates the exchange 
of information between trading partners (Spekman et al. 1998).  Recognizing the role of 
IT in facilitating supply chain integration, IT has been modeled as an antecedent of 
supply chain integration (Vickery et al. 2003).   
IT connections and integration strategies create linkages among firms in the 
supply chain, but linkages alone do not integrate firms.  Moving information seamlessly 
between a company and its trading partners facilitates the strategic integration that 
coordinates firms in the supply chain (Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995).  Specifically, 
information is most useful in a supply chain context when it is timely, accurate, and 
relevant to decision making (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1993; Whipple et al. 2002).  The 
exchange of information across these interfirm linkages integrates the firms and allows 
them to perform as a single virtual organization. 
1.3 Contribution of the Dissertation 
This dissertation addresses existing gaps in the literature by examining the effect 
of information exchange on supply chain performance.  Specifically, this dissertation 
examines IT enabled information exchange between firms in the supply chain.   
This dissertation makes four unique and significant contributions related to the 
use of information exchange in supply chains: 
 This dissertation extends the theoretical link between information 
exchange and supply chain participant performance.  Prior research 
recognizes the role of information exchange in supply chains but has been 
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limited in its measurement.  These analyses use a unique archival dataset 
from an electronically-mediated industrial exchange network to develop 
measures of actual information exchanges in B2B relationships. 
 This dissertation expands the growing body of literature on supply chain 
management by maintaining a perspective that performance is associated 
with the effective management of interfirm relationships.  The exchange 
of information with trading partners is specifically advanced as a key 
element of interfirm relationships that has not been fully developed in the 
literature. 
 This dissertation identifies dimensions of information exchange that 
contribute to the relational performance of firms in the supply chain 
through the use of dyadic observations of B2B interactions.  Using event 
history analysis tools and performance measures from strategic 
management literature, the association between information exchange 
characteristics and relationship termination is developed.  U-shaped 
relationships are identified where the effects of information exchange 
characteristics are negative at lower volume levels and positive at higher 
volumes. 
 This dissertation identifies dimensions of information exchange that 
contribute to the operational performance of firms in the supply chain.  A 
panel dataset of thirty-nine technology champion firms is used for 
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hypotheses testing.  Findings suggest that close trading partner 
relationships may be detrimental to performance. 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 discusses 
and applies relevant theory, Chapter 3 presents the methodology and data, Chapter 4 
identifies and tests hypotheses related to relationship termination, Chapter 5 identifies 
and tests hypotheses related to firm operational performance, and Chapter 6 offers 
conclusions and directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Theory and Review of Extant Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter uses transaction cost theory (TCT) to build a theoretical approach to 
understanding the effects of information exchange within electronically-mediated supply 
chain relationships.  This unique investigation into the role of information exchange in 
supply chain relationships has both academic and practical application. 
TCT is an appropriate theoretical lens for supply chain research because it can be 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of buyer-supplier relationships (Grover and Malhotra 
2003).  TCT identifies specific characteristics of interfirm exchanges and assumptions 
about firm behavior to guide a firm’s choice of relationship governance structure.  Simply 
put, TCT recognizes that there are attributes of business exchanges which may require 
firms to manage the relationship more carefully in order to avoid unfavorable outcomes. 
The chapter proceeds with an overview of the key elements of TCT that apply to 
this dissertation and an introduction of extant literature to form a framework for research 
into the use of information exchange in supply chain relationships.   
2.2 Transaction Cost Theory in a Supply Chain Context 
TCT proposes that firms decide strategically whether to make their inputs or 
purchase their inputs from the market (Williamson 1975; Williamson 1985).  Transaction 
costs are incurred when firms procure inputs from outside sources.  These transaction 
costs include searching for a source of supply, negotiating, coordinating the exchange, 
and monitoring the transaction.   
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The decision of whether to make or buy inputs was initially described as a 
dichotomous choice of either market or hierarchy (Williamson 1975).  This dichotomy 
was later expanded as a continuum of governance structures, recognizing that market 
characteristics and hierarchy characteristics could be blended in forming a continuum of 
business relationships (Webster 1992).  The space between the dichotomous choices of 
market and hierarchy was described as “hybrid” by Williamson (1985) and is depicted as 
supply chain relationships in Figure 2.1.  The hybrid space recognizes that firms can 
organize their external transactions using non-price mechanisms which create unique 
governance structures ranging from closely connected relationships to arms-length 
market transactions (Williamson 1985). 
Figure 2.1 Information Technology and the TCT Framework 
Market HierarchySupply Chain Relationships
Electronic Markets Hypothesis
Move to the Middle
Vendors to Partners
 
The continuum between pure markets and internal hierarchies has been used to 
describe the nature of supply chain relationships.  At the far left extreme of the supply 
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chain relationship continuum, the relationship is typically an arms-length or “market-
like” relationship between a supplier and its customer.   These exchanges differ from a 
pure market exchange because the exchange is not discrete but occurs repeatedly between 
the same two participants such that a relationship exists through an expectation of future 
exchanges.  This type of relationship may exist when commodities are repeatedly 
exchanged and the relationship is primarily governed by price mechanisms.  At the other 
extreme -- corresponding to the right-hand “hierarchy” end of the continuum -- are close 
relationships where suppliers tightly integrate with their customers.  The earlier example 
of a cable manufacturer that works closely with select customers to coordinate production 
and demand would be an example of a relationship on the hierarchy end of the supply 
chain relationship continuum.  At the far right of the continuum are the processes that 
have been moved into the firm’s hierarchy and are no longer external supply chain 
relationships but instead are vertically integrated internal processes.  Within the 
continuum in the middle are supply chain relationships characterized by varying levels of 
integration. 
TCT posits that the decision of how to manage relationships is determined by 
factors of the exchange transaction which include three dimensions and two assumptions.  
The three dimensions of exchange identified by TCT are: the frequency of exchange, the 
amount of uncertainty, and the degree of asset specificity (Waldman and Jensen 1998).  
The two assumptions are bounded rationality and opportunism. 
The frequency of exchange recognizes that how often firms transact to acquire a 
given input affects the overall cost of transacting.  If an input is only required 
occasionally, the firm may choose to use the market.  If, however, the input is needed 
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often, the cost of repeatedly renegotiating procurement from the market will increase 
aggregate transaction costs.  While discrete purchases may be transacted through the 
market, when multiple transactions are required to supply an input, firms will tend to 
move toward internalizing the transaction to reduce their overall cost (Williamson 1985).  
In practice, firms move away from discrete pure market transactions and create blanket 
purchase orders that govern the exchange for a specific period of time. 
Uncertainty in exchange relationships is often a result of coordination problems 
between exchange partners.  When one party is unsure of the plans and intentions of its 
exchange partner, slow or inappropriate decisions can increase costs.  In practice, this can 
occur when items that are ordered are not delivered when expected.  The customer is 
unsure why the ordered items were not delivered and may subsequently decide to order 
the items from another source rather than waiting for the initial order to be delivered. 
Asset specificity addresses the ease with which firms can reallocate assets to other 
relationships.  If assets are dedicated to supporting a specific relationship and cannot be 
reallocated to a new relationship, these transaction-specific investments can be the source 
of lock-in or hold-up (Shapiro and Varian 1998).  When a specialized asset is allocated in 
a buyer-seller relationship, the party holding the specialized asset has few options to 
protect the loss of that asset beyond maintaining the existing relationship.  Difficult and 
lengthy contract negotiations, cost concessions, and ongoing monitoring requirements 
needed to protect the specialized asset create additional transaction costs.  In practice, 
suppliers may co-locate their facilities inside of the customer’s warehouse in order to 
provide unique services.  In such a case, the supplier incurs costs to set-up the operation 
which may not be transferred to another relationship if the customer decides to change 
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suppliers.  An additional aspect of asset specificity occurs when a supplier develops a 
unique input for a customer specified need.  If the customer decides that the input is no 
longer needed, then the supplier may have no use for the production capability, existing 
inventory, or unallocated R&D expenditures. 
TCT posits that underlying these three dimensions are two assumptions.  TCT 
assumes that transacting parties are limited in their ability to collect and understand all 
issues related to the exchange (bounded rationality) and that if given the opportunity 
firms will behave selfishly in ways that are detrimental to the other party (opportunism).  
Firms incur costs to overcome bounded rationality and avoid opportunistic 
behavior.  The writing of extensive contracts and carefully monitoring the exchange are 
two ways that firms protect themselves.  However, as any of the three dimensions of 
exchange (frequency, uncertainty, and asset specificity) increase, there is a greater 
opportunity for firms to act opportunistically thus requiring additional transaction costs in 
order to reduce the risk.  Increased transaction costs require a firm to choose a 
governance structure closer to a hierarchy structure in order to minimize the risks of the 
outside firm not performing as expected.  When transaction costs become higher than the 
cost of internally producing the good, firms will seek the most efficient governance 
mechanism available, which may include internalizing the transaction and not 
exchanging with outside firms (Williamson 1975). 
Opportunism is a unique phenomenon in business since it affects interfirm 
transactions by both its occurrence and its risk of occurrence.  Opportunistic behavior 
occurs through misleading reports, misrepresented work time, quality shirking, and 
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similar actions reported regularly in the newspaper.  These specific actions create costs 
that affect firm financial and operational performance.  But opportunistic behaviors do 
not need to occur in order to create costs for firms.  The mere risk of opportunism can 
cause firms to incur prevention costs (Wathne and Heide 2000).   
Even when the risk of opportunism is high, firms may choose to not act 
opportunistically.  Literature has proposed that long-term orientation (Ganesan 1994), 
relational contracts (Ring and Ven de Ven 1992), pledges and idiosyncratic investments 
(Anderson and Weitz 1992), and explicit written contracts (Ring and Ven de Ven 1992) 
can discourage opportunism.   But whether opportunism occurs or only the potential 
exists, costs are incurred. 
The availability of information affects these transaction costs within the TCT 
framework.  Price alone effectively and efficiently coordinates pure markets.  In an 
environment of perfect information, the price mechanism coordinates exchange with 
minimal transaction cost.  Unfortunately, buyers and sellers do not possess perfect 
information and the resulting information asymmetry increases the cost of transacting 
through the market.  On the surface, one might predict that these increased costs would 
prompt firms to avoid transacting with the market.  In the long run, firms could develop 
internal capabilities to provide many of the inputs required for production.  But in reality, 
firms always rely on some level of outside input either because of technical expertise, 
availability of resources, or economies of scale (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  So in the 
short run, and often in the long run, firms rely on outside sources for inputs.  If firms can 
decrease the comparative transaction costs of using the market, it is economically 
justifiable to continue using market sources for inputs. 
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2.2.1 The Effect of Information Technology on the TCT Framework 
The application of information technology (IT) in supply chain relationships has 
changed the balance between markets and hierarchies by decreasing the cost of 
transacting outside the firm’s boundaries (Clemons and Row 1992; Malone et al. 1987).  
The reduction of external coordination costs has two distinct outcomes.  First, in 
situations where transaction costs would have forced firms to internalize exchange, the 
use of IT decreases the cost of exchange and allows the transaction to occur with external 
suppliers.  Research into the use of IT in the supply chain has shown that firms are using 
IT to reduce their internalized transactions and form more relationships with external 
firms (Brynjolfsson et al. 1994; Hitt 1999).   
Improvements in IT have greatly reduced external coordination costs, thereby 
decreasing transaction costs.  As shown in Figure 2.1, the incorporation of IT into the 
markets and hierarchies discussion has added richness to the TCT framework by helping 
predict movement along the continuum.  The electronic markets hypothesis (EMH) 
recognizes that the use of IT to facilitate interfirm information exchange lowers the costs 
of transacting outside of the boundaries of the firm.  Using IT is expected to decrease the 
cost of search, document processing, and monitoring.  Lower transaction costs are 
hypothesized to encourage firms to interact with the market rather than internalize 
transactions (Malone et al. 1987).  The EMH was followed by the vendors-to-partners 
thesis which recognizes that IT can be used to form close interfirm relationships where 
hierarchy-type benefits could be achieved in external (supply chain) relationships.  Firms 
are predicted to move away from discrete market transactions to form closer relationships 
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which enhance quality, responsiveness, and innovation (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1993; 
Saeed et al. 2005; Subramani 2004). 
These two perspectives are important because although they both support that 
firms will increase their use of outside suppliers, they differ in how firms will use outside 
suppliers.  EMH predicts an increased use of the market.  Conversely, the vendors-to-
partners thesis predicts the use of close relationships that are similar to a vertically 
integrated hierarchy but still outside of the firm boundaries. 
Balancing these perspectives, the “move to the middle” was proposed (Clemons et 
al. 1993; Gurbaxani and Whang 1991).  The “move to the middle” posits that the use of 
IT will create a balance between market and hierarchy benefits in supply chain 
relationships.  This balanced perspective is important since it recognizes the trade-offs 
that must be managed when integrating IT in supply chain relationships.  How IT 
changes the way interfirm business is conducted depends on the resources and needs of 
the participating firms.  Some will take advantage of more accessible markets (EMH) 
while other firms will use IT to seek improved performance through collaboration 
(vendors to partners).  The move to the middle is an important realization that firms will 
use a mix of IT strategies to manage their portfolio of trading partner relationships.    
While the literature is unclear where relationships will fall along the continuum, the use 
of IT to facilitate low cost interfirm transactions is consistent.   
While the use of IT can be seen as a benefit to enable firms to efficiently interact 
with external trading partners, the literature is inconsistent on the appropriate closeness of 
supply chain relationships and how much information should be shared.  So many studies 
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have shown the benefits of close trading partner relationships that one might assume that 
closer is better.  However, additional research has suggested that the trading partner pool 
be treated as a portfolio.  Through a portfolio perspective, close relationship are 
developed with specific trading partners while other trading partners are kept at arms-
length (Lambert et al. 1996a; Lambert et al. 1996b; McCutcheon and Stuart 2000). 
2.2.2 The Effect of Information Exchange on the TCT Framework 
Information exchange is central to the coordination of firms in a supply chain 
context and is instrumental in both markets and hierarchies under the TCT framework.  
From a markets perspective, the exchange of information is central to the efficient 
operation of the price mechanism.  Neoclassical economics assumes that full information 
is available to all market participants at no cost.  This full availability of information to 
all exchange participants in the market allows the price mechanism to efficiently clear the 
market.  Full information is rarely available to all parties in the exchange, but the parties 
can choose to exchange information.  When information is exchanged within supply 
chain relationships, firms can decrease the uncertainty and lower the cost of monitoring 
the relationship. 
TCT recognizes that information is not equally and fully available to all exchange 
participants.  TCT acknowledges information asymmetry and presupposes that 
information is available to the exchange parties – for a price.  The cost of searching, 
gathering, and using information increases the cost of coordinating transactions with the 
market (Williamson 1975; Williamson 1985).  
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Within the TCT framework, information exchange also can decrease transaction 
costs.  Information decreases transaction costs through its effect on uncertainty, 
coordination, and monitoring.  First, the availability of information decreases uncertainty 
by providing additional knowledge to trading partners.  The relationship becomes less 
uncertain when demand information, firm goals and intentions, and production plans are 
known and shared between exchange partners.  When information is shared in advance, 
there is less uncertainty about the intentions of the trading partner if problems do occur 
(Rozenzweig et al. 2003).  Second, information is used to efficiently coordinate 
transactions.  When suppliers know demand forecasts, marketing plans, and point-of-sale 
information, order quantities are expected and properly planned to minimize both 
overstocking and stockouts (Metters 1997).  Information technology has been used 
extensively to facilitate the low-cost exchange of information to support the order 
processing cycle.  Finally, information is used to facilitate monitoring mechanisms to 
protect against opportunistic behavior when specialized assets are at risk.  When 
production schedules, plant capacities, inventory positions, and shipment schedules are 
known across the supply chain, firms have greater visibility into the operations of their 
trading partners (Rozenzweig et al. 2003).  The regular exchange of this information 
allows for the monitoring of key interfirm processes critical to governance mechanisms 
under TCT. 
The downside of close trading partner relationships includes the cost of 
development and the risk of opportunism.  Since the cost of developing a relationship 
cannot be recovered or applied to a new relationship, these costs represent a specific asset 
that is lost if the relationship fails to develop.  The costs of developing close trading 
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partner relationships depend on many factors including the level of integration and 
governance structure (Lambert et al. 1996a).  Complex interactions and specific capital 
investments may require extensive formal agreements to coordinate their resources.  Such 
investments in time and capital are then protected under the terms of the contract.  If the 
anticipated benefits do not materialize, then firms have incurred unnecessary costs.  
Similarly, the transparency that develops when information is shared between firms may 
allow trading partners to act opportunistically by withholding some benefits of the 
relationship (Shapiro and Varian 1998).  In summary, this literature stream suggests that 
rather than pursuing close relationships with trading partners, it is more effective to 
develop close relationships with the right trading partners (Lambert et al. 1996a; Lambert 
et al. 2004). 
Research has linked the exchange of information between firms to the strategic 
issue of supply chain integration.  Using survey data from a sample of global 
manufacturers, Frohlich and Westbrook (2001) tested the relationship between supply 
chain integration strategy and performance.  The study included both the direction of 
integration (customer facing or supplier facing) as well as the degree of integration (no 
integration to extensive integration).  The study found that the greatest performance 
improvements were made by firms with the highest levels of integration with customers 
and suppliers.  Information is central to the integration of firms in the supply chain.  
Frohlich and Westbrook (2001) used four information exchange measurements to capture 
the integrative activities of firms.  The integrative activities used by firms to link with 
their external supply chain participants are each based on information exchange.  This 
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research clarifies the bi-directional role of strategic information exchange in supply chain 
relationships. 
Marketing channels literature also supports the vital role of information exchange 
in supply chain relationships.  Using organization theory and communications theory, 
researchers posit that the communications strategy is a moderator between channel 
conditions and channel outcomes (Mohr and Nevin 1990).  This vital role of 
communications between supply chain participants is empirically tested and validated 
through the operationalization of communication as frequency, direction, modality, and 
content (Rinehart et al. 2004; Vickery et al. 2004). 
2.3 Review of Empirical Literature 
2.3.1 Use of Information in Supply Chains 
Inventory can be a significant cost driver in supply chains.  Having too much 
inventory causes firms to accrue unnecessary carrying costs.  Having too little inventory 
causes firms to accrue unnecessary stockout costs.  Researchers suggest that information 
can be a substitute for inventory (Daugherty and Pittman 1995).  In practice, when 
forecasts, inventory positions, and actual demand are shared with upstream suppliers 
inventory needs can be planned such that goods are produced when needed rather than 
held in inventory in case they are needed. 
Specific research into demand distortion has shown that information can reduce 
the buildup of unneeded inventory.  Demand distortion, also known as the bullwhip 
effect, is a phenomenon whereby upstream supply chain participants experience volatility 
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in demand greater than the actual consumer demand volatility (Lee et al. 1997; Metters 
1997).  When the bullwhip effect occurs, small fluctuations in consumer demand create 
larger fluctuations in replenishment orders upstream in the supply chain.  These 
distortions of demand cause upstream participants to build-up inventory far beyond what 
is required to satisfy consumer demand.  Research into the causes of the bullwhip effect  
suggests that exchanging additional information including inventory status, order 
coordination, and point-of-sale data could reduce the bullwhip effect (Chen et al. 2000; 
Lee et al. 1997). 
Researchers using the beer game simulation, have found that information sharing 
does dampens the bullwhip effect (Croson and Donohue 2006).  In their study, the 
sharing of information allowed upstream suppliers to anticipate downstream inventory 
needs.  In a similar beer game simulation, it was found that the sharing of point-of-sale 
(POS) information upstream in the supply chain dampened the bullwhip effect but the 
results varied depending on the nature of the demand pattern (Steckel et al. 2004).  They 
found that when demand is volatile (S-shaped demand pattern) then the sharing of POS 
information becomes a distraction to the more immediate issue of responding to orders.   
The exchange of information between supply chain participants has benefits 
beyond dampening the bullwhip effect.  Through the modeling of a two-tier supply chain 
with one supplier and multiple retailers, it has been shown that sharing demand 
information can reduce inventory across the supply chain by as much as 12% (Cachon 
and Fisher 2000).  Sharing demand information is shown to improve manufacturer 
forecasting accuracy and decrease safety stock (Raghunathan and Yeh 2001).  This 
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research examines the role of information exchange in improving supply chain 
performance. 
2.3.2 Information Exchange to Support Specific Supply Chain Initiatives 
The exchange of information in the supply chain is found to support strategic 
initiatives.  These initiatives are thought to be strategic in nature because they allow firms 
to create unique competitive advantages by implementing interfirm processes.  Vendor 
managed inventory (VMI) is an interfirm process whereby the supplier is authorized to 
manage inventories of his downstream customers.  Since the VMI supplier has the 
freedom to make re-supply decisions for the retailers, inventories and transportation can 
be synchronized for both echelons (Cetinkaya and Lee 2000).  Similarly, the continuous 
replenishment process (CRP) allows the upstream supplier to control restocking at retail 
locations.   Studying a single manufacturer engaged in CRP with its retailers, it was 
found that stockouts were reduced and inventory turnover was increased (Lee et al. 
1999).  Programs like CRP allow inventory to be coordinated across multiple echelons of 
the supply chain.  Variability in demand is absorbed upstream by keeping safety stock to 
satisfy demand when forecasts understate the actual demand.  Researchers have shown 
that the sharing of demand information improves the upstream manufacturer’s forecast 
accuracy and allows for decreases in safety stock (Raghunathan and Yeh 2001).   
The use of just-in-time (JIT) processes has shown benefits for supply chain 
participants by allowing them to minimize the buildup of inventory throughout the supply 
chain.  Using a survey methodology, researchers found that use of JIT is directly related 
to savings in logistics costs for buyers (Dong et al. 2001).  Similarly combining the use of 
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EDI with a JIT environment has been shown to reduce shipment errors (Srinivasan et al. 
1994).  
Each of these interfirm processes are designed to improve supply chain 
performance by coordinating resources across the supply chain.  Successful coordination 
is dependent on the exchange of accurate and timely information (Angulo et al. 2004). 
2.3.3 Using Interorganizational Systems to Exchange Information 
Interorganizational systems (IOS) have been identified for their boundary 
spanning role in integrating firms in the supply chain (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994).  
These systems take many forms and use various technologies including: EDI, email, 
electronic exchanges, Web-based applications, and extensible mark-up language (XML).  
EDI is often the focus of empirical research since it represents a stable technology that is 
well established in industry.  Empirical literature has addressed EDI as both an 
application of a specific IOS technology and more generally as an enabler of information 
exchange.  Early EDI research focused on the adoption of the technology (Crum et al. 
1998; Crum et al. 1996; Johnson et al. 1992).  Although trade publications predicted that 
EDI technology would be supplanted by the newer technologies, EDI continues to be a 
primary method of exchanging information in industrial supply chains.    Firms already 
possess the necessary knowledge and infrastructure to exchange information using EDI 
and continue to leverage the resource. Trade journals report the continued and growing 
use of EDI (Brockmann 2003; Sliwa 2004).  More recent research has focused on the use 
of EDI to exchange information that supports collaborative supply chain initiatives, and 
may include: VMI, JIT, and CRP.   
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This literature is critical for establishing the key mediating role of IT and 
information exchange in supply chains.  IT is the enabler of information exchange and 
forms an efficient conduit that spans the boundaries of individual firms in the supply 
chain.  The information that is exchanged through the use of IT supports many of the 
innovative processes used to improve supply chain performance. 
2.4 Research Model Development 
Theory and existing literature clearly recognize the critical role of information 
exchange in supply chain relationships.  A gap in the literature is how information 
exchange is operationalized in empirical research.  Information exchange has not been 
studied in a way that will enhance the understanding of how information exchange 
improves performance.   
Research has addressed information exchange from many perspectives.  
Information exchange is often modeled as a binary measure where firms either exchange 
information or do not.  Some studies have recognized that information is not homogenous 
and have measured the existence of multiple types of information.  Such studies include 
whether demand forecast information is exchanged or whether point-of-sale information 
is exchanged but no more specific measures to capture the frequency or extent of the 
exchange.   
Other research has begun to address the multi-dimensional features of information 
and proposed robust measures to capture some of the complexities of information 
exchange but has been limited to data collection from single firms.  This dissertation 
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combines and expands these approaches by identifying and testing objective measures of 
information exchange across multiple firms. 
Early studies of information exchange technology focused on the adoption of IOS 
to coordinate the supply chain.  Appropriate questions at the time where centered around 
whether firms were exchanging information through the use of IOS and if performance 
was effected.  As such, basic binary measures and measures of the percentage of 
relationships that used the technology were appropriate to understand the diffusion of 
technology (Allen et al. 1992; Crum et al. 1998; Crum et al. 1996; Srinivasan et al. 1994; 
Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994).  
As the use of information exchange through technology became evident, research 
expanded to identify characteristics of information exchange.  In a study of the effects of 
information sharing strategies on supplier reliability, the type of information and 
direction of exchange were captured using binary measures (Walton and Marucheck 
1997).  This survey-based research measured information exchange as if the buyer shares 
forecasts, if the buyer shares planned production, if the buyer shares capacity 
information, and if the supplier shares planned production.  The study concludes that 
relationships where buyers share forecast information experience lower supplier 
reliability than relationships where buyers share planned production information with 
suppliers.  Sharing forecast information is less valuable than sharing production plans.  
These results support that what types of information are shared effects the performance 
outcomes.  Additionally, these measures recognize that each firm can exchange 
information such that information flows in both directions across the supply chain.  
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The complexity of information exchange has been captured in some EDI studies 
which allow for the development of an understanding of the heterogeneity of how firms 
use information exchange.  Facets of EDI usage that help measure these differences are 
the volume of exchanges through IOS, the different types of information exchanged 
through IOS (diversity), the number of trading partners connected through the IOS 
(breadth), and the extent to which the interfirm processes are intertwined (depth) 
(Massetti and Zmud 1996).  Although the focus of the study was EDI use, the measures 
captured how the firms were using a specific IOS to manage their portfolio of trading 
partner relationships.  Segregating exchange into multiple components allows researchers 
to address how each facet contributes to firm performance and their interaction can be 
considered.  This dissertation adopts the multi-faceted approach and applies it specifically 
to the measurement of information exchange in supply chain relationships.  
For the purposes of this study, information types are categorized as being either 
transactional or enhanced based on their content.  This distinction between types of 
information that can be exchanged is modeled by Cachon and Fisher (2000).  In their 
study, information exchange is categorized as traditional information sharing and full 
information sharing.  Under their depiction of traditional information sharing, only order 
information was given to the supplier.  Full information sharing is modeled as allowing 
the supplier visibility of the retailer’s inventory levels.  Their use of traditional 
information sharing is consistent with the transactional information identified in this 
dissertation.   
This distinction has also been modeled where traditional information is compared 
with the sharing of additional downstream demand forecasts (Cachon and Lariviere 
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2001).  The inclusion of additional types of non-order information gets to the issue of 
how diverse information is used in the supply chain. 
Transactional information is used to support the order cycle and was described as 
having an electronic data processing orientation by Porter and Millar (1985).  This 
information includes electronically exchanged requisitions, purchase orders, purchase 
order confirmations, invoices, and remittance advice documents.  Exchanging these 
documents electronically reduces the processing costs for firms by eliminating mailing 
costs, eliminating mailing delay, eliminating the need to enter the data manually at the 
receiving site, and reducing data entry errors.   
Information beyond order cycle information can be used to support the 
coordination of interfirm resources (Cachon and Fisher 2000; Cachon and Lariviere 
2001).  In a study of VMI processes, researchers recognized that information including 
forecasts, daily demand, inventory positions, and shipment information can be exchanged 
in order to improve supply chain performance (Angulo et al. 2004).  In this dissertation, 
the additional information that can be used to support interfirm coordination is included 
as enhanced information.  This depiction of enhanced information exchange is inclusive 
of the full information identified in both Cachon and Fisher (2000) and Cachon and 
Lariviere (2001).   
These two types of information exchange are modeled distinctly in research 
depending on the focus of the study.  Exchanging enhanced information between a 
vendor and a retailer can include demand information, shipment information, inventory 
positions, and forecasts to support the decisions in a VMI process (Angulo et al. 2004).  
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The outcomes of these additional information flows include improved cash flow, 
shortened order cycle time, and increased firm competitiveness (Iacovou et al. 1995).   
Conversely, the exchange of transactional information is associated with improving the 
speed and accuracy of the order processing cycle.  The electronic exchange of 
requisitions, purchase orders, and invoices lowers the cost of transacting but has minimal 
impact beyond the order cycle.  
Firms may choose to exchange any combination of the various types of 
information.  Since research has identified that performance outcomes are affected 
differently based on the types of information exchanged, one could expect that various 
combinations of information types will similarly affect performance outcomes (Cachon 
and Fisher 2000).  These two dimensions of information exchange characteristics become 
the foundation for improving the understanding of information exchange in supply chain 
relationships. 
To illustrate the theorized relationship between the exchange of transactional 
information and the exchange of enhanced information in trading partner relationships, 
Figure 2.2 provides a two-by-two matrix.  The four quadrants identify four distinct 
combinations of exchange volume between transactional and enhanced information 
within trading partner relationships.  The mean values of transactional information 
exchange volume and enhanced information exchange volume are identified for each 
technology champion firm.  By comparing the exchange volumes for each trading partner 
relationship with the mean of the technology champion firm, relationships can be 
identified as operating either above or below the mean for each type.  Trading partners 
that are above the firm mean for both transactional and enhanced information exchange 
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are recognized as having closer relationships relative to other trading partners exchanging 
with the technology champion firm. 



















The top-left quadrant, I Transactional Relationships, depicts a condition where the 
frequency of transactional information exchange is high and the frequency of enhanced 
information is low.  In practice, this situation may occur when a commodity item is 
exchanged.   Although the item may be needed often or it is requested by multiple 
business units within the organization, the information exchanged is oriented towards the 
order cycle and little if any additional information is exchanged.  Such may be the case in 
a supply chain relationship for providing office supplies.  The buying firm could create a 
contract that decentralizes the ordering process which allows each operating area to place 
orders with the office products supplier on an as-needed basis.  This would potentially 
create a situation where order cycle information is exchanged at a high frequency.  Once 
 29 
 
the items for the contract are identified and pricing / service expectations are agreed 
upon, minimal additional information would be required to support the relationship.  
Enhanced information such as production schedules, demand forecasts, and logistics 
documents are rarely shared in these commodity relationships because the cost of 
exchanging them is often greater than the value they add in managing basic commodity 
products.  The supplier simply fills the order and delivers it based on a pre-determined 
service-level agreement. 
The top-right quadrant, II Close Relationships, depicts a condition where both 
transactional and enhanced information are exchanged at a high volume.  A high volume 
of transactional information is indicative of many interfirm orders being placed and 
filled.  Trading partner relationships that exist in this quadrant may exchange commodity 
item or production materials that are supplied on a frequent basis.  Materials supplied 
through a just-in-time process could represent items that are ordered on an hourly or daily 
basis for sequencing into the production cycle.  Due to the critical nature of the items, 
additional enhanced information could be exchanged to synchronize production further 
down the supply chain.  The exchange of additional information including demand 
forecasts, actual customer demand, production sequences, and inventory balances can 
enhance the planning process across multiple echelons of the supply chain.   
The bottom-left quadrant, III Arms-length Relationships, depicts a condition 
where both transactional and enhanced information are exchanged at a low volume.  
These trading partner relationships are expected to represent non-critical items that are 
ordered on an infrequent basis.  The items may be low in cost or low in usage which in 
either case would support infrequent ordering.  Low cost items have a minimal effect on 
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carrying costs relative to their ordering costs as modeled in the economic order quantity 
(EOQ) calculation and are often ordered in larger quantities less often.  Similarly, low 
demand items would be ordered infrequently even in a just-in-time environment.   
Commodity or low-criticality items would be less likely to benefit from the exchange of 
enhanced information.  In practice, these items might include maintenance, repair, and 
operations (MRO) supplies which are used to support the functions of the firm.  
The bottom-right quadrant, IV Enhanced Relationships, depicts a condition where 
transactional information is exchanged at a low volume but enhanced information is 
exchanged at a high volume.  The high volume of exchange for enhanced information 
would suggest that the items supplied through these trading partner relationships are 
critical in nature either due to their use in the process or their cost.  The exchanging of 
enhanced information would support enhanced planning and synchronizing across 
interfirm processes.  The combination of high enhanced volume with low transactional 
volume would suggest that the items are either ordered in bulk or not needed very often.  
In practice, these items may be direct materials that are used in production of the firm’s 
product.  Large quantities of critical inputs that are ordered infrequently may include raw 
materials that are ordered by rail car such as flour and sugar.  Small quantities of critical 
inputs may include custom hydraulic equipment for large construction equipment.  In 
either case, large volumes of planning and sequencing information may be exchanged to 
ensure that the input is available when needed, but minimal transactional information is 
exchanged due to the infrequent need to procure the items. 
This matrix provides a grid though which information exchange can be observed 
to better understand how firms use information exchange strategically in their supply 
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chain relationships.  Based on the TCT theoretical lens and the extant literature on the use 
of IT-enabled information exchange, this dissertation will address the research question 
of how information exchange is associated with supply chain performance. 
Chapter three describes the research setting and data that will be used to test 
hypotheses through studies developed in Chapters four and five. 
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Chapter 3: Research Setting and Data 
This dissertation uses a unique dataset extracted from an established, 
electronically-mediated industrial exchange network.  Where most previous studies have 
been limited to survey-based perceived measures of information exchange, simulation of 
information exchange, or analytical modeling of supply chain interaction, this study uses 
objective measures of actual exchanges of information between industrial supply chain 
participants. 
This proprietary database has been made available by one of the largest EDI 
network providers in the industry.  The data include summary volumes at a network, 
technology champion firm, trading partner, and dyadic level on a monthly basis for the 
years 2004 and 2005.  Additional secondary data on firm performance and company 
specific data has been provided from Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. 
Interactions with this EDI network provider helped provided qualitative and 
quantitative information pertaining to this research.  The qualitative information is used 
to help describe the context of the investigation of the research questions.  Conversations 
with employees from the EDI network provider helped give great insight into the nature 
of the relationships between the technology champion firms and their trading partners. 
Although none of the qualitative information was used explicitly, it was used implicitly to 
help structure the research. 
3.1 Use of Electronic Data Interchange Data for Empirical Research 
For the purposes of this study, EDI is defined as a specific type of IOS which 1) 
exists between at least two organizations, 2) transfers data between independent 
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application systems at each firm, 3) uses standardized data formats, and 4) transfers the 
data using telecommunication links (Iacovou et al. 1995; Pfeiffer 1992).  EDI under this 
definition is a computer-based method of formatting and exchanging information that is 
relatively fast, accurate, and low-cost.  
The benefits of technology adoption related to EDI implementation have been 
addressed in logistics and EDI literature.  A survey of warehousing firms found that firms 
using EDI had a strategic impact by providing a greater (average) number of services to 
customers and by more easily accommodating special customer requests (Rogers et al. 
1992).  The use of EDI in an automotive setting resulted in a cost savings of between 
sixty and one hundred dollars per vehicle (Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995). 
While early EDI studies focus on the growth and adoption of the technology, 
more recent research accepts the widespread use of EDI and instead focuses on the best 
use of the technology.  For example, Subramani (2004) looks at how firms can extend 
EDI relationships to develop domain-specific knowledge and business-specific processes 
that create negative externalities for their competitors.   
Researchers in IT, operations management, and logistics have viewed EDI as a 
specific application of IOS.  This perspective contributes to the understanding of the use 
of IT as a tool for the exchange of interfirm information.  Key EDI-based literature, 
methodology, and findings are summarized in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 EDI Literature Review 
Author (s) Methodology Major Findings 
(Subramani 2004) Empirical – Case 
study 
• Suppliers benefit from EDI 
implementation when they use the 
integration to build business process 








• EDI use contributes to cost savings and 
SCM improvements (reduces bullwhip) 




• EDI seen as a source of efficiency rather 
than integration 
• Firms are more accommodating to 
customer EDI than supplier EDI 
(Mukhopadhyay 
and Kekre 2002) 
Empirical – 
Archival data 
• Use of integrated EDI results in more on-
time payments and less credit orders 
• Customer driven EDI implementation 
results in greater benefits for the supplier 
• Supplier process specificity results in 
greater benefits for the supplier 




• Compatibility of trading partners is 






• Sharing of demand information improves 
the manufacturer’s forecast accuracy 
• Information sharing decreases safety 
stock 
• Continuous replenishment programs 
benefit retailer and manufacturer by 





• The use of EDI and firm financial 
performance are positively related 
• Increased inventory is positively related 
to EDI, stable demand, small firm size, 
routine production technology and JIT 
usage 




• Use of IT to accelerate the flow of 
products is more valuable than using IT 
to expand the flow of information 
(Lee et al. 1999) Empirical – Case 
study 
• Retailers who are forced to adopt systems 
can benefit if they reengineer their 
internal processes 
(Crum et al. 1998) Empirical – 
Survey  
• Use of EDI is increasing 
• Customer service and marketing are 
implementation drivers 
• Use of transaction sets is concentrated 
• Stakeholders generally satisfied with EDI 




• EDI can be measured as a multi-
dimensional technology 
• Longer use of EDI and increased 
investment increase the width, depth, and 
range of use 
(Walton and Empirical – • EDI reduces uncertainty due to timeliness 
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Marucheck 1997) Survey and information flow 
• Demand information is negatively related 
to supplier performance 
• Production schedule sharing is positively 
related to supplier performance 
(Crum et al. 1996) Empirical – 
Survey 
• Adopters and non-adopters differ on 
environmental and organizational factors 
• Slow increase in use of new transactions 
• Customer show higher EDI satisfaction 
than carriers (suppliers) 
(Massetti and Zmud 
1996) 
Conceptual • Identified four dimensions of EDI usage: 
volume, diversity, breadth, depth 
(Mukhopadhyay et 
al. 1995) 
Empirical – case 
study 
• Real dollar savings for production are 
attributed to the use of EDI. 
• Savings from inventory carrying, obsolete 





• Supplier’s use of EDI creates positive 
network externalities for himself and 
negative network externalities for its 
competitors 
• Buyer pays a premium for EDI integrated 
supply 





• For small firms, pre-adoption awareness 
of EDI benefits is low 
• External pressure from customers and 
competitors drives adoption of EDI 
• Implementation cost is a barrier for small 
firm adoption of EDI 
(Srinivasan et al. 
1994) 
Empirical – case 
study 






• Asset specificity is positively related to 
the degree of electronic integration 
• Trust is positively related to the degree of 
electronic integration 
• Reciprocal investment is negatively 
related to the degree of electronic 
integration 
(Allen et al. 1992) Empirical – 
Survey 
• Large carriers are expanding EDI usage 
more than small carriers 
• EDI is used more without contracts than 
with contracts 
• Carriers implement EDI to meet customer 
requirements and improve customer 
service 





are better able to accommodate customer 
requests 
• Warehousing firms offering EDI 
technology provide more services to their 
customer than non-EDI firms 




• 56% used firm-specific (custom) formats 
• Meeting customer requirements/customer 
service was greatest benefit of 
implementation 




• EDI usage positively correlated with 
supplier base reductions 
   
3.2 Formatting Standards and Electronic Intermediaries 
EDI provides standard communication formats that allow companies to 
universally exchange data.  An EDI standard is a specific format for translating discrete 
business documents into electronic messages.  Each business document type is defined 
using an EDI standard format.  Purchase orders, invoices, shipping notices, demand data 
and hundreds of other business documents are specifically defined for transfer between 
companies.  Through the use of standardized format, all purchase orders will have the 
same electronic layout.  This standardization allows the purchase order to be created and 
interpreted by all firms using the format standard.  Firms that use the EDI standards can 
more easily exchange information with external firms since the published standards 
specify how the data is interpreted for use between firms. 
There are currently two organizations recognized for developing EDI message 
standards.  The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) develops domestic 
standards and the United Nations (UN) creates international standards. The UN standards 
establish criteria for standard EDI messages for Administration, Commerce, and 
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Transport (EDIFACT) (Massetti and Zmud 1996).  The ANSI X12 and the United 
Nations EDIFACT standards are both used for the formatting of electronic documents 
using EDI (Zuckerman 2004).  Domestically, the ANSI X12 standard for EDI business 
documents is most popular as it is specifically designed to support business transactions 
in North America.  The United Nations EDIFACT standard is used for international EDI 
transactions.  Alternative formatting methods include XML and relation specific 
messaging formats (Zuckerman 2004).  Although low set-up and implementation costs 
are making alternative formatting methods more popular, their lack of standardization 
limits their effectiveness. 
3.2.1 EDI Exchange Networks 
For the purposes of this study, the sponsoring firm will be called the technology 
champion firm which corresponds to other research that identifies the sponsor as the 
relationship initiator (Iacovou et al. 1995; Truman 1998).  Sponsor firms participate in 
the exchange of information and take a leadership role in the development, maintenance, 
and expansion of the IOS with their trading partners.    Their customers and suppliers that 
join the EDI network are identified as participants, adopters or simply trading partners 
(Iacovou et al. 1995).  For the purposes of this study, trading partner will be used to 
describe the firms that were invited to join the network by the technology champion firm. 
3.2.2 Establishing and Maintaining an Electronic Network 
The exchange of EDI documents can be arranged directly between firms or by 
using an EDI service provider as an intermediary.  The service provider offers technical 
support and operates the exchange network.  Many firms seek the services of EDI 
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intermediaries to avoid the development and maintenance costs related to creating 
proprietary communications networks.  Researchers note that EDI implementation costs 
create a technology barrier as EDI champion firms attempted to expand the technology to 
their trading partners (Walton and Marucheck 1997).  Value-added network providers 
(VANs) reduce the technology barrier by becoming electronic post offices for firms that 
do not want to build and maintain their own proprietary EDI communication networks.  
A firm choosing to use an integrator to implement EDI-based transactions with its trading 
partners would select a VAN, which in turn, works with the sponsor’s trading partners to 
form electronic linkages.  Once the trading partner joins the electronic network, the VAN 
serves as a clearing-house for all EDI transactions between the sponsor firm and its 
trading partners.  The VAN is responsible for the high-speed connectivity, security, 
training, and data format support to ensure compliance with various EDI standards.   
EDI is subject to network externalities such that the benefits to sponsors are 
increased as additional firms adopt the technology (Shapiro and Varian 1998).  Growth of 
the EDI network allows sponsors to transact with more trading partners and reduce the 
cost of maintaining alternate parallel systems to transact with non-EDI-capable trading 
partners (Iacovou et al. 1995).   Johnson et. al (1992) aptly note that firms are increasing 
their use of EDI by getting more trading partners to use EDI  and by expanding the types 
of information exchanged using EDI.  
Although adoption of EDI and growth of the EDI network are in the best interest 
of the technology sponsors, many trading partners are reluctant to adopt the technology.  
Technology diffusion research recognizes that smaller firms may be at a disadvantage in 
adopting EDI.  Studies focused on the diffusion of EDI technology recognize that the cost 
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of EDI implementation can deter the adoption of EDI by some firms (Iacovou et al. 
1995).  Three factors have been identified for their effect on EDI adoption for small 
firms: perceived EDI benefits, organizational readiness, and external pressure (Crum and 
Allen 1990; Iacovou et al. 1995).  Perceived EDI benefits are the recognition by a firm’s 
management that implementing EDI provides a relative competitive advantage.  
Organizational readiness refers to the firm’s technical and financial resources that can be 
allocated to EDI implementation.  External pressure refers to influences outside of the 
firm that encourage the adoption of EDI.  These external influences can originate with 
competitors or trading partners.  Through an empirical study of seven companies, 
researchers found that the strongest influence of small firm adoption of EDI was external 
pressure from trading partners (Iacovou et al. 1995).  Firms that were highly dependent 
on their EDI champion trading partners showed the highest likelihood of EDI adoption.  
In the same study, results indicated a positive relationship between perceived benefits and 
adoption but mixed results for the relationship of organizational readiness and EDI 
adoption. 
The pressure from sponsor firms to implement EDI has often been identified as a 
driver of EDI adoption by trading partners.  As one might expect, meeting a customer 
requirement was one of the most important reasons that trucking firms implement EDI 
(Allen et al. 1992; Johnson et al. 1992).  Moreover, firms often couple the use of EDI 
with other strategic initiatives such as the reduction of trading partners and the use of 
longer-term contracts (Allen et al. 1992; Crum and Allen 1990). 
Although trading partners are increasingly migrating to the Internet to support 
EDI transactions, their interactions with the technology champion firms are still captured 
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in this dissertation.  The full-service integrator providing the data for this study supports 
both proprietary communications links as well as communication through existing 
Internet channels using the AS2 specification.  AS2 is a relatively new specification that 
is becoming the standard for securely transporting EDI data through the Internet.  Firms 
have been expanding their use of AS2 as a way to reap the benefits of standardized EDI 
formatting while avoiding the cost of using a proprietary communications network.  
Existing EDI integrators often offer software and hosting services for Internet EDI in 
order to meet customer demands for hybrid solutions.  The technology champion firms in 
this study are exchanging EDI documents through either the proprietary VAN network or 
are using Internet EDI.  Whether a technology champion firms uses the proprietary 
communication network or the Internet to connect with their trading partners is 
immaterial since the data is captured as it is routed to the electronic mailbox.  In other 
words, regardless of the network that transports the EDI information exchange (VAN or 
Internet), the interaction with a technology champion firm and its trading partners is 
captured by examining information sent to and from the technology champion’s EDI 
mailbox. 
3.3 Units of Observation 
This dissertation adopts two distinct units of observation.  The first unit of 
observation is used in Chapter 4 and focuses on the exchange dyad.  Each dyad consists 
of a technology champion firm and one trading partner.  Using this unit of analysis allows 
for the exploration of information exchange within a specific supply chain relationship.  
The second unit of observation is adopted in Chapter 5.  This unit of observation is the 
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technology champion firm. This single firm level unit of observation supports the 
exploration of how a firm’s use of the technology affects its performance. 
Both analyses focus on the inter-firm information exchanged through an EDI-
based trading network.  The information exchange transactions on this trading network 
during a twenty-four month period provide the data for both analyses.  This proprietary 
longitudinal dataset includes observations of the electronic transactions for thirty-nine 
publicly traded technology champion firms and their EDI connected trading partners.  
These thirty-nine focal firms are the EDI technology champions that formed initial 
relationships with the EDI integrator and then enlisted the participation of their trading 
partners.  The EDI integrator coordinates with each of the technology champion firm’s 
trading partners to create a telecommunications link either through a proprietary 
communications network or an alternate public network such as the Internet.   
3.3.1 Firms in the Network 
The technology champion firms in this trading partner network represent a broad 
range of industries.  Based on the two-digit SIC code, the thirty-nine technology 
champion firms are distributed across three echelons of the supply chain (manufacturing, 
wholesale trade, and retail trade).  Of the thirty-nine firms, twenty-three of them are 
manufacturers, eleven are retailers, and five are wholesalers. 
The dataset provided by the EDI integrator includes all EDI transactions for the 
years 2004 and 2005 for the technology champion firms.  Researchers have noted that 
firms can employ multiple methods and technologies to exchange information with their 
trading partners (Vickery et al. 2004).  This being the case, the EDI network which 
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provided the data may not be the primary exchange technology for a particular 
technology champion firm.  In situations where the focal EDI network is not the primary 
exchange technology, changes in the data exchanged through the network may be 
confounded by the use of alternate channels.  Since the services provided by the EDI 
integrator are scalable, technology champion firms use the network in various ways to 
support their business needs.  Some technology champion firms use the network for only 
specific transaction types or relationships.  Other technology champion firms use the 
network as their primary mode of interfirm communications.  The EDI integrator was not 
able to fully assess the champion firm’s use of alternate methods or strategy in using this 
network.  To minimize the effects of including firms where alternate technologies may be 
in place, technology champion firms were eliminated from the study if they did not 
transact order cycle data through the observed network.  An assumption was made that if 
order cycle transactions are not being exchanged on this network then the firm must be 
using at least one other primary channel to transact in the supply chain.  A test was 
conducted to verify that order related data was transacted by the technology champion 
firm during the study period.  If the champion firm did not transact any order cycle 
documents with its trading partners at any time during the study period, they were 
eliminated from study.  The resulting 39 technology champion firms included in this 
study represent 23 manufacturers, 5 wholesalers, and 11 retailers. 
The EDI integrator noted that technology champion firm relationships may vary 
by trading partner.  As such, the potential exists that for an individual trading partner 
relationship, alternate technologies and communications methods may be in place.  If a 
particular technology champion firm-trading partner dyad does not use this network as 
 43 
 
their primary exchange channel, any measures made from observations of this network 
may be biased.  To minimize any potential confounding effects from unobserved 
information exchange, each dyadic relationship was analyzed to ensure that order cycle 
data was transacted by the dyad and that the information exchange was reciprocal.  The 
presence of order cycle information exchange within the dyad provides an indication that 
the observed network at least supports the foundational electronic data processing 
functions of the dyad.  By confirming the reciprocal exchange of information within the 
dyad, there is an increased likelihood that the observations represent a fully functioning 
supply chain relationship where information is shared by both parties.  For the purposes 
of this analysis, all observed trading partner relationships include order cycle transactions 
and a reciprocal sharing of information across the dyad. 
The study period covers twenty-four months, starting in January 2004 and ending 
in December 2005.  Transactional data are collected and transferred to a data warehouse 
by the EDI integrator at the close of each calendar month.  Monthly extracts were made 
from the EDI integrator’s data warehouse using Business Objects.  Each observation in 
the extracted files contains unique technology champion firm-trading partner volumes for 
each transaction type during the period.  A sample of the data is shown in Table 3.2; the 
EDI integrator transaction database provides observations at a summary level for each 
dyadic relationship on the network. 
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1 X S A Jan. 2005 850 23 
2 X S A Feb. 2005 304 30 
3 Y R B Feb. 2005 610 341 
…n       
 
As illustrated in Table 3.2, each observation identifies the technology champion 
firm and its exchange with a specific trading partner during the period.  The identities of 
the technology champion firms are masked throughout the analysis under the terms of the 
non-disclosure agreement with the EDI integrator.  The identities of the trading partner 
firms were not supplied by the network provider.  Each observation then identifies 
whether the technology champion firm received ( R ) the EDI document or sent ( S ) the 
EDI document.  The EDI integrator assigns unique mailbox numbers to each of the 
trading partners to facilitate the routing of EDI messages. The period is the abbreviated 
month and year of the transaction.  The EDI Transaction ID is an alpha numeric value 
that identifies either an ANSI X12 standardized message, an EDIFACT standardized 
message, or a generic value identifying a firm specific custom message.  Examples of 
standard EDI transactions under the ANSI X12 and United Nations EDIFACT message 
types are included in Appendix A. 
The termination study developed in Chapter 4 uses the monthly observations to 
support the analysis of information exchange characteristics and relationship termination.  
For the technology champion firm performance analysis developed in Chapter 5, the 
monthly information exchange data is aggregated to the calendar quarter.  This 
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aggregation allows for the matching of firm quarter information exchange measures to 
the publicly available firm financial data. 
Technology champion firm’s financial and operational measures were obtained 
from Standard and Poor’s Compustat financial database.  Public companies provide 
selected operational and financial information on a quarterly and annual basis.  The 
Compustat data have been extracted and matched for all thirty-nine technology champion 
firms for each of the eight quarterly EDI observation periods. 
3.3.2 Key Constructs 
The three dimensions of transactions outlined by Williamson (1975 and 1985) are 
found within the measures commonly used in the research of information exchange and 
EDI adoption.  Researchers have identified some characteristics of information exchange 
including information frequency, information diversity, and degree of customization 
(Crum et al. 1998; Massetti and Zmud 1996; Srinivasan et al. 1994; Williams et al. 1998).  
These richer measures of information exchange have extended research beyond the 
foundational level of binary measures which only measured if trading partners shared 
information.  Greater interest is now focused on what information is exchanged and how 
the exchange affects supply chain performance (Saeed et al. 2005).  This dissertation 
builds on these empirical measures and extends them to recognize the directional 
properties of information exchange and the diversity of information exchange. 
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Directionality of Information Exchange 
Since this dataset provides a unique view of supply chain information exchange, 
the standard frequency measures of TCT and information exchange research are being 
combined and augmented to recognize not only the number of exchanges each month 
(frequency) but also the direction of the exchange.  Since direction of exchange is 
sensitive to the position of the focal party within the exchange relationship, this study 
will maintain all statements about direction of exchange based on the perspective of the 
technology champion firm.  Information exchange noted as “Send” represents 
information transferred from the technology champion firm to the trading partner.  
Information exchange noted as “Receive” represents information transferred from the 
trading partner firm to the technology champion firm as illustrated in Figure 3.1.   











































Figure 3.1 has been labeled to associate the electronic exchange network with a 
traditional supply chain configuration.  Specifically, the roles of supplier, focal firm and 
customer have been noted to illustrate the flow of information across the network.  The 
roles of participants in the electronic exchange network used in this dissertation are not 
specified since the roles are based on each unique transaction rather than on the specific 
location of a firm within the supply chain.  Potentially, a trading partner may supply raw 
materials to a focal firm and then in a later transaction purchase finished goods from the 
same focal firm, thus the trading partner’s role could change from supplier to customer 
depending on the transaction.  What is unique in the structure of this network is that 
technology champion firms that are retailers predominately interact only with their 
suppliers through the exchange network.  Consumers do not use EDI value added 
networks to transact with retailers.     
Information Type 
The level of detail available in an EDI enabled exchange network allows for the 
categorization of information by type as well as volume.  Each transaction is identified 
with a transaction code to identify the functional process to which the information 
belongs.  The sending firm identifies the transaction type so that the receiving firm knows 
where to route the information and which EDI standard to use when accepting the data 
into their system.   
The standardized formatting and identification of EDI transactions allows the 
transactions to be identified by the type of information they include.  A preliminary 
categorization of the EDI standard transaction types into the two previously defined 
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categories was provided to the EDI network integrator.  Account executives then 
responded individually based on their knowledge of how the transaction types are used 
on the network.  Modifications were made to the categorization and the revised categories 
were returned to the network integrator for review.  The final form of the grouping used 
for all subsequent analysis is included in Appendices B and C.  
The use of standardized transaction types is a key element of EDI networks.  In an 
EDI enabled network, purchase orders are identified with transaction code 850.  The EDI 
ANSI X12 standard for transaction code 850 provides details of field locations and 
formats such that the 850 transactions from any trading partner can easily be incorporated 
into the host firm’s computerized order processing system.  As described in Chapter 2, 
these transaction codes are used in this study to group information exchange documents 
as being either transactional or enhanced. 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Exchange Network 
The EDI exchange network provides a unique view of the electronic information 
exchanges for thirty-nine technology champion firms and their 18,644 trading partner 
relationships.   Over a two-year period, there are 320,788,026 business documents 
exchanged in this network.  Based on the categorization of information exchange 
provided in Chapter 2, these exchanges are representative of both the transactional and 
enhanced types.  As described in Table 3.3, a small percentage of the documents 
exchanged (2%) could not be identified with either category.  This occurs when non-
standard EDI transactions are defined by a technology champion firm or within a specific 
dyad.    EDI participants may use non-standard transaction codes to identify documents 
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that are unique to their trading partner relationships.  Seventy-five percent of the 
transactions are categorized as transactional exchanges.  Twenty-three percent of the 
documents exchanged are categorized as enhanced information exchange.  The remaining 
two percent were not mapped to either primary group and are identified as miscellaneous. 
Table 3.3 Network Descriptive Statistics 
Technology Champion Firms 39
Trading Partner Relationships 18,644
Transactional Information Exchanges 241,014,613
Enhanced Information Exchanges 72,927,949
Miscellaneous Information Exchanges 6,845,464
Unique Document Types 352  
Since the data aggregated monthly by the EDI integrator is oriented to the 
technology champion firms, the number of trading partners on the network will be 
slightly overstated.  This occurs when a technology champion firm is a trading partner of 
another technology champion firm.  When a technology champion firm is a supplier or 
customer of another technology champion firm, they will be included as both a 
technology champion firm and a trading partner.  This “double counting” is not be an 
issue for two reasons.  First, the firm should be treated differently in each observation 
because of the role it plays in the information exchange—either as the technology 
champion or as the trading partner.  Second, the double counting has minimal impact on 
the study outcomes due to the large number of trading partners and the relatively small 
number of technology champion firms. 
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Supply Chain Echelons 
Within the network, technology champion firms represent three distinct echelons 
of the supply chain (manufacturing, wholesale trade, and retail trade).  Using the 
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information exchange matrix introduced in Figure 2.2, the portfolio of trading partner 
relationships can be characterized for each echelon of the supply chain.  By considering 
the types of information exchanged with each trading partner, a descriptive analysis 
provides some understanding of how each echelon uses information exchange to interact 
with their pool of trading partners. 
Trading partner relationships can be categorized using the typology identified in 
Figure 2.2.  By comparing the volume of transactional and enhanced information 
exchange for each trading partner relationship to the mean for the technology champion 
firm, each trading partner relationship can be associated with a quadrant in the 
information exchange matrix.  Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the trading partner 
relationships in the network based on the information exchange quadrants. 
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Each trading partner relationship is associated with a quadrant of the matrix based 
on the mean exchange volume of the technology champion firm in the relationship.  As 
shown in Figure 3.2, eighty percent of the trading partner relationships in the network are 
characterized as arms-length based on their relatively low volumes of transactional and 
enhanced information exchange.  Conversely, seven percent of the trading partner 
relationships in the network are characterized by a high volume of both transactional and 
enhanced information exchange as identified by the III Close Relationships quadrant.  
This distribution of relationships supports research which suggests that firms are showing 
a tendency toward managing their trading partner relationships as a portfolio consisting 
of a wide array of types (Krapfel et al. 1991).   These relationship types are often 
characterized by their closeness and their ability to support strategic initiatives. 
 52 
 
Technology champion firms vary in their use of close and arms-length 
relationships.  From a supply chain echelon perspective, manufacturing firms have the 
lowest percentage of arms-length relationships of any of the three echelons but it still 
represents seventy-five percent of their relationships.  Retail trade firms have the highest 
percentage of arms-length relationship at eighty-two percent.  
Expanding this analysis to consider the performance of trading partner 
relationships operating in each quadrant may provide insight into a relationship between 
information exchange characteristics and relationship performance.  Strategy research has 
recognized survival as a measure of firm performance (Shaver and Flyer 2000).  The 
importance of relationship survival is echoed in marketing literature which recognizes 
that firms are reducing the number of trading partners they exchange with in order to 
develop competitive benefits with selected trading partners (Spekman 1988).    
Additionally, researchers have noted that over time, dissatisfied exchange partners will 
leave the relationship to seek new partners (Hirschman 1970). Subsequently, trading 
partners can benefit by avoiding termination. 
Performance in an electronic exchange network can be observed as exchange 
continued over time.  As illustrated in Table 3.4, trading partner relationships 
characterized by low levels of transactional and enhanced information exchange 
experience the highest termination rates.  Termination here is measured by exchange 
occurring in 2004 but not in 2005.  The unit of observation is limiting since it creates the 
possibility that a trading partner relationship may actually be terminated in 2004 which 
would generate low volumes of information exchange which could potentially assign the 
relationship incorrectly to the III Arms-length quadrant.  Table 3.4 does provide some 
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initial insight into the variation of relationship termination rates across the network.  It 
should be noted that the absence of information exchange through the network is 
assumed to indicate the termination of the business relationship.  The potential to assign 
relationships to incorrect quadrants is addressed in subsequent chapters by using multiple 
methods which evaluate information exchange characteristics and performance on a 
month-to-month and quarter-by-quarter basis.  The use of smaller discrete time period 
observations allows for a closer association of information exchange characteristics and 
the performance outcomes.  
Retailers on average show the highest termination rate with trading partners 
characterized as arms-length (41%) and lowest termination rate with trading partners 
characterized as close relationships (8%).   Manufacturers and wholesalers show similar 
differences between arms-length and close relationships however, wholesalers on average 
have the lowest termination rate with trading partner relationships characterized as 
transactional (3%).  Additional analysis will be conducted in each study to explore how 
the effects of information exchange may vary based on the location of a firm within the 
supply chain.  
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Manufacturer A 4% 47 16% 19 41% 354 0% 12 35% 432
Manufacturer B 0% 6 0% 1 10% 41 0% 4 8% 52
Manufacturer C 0% 4 0% 10 14% 69 33% 3 12% 86
Manufacturer D 0% 3 0% 7 58% 45 0% 4 44% 59
Manufacturer E 0% 11 0% 23 19% 223 4% 49 14% 306
Manufacturer F 0% 1 33% 6 29% 52 0% 2 28% 61
Manufacturer G 7% 15 0% 8 57% 83 33% 3 45% 109
Manufacturer H 4% 23 0% 8 17% 88 7% 14 13% 133
Manufacturer I 23% 22 0% 3 35% 83 33% 18 32% 126
Manufacturer J 0% 4 0% 1 14% 22 0% 3 10% 30
Manufacturer K 100% 14 100% 5 100% 110 100% 5 100% 134
Manufacturer L 22% 28 18% 11 49% 205 20% 5 44% 249
Manufacturer M 11% 18 18% 6 32% 146 57% 7 30% 177
Manufacturer N 20% 5 17% 11 41% 63 0% 6 34% 85
Manufacturer O 0% 1 0% 1 11% 19 25% 4 12% 25
Manufacturer P 0% 7 0% 3 10% 96 0% 6 9% 112
Manufacturer Q 2% 62 2% 96 9% 481 0% 57 7% 696
Manufacturer R 0% 2 0% 6 25% 81 0% 5 22% 94
Manufacturer S 0% 4 0% 9 19% 31 0% 26 8% 70
Manufacturer T 11% 9 0% 1 29% 21 33% 3 24% 34
Manufacturer U 20% 10 13% 15 22% 91 25% 4 21% 120
Manufacturer V 67% 3 0% 0 8% 13 20% 10 12% 26
Manufacturer W 0% 6 0% 1 10% 41 0% 4 8% 52
Mfg Average 12% 13 8% 11 30% 107 10% 11 25% 142
Wholesaler A 0% 23 3% 32 32% 324 0% 9 27% 388
Wholesaler B 2% 41 5% 19 35% 251 29% 14 29% 325
Wholesaler C 10% 21 18% 17 34% 219 18% 11 30% 268
Wholesaler D 0% 24 2% 57 17% 418 2% 55 13% 554
Wholesaler E 3% 64 3% 58 16% 827 4% 53 14% 1,002
Whslr Average 3% 35 4% 37 23% 408 7% 28 19% 507
Retailer A 13% 23 5% 42 23% 397 7% 15 20% 477
Retailer B 0% 63 2% 63 14% 303 5% 41 10% 470
Retailer C 0% 17 0% 14 0% 189 0% 1 0% 221
Retailer D 12% 265 14% 185 48% 2,203 29% 90 42% 2,743
Retailer E 17% 18 11% 18 28% 198 0% 1 26% 235
Retailer F 20% 5 0% 3 46% 99 0% 1 43% 108
Retailer G 43% 7 0% 3 90% 68 40% 5 80% 83
Retailer H 12% 222 7% 492 49% 4,484 9% 316 41% 5,514
Retailer J 11% 9 19% 27 33% 255 8% 12 30% 303
Retailer K 4% 51 3% 31 27% 1,050 1% 113 23% 1,245
Retailer L 4% 12 0% 33 28% 1,368 0% 27 27% 1,440
Rtlr Average 10% 63 8% 83 41% 965 10% 57 35% 1,167
Overall 10% 1,170 7% 1,345 36% 15,111 10% 1,018 31% 18,644




One might assume that the trading partner relationships in the III Arms-length 
quadrant provide sporadic materials on an as-needed basis since they are characterized by 
low levels of transactional exchange, however, there are other trading partner 
relationships with similar low levels of transactional information exchange that 
experience significantly lower levels of termination.  Trading partner relationships in the 
IV Enhanced quadrant are characterized by similar low levels of transactional 
information exchange but experience termination rates below ten percent across any of 
the three echelons.  From an information exchange perspective, the difference for trading 
partner relationships in the IV Enhanced quadrant also includes the exchange of relatively 
high levels of information beyond what is exchanged to support the routine order cycle.  
This dissertation will develop this relationship between termination rates and the 
closeness of trading partner relationships. 
3.5 Research Question 
Theory and extant research recognize the critical role of information exchange in 
supply chains.  The descriptive analysis in this chapter indicates that technology 
champion firms vary in how they use information to interact with their trading partners.  
Firms differ in their use of distinct types of information, volumes of information 
exchange, and their balance between sending and receiving information. 
Theory supports that information exchange affects the performance of both 
relationships and individual firms.  This descriptive analysis supports that based on 
relationship termination, performance varies with information exchange characteristics 
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when relationship performance is defined as survival.  The literature is not clear on what 
characteristics of information exchange affect supply chain performance.   
This study proceeds with Chapter 4 by developing hypotheses and empirically 
testing relationship performance based on relationship termination.  This approach 




Chapter 4: Trading Partner Relationships 
4.1 Introduction 
This part of the dissertation contributes to the literature by providing an empirical 
examination of the effects of information exchange on trading partner relationship 
termination.  Specifically, this study provides a longitudinal examination of trading 
partner relationship termination in an electronically-mediated B2B network.  The 
network includes observations of trading partner relationships across the manufactures, 
wholesalers and retailers. 
The level of analysis of this study is the trading dyad.  Dyadic studies have been 
of great interest to researchers since it is the smallest relational unit in the supply chain 
where interfirm actions can enhance or cripple the supply chain (Anderson et al. 1994; 
Dwyer et al. 1987; Dyer and Singh 1998; Svensson 2004; Whipple et al. 2002).  Research 
into supply chain relationships often takes either a buyer’s or seller’s perspective and 
focuses on the performance of one party.  This dyadic study uses termination as the 
performance measure recognizing that both participants invest in the business 
relationship and neither achieves future relational benefits if the relationship is 
terminated.  By adopting a dyadic level of analysis, this study captures the unique 
characteristics that are often overlooked in a firm-level or industry-level analysis. 
The performance measure of interest in this study is relationship termination.  
Relationship termination is particularly pertinent as a performance measure when the unit 
of analysis is a relational dyad.  Research has recognized that there is value in supply 
chain relationships that endure over time.  Relationships between supply chain 
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participants are noted for creating sustainable competitive advantage because of their 
ability to develop causal ambiguity and time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and 
Cool 1989; Dyer and Singh 1998).  Causal ambiguity develops in relationships due to the 
complex nature of the relationship whereby competitors can observe the relationship but 
still not fully duplicate it such that they can obtain the same competitive results.  From an 
interfirm process orientation, time compression diseconomies recognize that the benefits 
of the relationship are built over time and that if a competitor desires to duplicate the 
relationship they will incur greater costs to develop the relationship quickly.  
Additionally, firms often allocate resources to develop relationships and there is an 
expectation that the initial investment will provide benefits for an extended period of time 
(Jackson 1985).  When firms invest in relationships and those relationships are 
terminated, they return to the market to invest in developing new relationships.  Firm 
survival is often the focus of strategic management research due to the inherent interest 
academically and practically in avoiding termination or exit from a market (Cottrell and 
Nault 2004; Disney et al. 2003).  This study focuses on relationship termination as a 
performance measure and applies it to the analysis of dyadic supply chain relationships.   
There are several contributions of this examination into the use of information 
exchange in supply chains and its impact on relationship termination.  First, this study 
differentiates between the types of information exchanged within B2B industrial supply 
chain relationships.  The effects of transactional information exchange are separated from 
the effects of enhanced information exchange.  Second, objective measures of 
longitudinal information exchange are captured and used for empirical research.  Third, 
the use of two statistical methodologies, provides an improved understanding of how 
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individual firms and their exchange of information is associated with the termination of 
their trading partner relationships.  These results are expanded by associating the 
relational outcomes of firms in different echelons of the supply chain (i.e. manufacturers, 
wholesaler, and retailers) with their use information exchange in their trading partner 
relationships.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 4.2 provides a 
development of hypotheses; section 4.3 develops the research methodology; section 4.4 
provides the model results and hypotheses tests; section 4.5 discusses the contribution 
and limitations; and section 4.6 concludes this portion of the dissertation.   
4.2 Development of Hypotheses 
From TCT, transactional volume is an important part of understanding the 
closeness of a supply chain relationship.  Webster (1992) recognized that interfirm 
transactions were migrating from discrete market transactions toward relational exchange 
where firms experience recurring transactions over time.  As firms move away from 
discrete market transactions, they have the potential to identify new opportunities through 
coordination with their trading partners as they understand each other’s needs more 
through repeated exchanges (Webster 1992).   
In an arms-length market transaction, there is minimal expectation of future 
exchange so the motivation to perform is limited.  Under such conditions, trading 
partners may choose to not fulfill the contract with limited ramifications.  Arms-length 
transactions are characterized by: limited investment of specific assets, minimal 
information exchange, low levels of interdependence, low transaction costs, and minimal 
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investment in governance structures (Dyer and Singh 1998; Williamson 1985).   The 
result is that the buyer experiences minimal costs related to selecting a new supplier for 
subsequent purchases – there is nothing unique about the relationship.  In this situation 
there is no commitment or loyalty to the relationship which allows either party to exit the 
relationship without expression of cause or justification (Hirschman 1970). 
As transactions move from discrete to recurring, the foundations of a relationship 
emerge (Webster 1992).  A distinction between discrete and relational exchange then is 
the repetition of procurement exchanges over time.  As transactions move away from 
discrete market events, there is the potential to develop relational aspects including trust, 
dependence, and loyalty (Hirschman 1970; Morgan and Hunt 1994).  The replacement of 
market transactions with multi-year contracts further creates an environment of lock-in 
whereby switching costs are legally imposed to minimize exit (Shapiro and Varian 1998).    
Moving away from market transactions introduces a longer-term orientation and closer 
relationships (Kalwani and Narayandas 1995). 
As dependence increases, the opportunity for trading partners to act in their own 
best interests increases.  A sole supplier of an input has the opportunity to extract 
additional margin with less chance of repercussions in the short-run.   To ensure against 
such actions, firms may increase monitoring mechanisms or realign their relationships in 
order to minimize risk (Williamson 1975).  At higher levels of transactional volume, 
termination may actually become a greater risk such that a non-linear relationship exists 
between transactional volume and relationship termination. 
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To test the combination of these opposing forces, a non-linear hypothesis is put 
forth as, 
Hypothesis 1:  There is a u-shaped relationship between transactional information 
exchange volume and relationship termination. 
As relationships move beyond a basic transactional focus, firms can create unique 
competitive advantages (Dyer and Singh 1998).  By exchanging information, firms 
identify opportunities to combine complementary resources.  A manufacturer, The 
Campbell Soup Company, formed ties with their retailers beyond the sales-to-purchasing 
interface (Lee et al. 1999).  These additional linkages provided information that 
supported the development of processes whereby Campbell’s could monitor end 
customer demand and provide inventory management services for their retailers.   
Campbell’s enhanced their relationship by embedding interfirm routines that provided 
unique value to the retailer.  The retailer experienced improved performance in the form 
of lower stockouts and higher inventory turnover.  
Research has also recognized that too much information can be detrimental to 
performance.  Through a simulation, researchers allowed for large volumes of point-of-
sale information to flow upstream in the supply chain (Steckel et al. 2004).   Results of 
their study indicate that depending on the demand variability, additional information may 
not aid the planning process but actually diminish performance by distracting upstream 
decision makers.  One might recognize the potential to overload a relationship with 
information when IT is used to mediate the exchange.  The marginal cost of sending 
additional information is low once the fixed costs of formatting the data and establishing 
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the network are incurred.  One might argue that the additional information could be 
ignored but the filtering of information required to identify the pertinent information may 
still diminish performance as previously found.  Receiving an overload of information 
can be detrimental to performance either because the receiver must filter the information 
to identify the pertinent parts or may become frustrated and ignore all the information 
from the sender. 
This diminishing affect of too much information suggests that there is a non-linear 
relationship between the volume of enhanced information exchange and relationship 
performance.  Thus,    
Hypothesis 2:  There is a u-shaped relationship between enhanced information exchange 
volume and relationship termination. 
Enhanced information may be more indicative of a close relationship and, 
therefore, will decrease the likelihood of relationship termination.  Strategy research 
recognizes the value of information exchange beyond the sales-to-purchasing interface 
(Dyer and Singh 1998).  This enhanced information exchange occurs when multiple 
interorganizational functions integrate.  In practice, this occurs when the serial interface 
between the marketing function of the selling firm and the sales function of the buying 
firm is augmented by the creation of parallel exchanges between multiple operational 
areas in each firm.  These multiple functional interfirm interfaces are noted as a source 
innovation such that new products, services, and technologies are developed (Dyer and 
Singh 1998).  The sales-to-purchasing interface is supported by routine order cycle 
document exchanges (requisitions, purchase orders, invoices, etc.).  Exchanges between 
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the functional areas of two firms would be supported through the exchange of additional 
information described in this study as enhanced (demand data, forecasts, inventory levels, 
forecasts, production schedules, etc.). 
Given the additional functionality supported by the exchange of enhanced 
information, one could expect that a single procurement transaction might be the result of 
the multiple exchanges of enhanced information.  A purchase order could be preceded by 
the exchange of demand forecasts, production schedules, and inventory positions which 
improve the quality of the purchase decision.   After ordering, additional information on 
shipment schedules, production sequences, and quality control tests may be provided.  
This post-sale information provides additional value by smoothing the integration of the 
purchased input.  The order cycle information is then preceded and followed by enhanced 
information which improves the quality of the decision and the use of the delivered input. 
Research has recognized that early implementations of IT for information 
exchange in the supply chain were oriented toward transactional efficiency (Narasimhan 
and Kim 2001; Williams et al. 1997).  These studies acknowledge that the use of 
information exchange goes beyond supporting the foundational processes of the support 
activities in the supply chain.  Specifically, IT can be used to affect the primary activities 
of the value creation which include: operations, inbound logistics, outbound logistics, 
marketing, sales, and service functions (Porter 1980).  As firms look to implement just-
in-time (JIT) and other strategic programs with their suppliers, key information is 
exchanged in order to synchronize interfirm processes (Bardi et al. 1994).  Through the 
exchange of enhanced information, firms are able to integrate similar functions, 
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consolidate redundant functions, and eliminate unnecessary activities thus improving 
their performance beyond low cost transactional processing.  Thus,  
Hypothesis 3:  The ratio of enhanced to transactional information exchange volume is 
negatively associated with relationship termination. 
The three proposed hypotheses are summarized in Figure 4.1.  Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2 identify u-shaped relationships between the information exchange 
characteristics and relationship termination.  Hypothesis 3 proposes a negative 
relationship between the ratio of enhanced to transactional information exchange and 
relationship termination. 





















4.3 Research Methodology 
The goal of this study is to explore the relationship between information exchange 
and relationship termination in a business-to-business dyad.  Using the electronically-
mediated trading partner network detailed in Chapter 3, specific measures of information 
exchange are defined to support hypothesis testing to associate dyadic information 
exchange characteristics with relationship termination.  Since previous research has not 
addressed information exchange characteristics and supply chain performance at this 
level of granularity, a multi-level analysis is provided.  First, a logistic regression model 
is developed to support an event history analysis using the information exchange 
characteristics as independent variables and relationship termination as a dichotomous 
dependent variable.  Second, an alternative event history analysis is developed using the 
Cox Proportional Hazards Model.  
4.3.1 Data 
The data provided for this study support multiple levels of analysis.  Analysis of 
trading partner relationship termination is best understood through longitudinal data at 
the dyadic relationship level.  The dataset includes monthly observations of information 
exchange between each of the thirty-nine technology champion firms and their 
electronically-mediated trading partners.  Each dyadic relationship is characterized by its 
information exchange and its potential termination.  Using multiple analysis tools, this 
portion of the dissertation will evaluate trading partner relationship termination at a 
dyadic level.   
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A key aspect of event history analysis is identifying the group of study 
participants that are at risk of the hazard occurring during a given period.  Trading partner 
relationships that are at risk during a given time period are referred to as the “risk set” 
(Allison 1985).  In a supply chain context, trading partner relationships that are 
terminated in January are no longer at risk in February.  At the end of each period in the 
study, the set of study participants is reduced by the number of relationships that 
experience termination.  Event history studies require knowledge of the number of 
participants that are at risk each period and the number of participants that experience the 
hazard (termination) each period.    Event history analysis then attempts to associate 
explanatory variables with the variation in the period-to-period hazard occurrences. 
4.3.2 Measures 
Trading Partner Relationship Termination 
The termination of a trading partner relationship is operationalized through the 
data of an electronically mediated information exchange network.  Within a given period 
of time, the technology champion firm either transacts with the trading partner or they do 
not.  When information ceases to be exchanged, the relationship is considered to be 
terminated.  A binary variable is used to identify whether the relationship has been 
terminated.  For each month, the hazard variable is coded as ‘0’ if information is 
exchanged within the dyad.  When the dyadic relationship ceases to exchange 
information, the hazard variable is coded ‘1’ to recognize the termination of the 
relationship.  Due to the potential seasonality of some trading partner relationships, gaps 
may occur in the month-to-month data.  These gaps would make it appear that a dyadic 
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relationship was terminated and then re-started one or more months later.  In a supply 
chain context, seasonality of some relationships may create instances where a dyad does 
not exchange information for a month or more but the relationship itself is continuing 
with transactions appearing later in the study period.  A supplier of winter coats may not 
receive orders from a specific retailer during the spring months, but as the planning for 
winter sales begins, information will start being exchanged and the relationship will 
continue.  Trading partner relationships are only considered terminated if they stop 
transacting and do not resume transacting in a later month during the study.  The 
termination variable is set to ‘1’ to identify termination of a relationship only if the 
information exchange does not resume during the study period. 
Relationship termination is identified by the absence of transactions in future 
periods.  Since the dataset includes data for twenty-four months, there are no 
relationships identified as terminated in the last month of the study (month 24).  Without 
data for the 25th month, there is no way to ascertain whether relationships continued or 
were terminated.  This situation is common in longitudinal studies where variables are 
based on differences between observation periods.  As a result, there is no variation in the 
dependent variable for the twenty-fourth month of the study and those observations are 
all dropped prior to estimating the model. 
Transactional Information Exchange Volume 
The volume of transactional information exchange is measured as a count variable 
(in millions).  Information is identified as transactional based on the categorization of 
EDI transaction types described in Chapter 2 and specifically listed in Appendix B.  Each 
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EDI transaction type is identified as containing either transactional information or 
enhanced information.   EDI transactions identified as containing transactional 
information are aggregated by the month for each dyad.  In a longitudinal analysis, the 
use of a cumulative measure of transactional volume is critical due the nature of 
termination in a supply chain context.   Practitioners recognize that when a relationship is 
targeted for termination, the exchange of information does not stop immediately but 
instead decreases over time.  This situation occurs either through an intentional 
“weaning” of the trading partner or simply because the invoices and payments from 
recent shipments may require additional time before all outstanding transactions are 
reconciled.  Use of a single month measure of information exchange volume would relate 
the final termination event to the prior month’s potentially miniscule transactional 
exchanges made to reconcile a relationship whose primary exchange potentially ended 
months earlier.   To address this issue, this study uses aggregate exchange volumes from 
the start of the study to the final month prior to relationship termination.  This treatment 
of information exchange as a cumulative measure allows for termination to be explained 
based on a full measure of information exchange characteristics rather than potentially 
minimal end-of-life information exchanges that would not be representative of the true 
characteristics of the relationship. 
To capture the non-linear relationship between transactional information 
exchange and trading partner relationship termination, a squared variable is introduced.  
The study of information and knowledge often recognize an increasing or decreasing 
effect at higher levels of exchange which creates a non-linear relationship.  In such 
studies, the predictor variable causing the non-linear relationship is modeled using both 
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its calculated value and its squared value (Berman et al. 2002; Steckel et al. 2004)   For 
each dyadic monthly observation, the mathematical square of the cumulative 
transactional information volume is calculated. 
Enhanced Information Exchange Volume 
The volume of enhanced information exchange is measured as a count variable (in 
millions) and is analogous to the transactional information exchange measure described 
above.  Based on the categorization of enhanced information described in Chapter 2 and 
listed in Appendix C, EDI transaction types are identified as containing either enhanced 
information or transactional information.   EDI transactions identified as containing 
enhanced information are aggregated by month and trading dyad. 
To capture the non-linear relationship between the exchange of enhanced 
information and trading partner relationship termination, a squared variable is introduced 
as described previously for the transactional exchange volume measure.  For each dyadic 
monthly observation, the mathematical square of the enhanced information volume is 
calculated. 
Transactional to Enhanced Information Exchange Ratio 
To measure the relationship between the exchange of enhanced information and 
transactional information, a simple ratio is calculated.  The ratio addresses the 
comparative effect of enhanced information to transactional information on the 
termination of a trading partner relationship.  As shown in  4.1, the ratio is calculated by 
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dividing the enhanced information exchange volume by the transactional information 
exchange volume for each unique trading dyad and month combination. 
[ ]ijtijt
ijt
where ij represents a technology champion firm-trading partner dyad and t is a specific time period





Control Variable – Firm Dummy 
The data for this analysis includes observations of thirty-nine technology 
champion firms.  To control for the firm specific variation in the dataset, a series of 
dummy variables are included to identify the technology champion firms associated with 
each observation.  The thirty-nine technology champion firms require the inclusion of an 
additional thirty-eight binary variables.  This control variable is required in both the 
Logistic regression and the Cox Proportional Hazards Model to control for firm effects. 
Control Variable – Month 
The data includes monthly observations for each technology champion-trading 
partner dyad with the potential for each dyad to include up to twenty-four monthly 
observations.  A series of dummy variables are included to identify the month of each 
observation and control for variation due to time.  The twenty-four monthly observation 
periods require the use of an additional twenty-three binary month dummy variables.  
This variable is used in the logistic regression to control for the time effects.  Control 
variables for time are not required in the Cox Proportional Hazards Model since the time 
factor is controlled using the DURATION variable. 
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4.3.3 Modeling Event History 
The study of events and their causes have been the source of great interest in 
many academic fields.  The event of interest is often failure in the form of death or 
termination with the studies addressing the potential causes of the event.  In the context 
of supply chain relationships, the hazard encountered is that the trading partner 
relationship is terminated.  This section examines how the hazard (termination of the 
supply chain relationship) is associated with the characteristics of information exchange. 
In studying events, the data include the history of the event occurrence and 
measures of potential explanatory variables.  Typically, these explanatory variables 
change over time creating the need to model the history as a series of longitudinal 
observations.  Using standard regression techniques to model the data often causes 
unnecessary loss of information (Allison 1985). Similarly, loss of information can occur 
if the event of interest does not occur during the study period.  If the relationship does not 
terminate during the study period, the length of the relationship is unknown and could be 
assumed to be the full length of the study, but that too would underestimate its true value 
in that the relationship could continue for years beyond the study.  In event studies, this is 
referred to as censoring.  Censoring is the situation where variables are measured within 
the range of the study period but their values are unknown prior to the study and after the 
study.  Left-censoring refers to the unknown measures of variables prior to the study.  
Right-censoring refers to the unknown values after the study.  Censoring also occurs 
when a participant in the study leaves the study prior to its completion and without 
experiencing the hazard event.  In an electronically mediated trading partner network, 
firms may migrate to new technologies or change network providers which could 
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potentially eliminate them from the study.  Models that allow for censoring of data keep 
the observations of hazard and non-hazard relationships up to the point when the 
participant leaves the study thus minimizing the effects of lost data points. 
In either case, the analysis of event history requires unique treatment to avoid the 
effects of both censored data and time varying explanatory variables.  Each of these 
situations can be addressed using either a logistic regression or a proportional hazard 
model to estimate the likelihood of the event (Allison 1985).  This study presents results 
for hypotheses tests using both methods. 
Both the logistic regression and proportional hazards model estimate the 
likelihood of an event occurring.  This allows for an additional verification of the 
predictive power of the models by holding back a portion of the data for post-hoc 
analysis of the estimated model coefficients.  To facilitate this test, ten percent of the 
observations are not included in the data used to estimate the coefficients.  This randomly 
generated “hold-out” sample will be used for a post-hoc analysis which is presented in 
the discussion of the study results.  
4.3.4 Logistic Regression Modeling 
A logistic regression may be used to specify how the probability of an event 
depends on selected explanatory variables.  First, a logistic regression supports the use of 
a binary dependent variable to identify the event occurrence.  The event of interest in this 
study is the termination of the trading partner relationship.  Second, the model estimates 
the probability of the hazard (termination) occurring during a specific time period given 
the levels of the explanatory variables.  
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Using a discrete-time model, variation in the hazard in each time period is 
allowed by letting each intercept term (α) identify a unique time period.  When using a 
logistic regression, these time period constants are modeled as a set of dummy variables, 
one for each of the observed time periods (Allison 1985).  Additionally, this dataset 
contain observations of multiple trading partner relationships for each firm so a vector of 
firm dummy variables are also included in the model as shown in  4.2. 
( )( )t t t t-1
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bility of termination of a trading partner relationship
 
A maximum likelihood estimation is used to calculate the coefficients.  The 
overall effect is that the data are modeled such that a unique observation is created to 
represent each period that a trading partner relationship is at risk.  For example, trading 
partner relationships that terminated after four months contribute four trading partner-
months of observations.  Trading partner relationships that have not terminated by the 
end of the twenty-four months of the study are considered to be censored.  Censoring in 
this context refers to the fact that the relationships may have terminated after the study 
period but that information is unknown and not within the range of study.  Censored 
trading partner relationships then contribute the maximum twenty-four trading partner-
months. 
For each trading partner-month, the dependent variable is coded ‘1’ if the trading 
partner relationship terminated that month, otherwise it is coded zero.  The information 
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exchange characteristics then serve as explanatory variables and take on their cumulative 
values up through the month prior to termination.  This lagging of the explanatory 
variables is critical in the analysis of electronically mediated information exchange.  
Since the dependent variable (termination) is defined as the absence of any information 
exchange on the network, the month in which the trading partner relationship is absent 
will show zero values for both the transactional and enhanced information exchange 
volumes.  A simple lagging of one month then relates the termination in one month to the 
information exchange characteristics cumulative to the month prior to termination.  For 
example, a trading partner relationship that shows no transactions in October is coded as 
terminated for the month of October and the information exchange characteristics are 
measured as cumulative up to the termination occurrence.  Since the relationship had no 
transactions in October, the transactional and enhanced information exchange volumes 
are cumulative through September.  The variables for the logistic regression analysis are 
summarized in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1  Definition of Logistic Regression Model Variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable 
TERMINATIONit 1 if terminated in that month, 0 otherwise 
Independent Variables 
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUMEijt Cumulative volume of transactional information 
exchange between a trading partner and the 
technology champion firm 
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME2ijt The mathematical square of the cumulative volume of 
transactional information exchange between a trading 
partner and the technology champion firm 
ENHANCED_VOLUMEijt Cumulative volume of enhanced information 
exchange between a trading partner and the 
technology champion firm 
ENHANCED_VOLUME2ijt The mathematical square of the volume of enhanced 
information exchange between a trading partner and 
the technology champion firm 
RATIOij The ratio of cumulative enhanced information 
exchange volume to the cumulative transactional 
information exchange volume between a trading 
partner and the technology champion firm 
MONTHt A series of binary dummy variables to identify the 
month of observation 
FIRMi A series of binary dummy variables to identify the 
technology champion firm 
As noted by Allison (1985), the logistic regression procedure adequately handles 
both the censoring and time-varying explanatory variable issues that can be problematic 
in estimating the probability of a hazard occurring.  Censoring is addressed in this study 
by including trading partner relationship observations for all periods in which their 
termination was at risk.  Variances in the explanatory variables in each period are 
captured by including each trading partner-month combination as a separate observation 
and including a series of dummy variables to identify the month. 
This application of a logistic regression is specifically adapted to account for 
changes in the hazard rate over time.  By including a set of dummy variables for the time 
periods, the intercept is adapted for each discrete time (Allison 1985).  This specification 
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supports the inclusion of time-varying explanatory variables which recognize that the 
probability of a hazard occurring is explained through the cumulative exchange of 
information within a relationship while controlling for the effects of time.  
4.3.5 Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
An alternative method to model event history is the Cox Proportional Hazards 
regression analysis.  This technique addresses the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an 
event and its timing.  The Cox Proportional Hazards Model (hereafter simply called the 
hazards model) has been used in empirical research to study the likelihood of market 
leader dethronement (Ferrier et al. 1999), manufacturing firm survival in the UK (Disney 
et al. 2003), and the likelihood of a customer purchasing additional financial products 
given demographic factors (Thomas et al. 2005). 
In this study, the event of interest is the termination of the trading partner 
relationship.  The hazards model is one of a series of methods to estimate hazard rates but 
is often preferred by researchers because it efficiently estimates the model even in studies 
with large numbers of observations and censored observations (Ferrier et al. 1999; Tuma 
and Hannan 1984).  As discussed previously, observations are considered censored when 
the event of interest occurred either before the study began or after the study period 
ended.  Censoring of observations can be a concern in the study of supply chain 
relationships where many of the trading partner relationships do not experience 
termination during the study period.  The hazards model uses each trading partner-month 
observation since the trading partner relationship was at risk during each month of the 
study regardless of whether they experienced the hazard event or not. 
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Two critical inputs to the hazards model are whether the relationship terminated 
and how long the relationship lasted.  The dependent variable of the model is the 
dichotomous measure of relationship termination described earlier for the logistic 
regression model.  TERMINATION is a binary measure of relationship termination and 
is set to ‘1’ if the relationship terminated during the month.  DURATION is a count of 
the number of months that the relationship existed since the beginning of the study 
period.  The variable DURATION is entered as the time function in the model (α).  The 
remaining explanatory variables are as described previously and are summarized in Table 
4.2. 
Table 4.2  Definition of Cox Proportional Hazards Model Variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable 
TERMINATIONijt 1 if terminated, 0 otherwise 
Time Function Variable 
DURATIONijt Number of months the trading partner relationship has 
existed since the beginning of the study period 
Independent Variables 
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUMEijt Cumulative volume of transactional information 
exchange between a trading partner and the 
technology champion firm 
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME2ijt The mathematical square of the cumulative volume of 
transactional information exchange between a trading 
partner and the technology champion firm 
ENHANCED_VOLUMEijt Cumulative volume of enhanced information 
exchange between a trading partner and the 
technology champion firm 
ENHANCED_VOLUME2ijt The mathematical square of the volume of enhanced 
information exchange between a trading partner and 
the technology champion firm 
RATIOijt The ratio of cumulative enhanced information 
exchange volume to the cumulative transactional 
information exchange volume between a trading 
partner and the technology champion firm 
FIRMi A series of binary dummy variables to identify the 




The only assumption of the Cox model is that the hazard is proportional in that for 
any two individual observations, at any point in time the ratio of their hazard is a 
constant.  Specifically, for any point in time (t), hi(t)/ hj(t) = c where i and j refer to 
distinct trading partners and c is the constant which depends on the explanatory variables 
but not on time.     Proportionality is tested using the scaled Schoenfeld residuals of the 
covariates on functions of time and a visual observation of the plotted residuals.  A non-
zero slope is an indication of a violation of the proportionality assumption (Allison 1985).     
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where i is the technology champion firm, j is the trading partner, and t is the month
 
4.4 Results 
This study seeks to expand the understanding of how relationship termination 
varies according to information exchange practices.  Extending the strategic management 
literature’s use of relationship survival as a key measure of relational performance (Dyer 
and Singh 1998), the information exchange matrix (Figure 2.2) provides a framework to 
associate information exchange practices with trading partner relationship performance in 
the form of relationship termination. 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset used for this analysis includes observations of the information 
exchange transactions for thirty-nine technology champion firms and their electronically-
mediated trading partner relationships.  These data capture EDI-based electronic 
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document exchanges over a twenty-four month period beginning January 2004 and 
ending December 2005.  Descriptive statistics on the overall dataset are included in Table 
4.3. 
Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TERMINATION 255,076 0.0252 0.1567 0 1.00
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME 255,076 0.0107 0.0802 0 10.56
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 255,076 0.0065 0.4903 0 111.54
ENHANCED_VOLUME 255,076 0.0033 0.0315 0 3.16
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 255,076 0.0010 0.0536 0 9.98
ENHANCED-TRANSACTIONAL_RATIO 255,076 12.9318 942.7700 0 283,562.50  
Monthly information exchange within each technology champion–trading partner 
dyad results in a large number of observations on which to test the hypotheses.  These 
237,021 observations are used in both the logistic and Cox Proportional Hazard models.  
The measures of information exchange described in Chapter 2 and developed into 
specific measures for the termination models.  Transactional volume is measured 
cumulatively up to the observation month and varies between zero and eleven million 
document exchanges.  The mean of cumulative transactional volume is approximately 
eleven thousand with a relatively large standard deviation of eighty-three thousand.  This 
indicates that the dyads included in this dataset vary greatly in the amount of 
transactional information exchanged.   
Similarly, the measure of cumulative enhanced information exchange varies 
across the observed dyads.  The cumulative volume of enhanced information exchange 
ranges from zero to approximately three million documents exchanged.  The mean is 
approximately three thousand which is relatively low due to the fact that many dyads 
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have an observed value of zero enhanced documents exchanged indicating that they do 
not exchange information beyond the transactional information.  
The measure of the ratio of enhanced to transactional information exchange is 
affected by the variation in both the cumulative transactional and enhanced measures.   
The mean ratio is approximately thirteen with many dyads reporting a ratio of zero 
resulting from not exchanging any enhanced information documents.  The mean of 
thirteen indicates an average ratio of thirteen enhanced documents to every transactional 
document.  The ratio measure ranges from zero to 283,563 indicating great variation in 
the ratio across the dyads. 
The pairwise correlations provided in Table 4.4 indicate a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between both the transactional volume and enhanced 
volume measures with relationship termination.  In interpreting the relationship, it is 
important to remember that termination is coded as ‘1’ if the relationship is terminated 
and ‘0’ if the relationship is not terminated.   These negative correlations indicate that at 
higher levels of exchange volume, the trading partner relationships are not terminated. 
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ENHANCED VOLUME 0.1854 0.0159 1
0.0000 0.0000
255,076 255,076 255,076
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 0.0522 0.0053 0.8162 1
0.0000 0.0080 0.0000
255,076 255,076 255,076 255,076
ENHANCED-TRANSACTIONAL_RATIO -0.0018 -0.0002 0.0867 0.0346 1
0.7087 0.9268 0.0000 0.0000
255,076 255,076 255,076 255,076 255,076
Statistically significant correlations are highlighted in bold and italics  
As expected, the linear and non-linear (squared) measures show a positive and 
statistically significant correlation for both the transactional and enhanced measures.  
This is not unusual in models that use squared measures for the testing of non-linear 
relationship.  A positive and statistically significant relationship also is identified between 
the ratio measure (ENHANCED-TRANSACTIONAL_RATIO) and both the linear 
enhanced information exchange measure (ENHANCED_INFORMATION_VOLUME) 
and the non-linear enhanced information exchange measure 
(ENHANCED_INFORMATION_VOLUME^2).  
The pairwise correlations provide further support for the distinct nature of the 
transactional and enhanced dimensions of information exchange.  Transactional 
information exchange volume (TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME) and enhanced 
information exchange volume (ENHANCED_VOLUME) are positively and statistically-
significantly correlated at 18%.  This positive relationship suggests that the levels of each 
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dimension move in the same direction.  However, their relatively low level of correlation 
suggests that they can distinctively measure two unique types of information exchange. 
4.4.2 Logistic Regression Results 
Results for the explanatory variables of the logistic regression model are provided 
in Table 4.5.  The model fit is statistically significant based on the Likelihood Ratio (LR) 
Chi-Square test statistic.  Although logistic regression does not have an equivalent to the 
R-squared that is found in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the McFadden pseudo 
R-squared is a provided as an indicator of the explanatory power of the model.  The 
pseudo R-square reported for this model is 10.01%.  Full results including the coefficient 
estimates of the control variables are included in Appendix D. 
The estimated coefficients of the transactional information exchange and 
transactional information exchange squared variables are used to test Hypothesis 1.  A 
negative estimated coefficient for the transactional information exchange volume variable 
(TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME) indicates a decrease in the likelihood of termination 
with each increase in transactional information exchange volume.  A negative coefficient 
for the squared transactional information exchange variable 
(TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2) indicates the non-linear u-shaped relationship that is 
hypothesized.  The negative coefficient for the non-linear term specifies that at higher 
levels of the transactional exchange volume, the likelihood of termination actually 
increases.  The results support Hypothesis 1. 
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Table 4.5 Logistic Regression Results 
TERMINATION Coef.     (Std Err) P>| t | sig Hypotheses Testing
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -6.2809   
(0.7646) 0.000 ** H1: Supported
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 0.6102  
(0.0764) 0.000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME -10.2760  
(2.1512) 0.000 ** H2: Supported
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 3.2679  
(0.8111) 0.000 **
ENHANCED-TRANSACTIONAL_RATIO 4.41E-06  
(0.00002) 0.824 ns H3: Not Supported
                                                                    . . .
. . .




Prob > chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0948
Log Likelihood -27,150.29
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level
 (technology champion dummy variables)
i
ιμ∑




The estimated coefficients of the enhanced information exchange and enhanced 
information exchange squared variables are used to test Hypothesis 2.  As discussed for 
Hypothesis 1, negative estimated coefficient for the linear variable 
(ENHANCED_VOLUME) indicates a decrease in the likelihood of termination with each 
increase in enhanced information exchange volume.  A negative coefficient for the 
squared enhanced information exchange variable (ENHANCED_VOLUME^2) indicates 
the non-linear u-shaped relationship that is hypothesized.  The negative coefficient for the 
non-linear variable specifies that at higher levels of the enhanced information exchange 
volume, the likelihood of termination increases.  The results support Hypothesis 2. 
 84 
 
Coefficient estimates for the ratio measure (ENHANCED-
TRANSACTIONAL_RATIO) are not statistically significant.  Although the estimated 
coefficient is positive, the results do not ensure that the estimate is statistically 
significantly different from zero.  The results do not support Hypothesis 3. 
4.4.3 Logistic Regression Results – Stratified Dataset 
Recognizing that the technology champion firms represent multiple locations in 
the supply chain, an additional analysis is conducted by stratifying the dataset.  Each of 
the technology champion firms are identified as a manufacturing, wholesaling, or 
retailing firm based on their 4-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code.  The 
dataset is stratified using the three groups and additional coefficient estimates are 
calculated based on the grouped observations.  Results are provided in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6 Logistic Regression Results: Stratified by Echelon 
Manufacturer Wholesaler Retailer
TERMINATION Coef.     (Std Err) P>| t | sig
Coef.     
(Std Err) P>| t | sig
Coef.      
(Std Err) P>| t | sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -5.7153  
(2.2169) 0.010 *




TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 6.8415   
(2.3809) 0.004 **
2.1515   
(0.5459) 0.000 **
3.4942   
(0.4076) 0.000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME -6.8762  
(3.7239) 0.065 *
-5.4869   
(4.3961) 0.212 ns
-25.0600   
(5.4516) 0.000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 10.2529   
(12.5015) 0.412 ns
1.6330   
(1.7376) 0.347 ns
15.5237   
(3.1330) 0.000 **
ENHANCED-TRANSACTIONAL_RATIO -2.96E-04  
(0.0005) 0.580 ns
1.72e-05   
(1.44e-05) 0.233 ns
4.14E-05   
(0.0003) 0.885 ns
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
constant -2.0442   
(0.1416) 0.000 **




observations 51,420 43,321 160,335
LR chi2 3,169.00 902.26 3,523.42
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.2468 0.1265 0.0886
Log Likelihood -4,851.56 -3,114.46 -18,130.01
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level
 (technology champion dummy variables)
i
ιμ∑




All three stratified models provide a good statistical fit of the data based on the 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square test statistic.  The McFadden pseudo R-squared 
statistics vary by supply chain echelon.  Manufacturers have the highest R-squared 
estimate of 24.68%, wholesalers have an R-squared of 12.65%, and retailers report a R-
squared of 8.86%.  The statistical results relative to the testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
vary across echelon groups.  Consistent with results for the full dataset, the echelon-based 
coefficient estimates do not show support for Hypothesis 3.  
Coefficient estimates from each of the three echelon groups show support for the 
u-shaped relationship between the exchange volume of transactional information and 
relationship termination.  The negative coefficient estimates for transactional exchange 
volume (TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME) and positive coefficient for the non-linear 
term (TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2) are consistent with the full dataset results 
provided in Table 4.5.   
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Echelon results vary for Hypothesis 2.  The manufacturing echelon does not show 
support for Hypothesis 2.  These results are shown in column 2 of Table 4.6.  The 
coefficient for the enhanced information exchange volume measure 
(ENHANCED_VOLUME) is negative and statistically significant.  This result indicates a 
negative relationship between the volume of enhanced information exchange and 
relationship termination at lower levels of volume, however, the non-linear measure 
(ENHANCED_VOLUME^2) is not statistically significant for manufacturers.  The u-
shaped relationship is not supported by the combined coefficient estimates so Hypothesis 
2 is not supported for the manufacturing echelon. 
Column 3 of Table 4.6 reports the coefficient estimates for dyadic relationships 
that include wholesalers as the technology champion firm.  The coefficient estimates for 
Hypothesis 2 are not statistically significant.  As a result the u-shaped relationship 
hypothesized for the enhanced information exchange volume is not supported in the 
wholesale echelon. 
Column 4 in Table 4.6 reports the coefficient estimates for dyadic relationship 
that include retailers as the technology champion firm.  The coefficient for the enhanced 
information exchange volume (ENHANCED_VOLUME) is negative and statistically 
significant.  The coefficient for the non-linear measure (ENHANCED_VOLUME^2) is 




4.4.4 Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results 
The output of the Cox Proportional Hazards Model are consistent with the results 
of the logistic regression. The estimated coefficients, standard errors, statistical 
significance, and model statistics are presented in Table 4.7.  The model fit is statistically 
significant based on the Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square test statistic.   
Table 4.7 Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results 
TERMINATION Coef.     (Std Err) P>| t | sig Hypotheses Testing
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -9.7162   
(0.8996) 0.000 ** H1: Supported
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 0.9230  
(0.0877) 0.000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME -17.5925  
(2.5864) 0.000 ** H2: Supported
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 5.5218   
(0.9024) 0.000 **
ENHANCED-TRANSACTIONAL_RATIO 8.43E-06  




Prob > chi2 0.0000
Log Likelihood -69,576.74
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level





The estimated coefficients for transactional information exchange volume show 
support for Hypothesis 1.  The negative and statistically significant coefficient for the 
linear transactional information exchange volume measure 
(TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME) combined with the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for the non-linear measure (TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2) support the 
hypothesized u-shaped relationship.  The combination of a negative linear term and a 
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positive non-linear term indicate that at lower levels of transactional information 
exchange, increases in the volume of information exchange is associated with a decrease 
the likelihood of relationship termination.  At higher levels of transactional information 
exchange, the effect of additional transactional information exchange is associated with 
an increased likelihood of relationship termination. 
The coefficient estimates provided by the model support the u-shaped relationship 
specified by Hypothesis 2.  The results show a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for the linear measure of enhanced information exchange 
(ENHANCED_VOLUME) combined with a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for the non-linear measure (ENHANCED_VOLUME^2).  The resulting u-
shaped function supports Hypothesis 2. 
Similar to the results for the logistic regression, the results do not support 
Hypothesis 3.  The coefficient estimate for the ratio measure (ENHANCED-
TRANSATIONAL_RATIO) is not statistically significant.  Full results including the 
coefficient estimates for the control variables are reported in Appendix E. 
4.4.5 Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results – Stratified Dataset 
Consistent with the procedure used to test the logistic regression model, an 
additional analysis provided to test the model using a stratified dataset.  The observations 
are grouped based on the technology champion firm that participated in the observed 
dyad.  The Cox Proportional Hazards Model is then used to analyze the observations 
separately for manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers.  The results of the analysis are 
provided in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8 Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results: Stratified By Echelon 
Manufacturer Wholesaler Retailer
TERMINATION Coef.     (Std Err) P>| t | sig
Coef.     
(Std Err) P>| t | sig
Coef.      
(Std Err) P>| t | sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -7.2445   
(2.2283) 0.001 *
-34.7517   
(5.4582) 0.000 **
-15.0735   
(1.4312) 0.000 **
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 7.2641  
(2.1074) 0.001 *








-51.6863   
(7.4789) 0.000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 16.2170   
(9.8837) 0.101 ns
2.6181   
(1.8341) 0.153 ns
30.8093   
(4.1358) 0.000 **
ENHANCED-TRANSACTIONAL_RATIO -3.77E-04  
(0.000531 0.477 ns
2.33E-05   
(1.49E-05) 0.119 ns
1.67E-04   
(0.0003) 0.603 ns
. . . . . . . . .
observations 51,420 43,321 160,335
LR chi2 2,635.90 328.78 2,548.56
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Log Likelihood -11,757.96 -6,419.96 45,616.05
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level




In all three analyses, the model fit is statistically significant based on the 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square test statistic.   Consistent with the results of the 
logistic regression, stratified logistic regress, and Cox Proportional Hazards Model, the 
stratified analysis shows support for Hypothesis 1 for all three echelons.  Hypothesis 1 
specified a u-shaped association between the volume of transactional information 
exchange and relationship termination.  Similar to the prior test, the stratified Cox 
Proportional Hazards model does not show support for Hypothesis 3.  Hypothesis 3 
specified a positive association between the ratio of enhanced information exchange 
volume to transactional information exchange volume and relationship termination. 
Results for Hypothesis 2 vary between the three supply chain echelons.  For the 
manufacturing and retail echelons, the results mirror the results of the stratified logistic 
regression.  The coefficient for the linear term (ENHANCED_VOLUME) is negative and 
statistically significant and the coefficient for the non-linear term 
(ENHANCED_VOLUME^2) is positive and statistically significant.  The results then 
support the u-shaped relationship posed by Hypothesis 2.    
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Results for the wholesaler group pertaining to the testing of Hypothesis 2 are 
different from the results found using the logistic regression.  Neither of the coefficients 
estimated for the enhanced information exchange volume are statistically significant.  
Hypothesis 2 is not supported in the wholesaler echelon.  Full results for the stratified 
output are provided in Appendix E. 
4.5 Discussion 
Together, these two statistical tests provide consistent support for the association 
of information exchange characteristics and relationship termination in this 
electronically-mediated exchange network.  The additional stratified tests of each model 
provide insight into the possible differences between the effects of information exchange 
at different locations in the supply chain. 
Strong support is shown for Hypothesis 1 at both the full network and echelon 
levels of analysis.  A u-shaped relationship is found associating the volume of 
transactional information exchange and relationship termination.  Dyadic relationships in 
this electronically-mediated network show a negative association between increasing 
levels of transactional exchange volume and relationship termination.  At higher volumes 
of transactional exchange there is a diminishing return reflected by the non-linear or u-
shaped curve.  These results compliment two divergent literature streams.  Researchers 
have noted that moving away from discrete market transactions to recurring relational 
exchanges provides advantages to both buyers and sellers (Kalwani and Narayandas 
1995; Webster 1992).  Since this study uses the exchange volume of order cycle 
information as the measure of transactional exchange volume, high levels of transactional 
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information exchange may be indicative of these recurring relational exchanges.  Trading 
dyads in this study showed a mean level of transactional information exchange volume in 
excess of 11,000 documents and are participating in an electronically-mediated exchange 
network.  This volume and the investment in resources to initiate an EDI relationship 
would suggest that these firms have a long-term orientation that characterizes a move 
away from discrete market exchange.  However, it is interesting that at higher levels of 
transactional information exchange, the likelihood of relationship termination increases.  
TCT would support that firms may internalize transactions when the risk of opportunism 
is high or the economies of scale increase such that internal production becomes an 
efficient alternative (Williamson 1975).  Alternatively, dyads may exit the network when 
transaction volumes become so great that it become economical to create custom IOS 
applications. 
Both models of the full network provided strong support for Hypothesis 2.  The 
volume of enhanced information exchange shows a u-shaped association with 
relationship termination.  In the Campbell’s Soup Company example, exchanging 
additional demand and inventory information allowed them to integrate the replenishment 
process with their retailers (Lee et al. 1999).  The diminishing return on increasing levels 
of enhanced information exchange may be the result of many factors.  From an 
information overload perspective, high levels of enhanced information exchange may 
create noise in the relationship that does not add value or may even increase costs due to 
the resources needed to filter out unnecessary information (Steckel et al. 2004).  An 
alternative explanation for increased relationship termination at higher volumes of 
enhanced information exchange may be related to the dependency and proprietary 
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knowledge that is created when interfirm processes are developed. These embedded 
processes may create a situation of small numbers bargaining where it is difficult for rival 
firms to compete for the buyer’s business (Williamson 1975).  In the Campbell’s Soup 
Company example noted above, retailers could become dependent on the inventory 
management services provided by Campbell’s which may increase their cost of switching 
to a new soup supplier (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  Additionally, Campbell’s gains 
access to proprietary customer information in order to manage the inventory processes 
(Subramani 2004).  This information may not be available to rival firms and creates a 
competitive advantage that may limit the actions of rival firms.  In either case, the 
relationship may suffer from a lack of competition resulting in sub-optimal performance 
and subsequent relationship termination. 
Additional measures may enhance this type of analysis.  Given the variability of 
results at the level of the firm, individual-firm level strategies that are not visible through 
the electronically-mediated network may be confounding the analysis.  The current 
models and measures compare firms based on the levels of all firms.  When firm level 
effects created confounding results in empirical strategic management research, the 
measures were adjusted to focus on their relation to firm characteristics (Woodward 
1965).  This type of analysis would then consider how the characteristics of one trading 
partner relationship vary compared to the norm of how trading partner relationships are 
managed by the technology champion firm.  When firms have standard practices of 
exchange with their trading partners, relationships that deviate significantly from that 
norm are more likely to experience termination.   Trading partner relationships that are 
characterized as being further from the firm level norm in either direction would be 
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expected to be at greater risk.  This additional alternative measure would focus on within 
firm differences to compliment the current analysis. 
This study focuses on the volume and type of information exchanged between 
firms in an electronic network.  Additional measures beyond volume may be included.  
Such measures might include the direction of information flow, the asymmetry of the 
directional flow, and the variability of exchange.  Some of these measures are used to 
develop variables in Chapter 5 where information exchange characteristics are associated 
with a focal firm’s performance.  
4.5.1 Evaluation of the Non-linear Specification 
The statistically significant coefficients for the non-linear terms indicate that at 
some level of volume, the slope begins to flatten and potentially becomes positive.  
Managerially it is important to understand at what volume of information exchange this 
phenomenon occurs.  Calculating the first derivative of the function identifies where the 
slope becomes zero when all other variables are held constant.  For the full model, the 
slope of the transactional information exchange volume becomes zero at 5.15 million 
transactions per month.  This is relatively large considering that the mean value for 
monthly transactional information exchange is 0.01 million.  The slope of the enhanced 
information exchange volume curve becomes zero at 1.57 million transactions which is 
still relatively large given that the mean value for monthly enhanced information 
exchange is 0.003 million.  These relatively large values suggest that although there is a 
diminishing return on increases to exchange volumes, the detrimental effects on 
relationship termination occur at such high levels that very few relationships are affected. 
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The initial hypotheses and models put forth in this study include a non-linear 
relationship for both the transactional and enhance dimensions of information exchange.  
As shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.7, these measures are statistically significant for the testing 
of the full dataset.  Additionally, both models show a good statistical fit of the data.  As 
an alternative specification, the coefficients are estimated and model statistics generated 
using only the linear terms.  Results for the logistic regression are provided in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 Logistic Regression Results for Linear Model 
TERMINATION Coef.     (Std Err) P>| t | sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -5.2227  
(0.6905) 0.000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME -9.9763  
(2.0502) 0.000 **
ENHANCED-TRANSACTIONAL_RATIO 4.58E-06  
(0.00002) 0.818 ns
                                                                    . .
. .




Prob > chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0945
Log Likelihood -27,159.59
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level
.
.
 (technology champion dummy variables)
i
ιμ∑




As shown in Table 4.9, the logistic regression results using a linear model 
provides results consistent with the fully specified model.  Both the transactional 
information exchange volume measure (TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME) and the 
enhanced information exchange volume measure (ENHANCED_VOLUME) provide 
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negative coefficients that are statistically significant.  The coefficient for the ratio of 
enhanced to transactional information exchange volume (ENHANCED-
TRANSACTIONAL_RATIO) is not statistically significant.  The overall model fit is 
statistically significant and provides a pseudo r-square measure that is greater than nine 
percent. 
The Cox Proportional Hazards model is also validated using a linear specification.  
Table 4.10 provides a summary of the coefficient estimates and model fit statistics. 
Table 4.10 Hazards Model Results for Linear Model 
TERMINATION Coef.     (Std Err) P>| t | sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -8.1876  
(0.7762) 0.000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME -27.5571   
(3.0222) 0.000 **
ENHANCED-TRANSACTIONAL_RATIO 0.00002   
(0.00002) 0.309 ns
                                                                    . .
observations 255,076
LR chi2 5,049.95
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Log Likelihood -69,565.37
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level
. (technology champion dummy variables)i ιμ∑
 
As shown in Table 4.11, the hazard model results using a linear model provide 
results consistent with the fully specified model.  Both the transactional information 
exchange volume measure (TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME) and the enhanced 
information exchange volume measure (ENHANCED_VOLUME) provide negative 
coefficients that are statistically significant.  The coefficient for the ratio of enhanced to 
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transactional information exchange volume (ENHANCED-
TRANSACTIONAL_RATIO) is not statistically significant.  The overall model fit is 
statistically significant. 
An additional post-hoc analysis is conducted to test the interaction of 
transactional and enhanced information exchange.  Table 4.11 provides the regression 
results for the logistic model. 




TERMINATION Coef.     (Std Err) P>| t | sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -5.2742  
(0.6569) 0.000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME -17.1490  
(2.5326) 0.000 **










Prob > chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0951
Log Likelihood -27,140.37
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level
 (technology champion dummy variables)
i
ιμ∑




These results identify a positive and statistically significant relationship for the 
interaction variable.  Neither the statistical fit of the model nor the explanatory power of 
the model (pseudo r-square) is improved by the inclusion of the interaction variable.  The 
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statistically significant and positive coefficient suggests that a combined effect of 
transactional and enhanced information exchange is positively associated with 
relationship termination.  Similar results are found when the interaction variable is 
modeled in the Cox Proportional Hazards Model.  This finding may be explained by the 
fact that relationships with high levels of both enhanced and transaction volume may be 
ripe for opportunistic behavior (either by the technology champion firm or its trading 
partner).  This opportunism may result in relationship termination. 
4.5.2 Model Predictive Power 
An additional test of a logistic regression model is how well it predicts (log-odds) 
the outcomes for each observation.  There are two approaches to this verification.  The 
first is a traditional classification table where the estimated coefficients are used to 
predict the already known outcomes.  As shown in Table 4.12, the model accurately 
predicts nearly 99% of the relationships that are not terminated (TERMINATION=0) and 
less than one percent of the relationships that are terminated (TERMINATION=1).  The 
overall predictive accuracy of the model is 97.36%.  Table 4.12 shows that of the 223,752 
observations that were not terminated, the model correctly predicts 223,484 of the 
observations.  The model also correctly predicts eleven of the 5,796 observations that 
ended in termination.  Overall, the model correctly predicts the outcomes for 97.36% of 
the observations.  The model has a higher accuracy in predicting observations that do not 
terminate.  This is not surprising since the coefficients were estimated based on a dataset 
where the hazard occurred for only 3% of the observations.  For comparison, a naïve 
model which uses no explanatory variables can be estimated based on the larger 
proportion of outcomes.  In this case, a naïve model would be based on 97% of the 
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observations not terminating.   Since the naïve model would be correct 97% of the time, 
the logistic model a slightly better overall predictor (97.36%) than the naïve model. 
Table 4.12 Classification Table for Estimation Sample 
TERMINATION Percentage Correct
1 0
1 5,796 11 0.19%
0 223,752 223,484 99.88%
Overall Percentage 97.36%  
An additional test of the logistic model can be made when a large number of 
observations are available.  A holdout sample of the data is reserved for testing the 
predictive ability of the estimated coefficients.  For this study, a post-hoc logistic 
regression estimation was made using a random sample of 90% of the observations.  The 
estimated coefficients were then used to predict the 10% holdout sample.  Table 4.13 
shows resulting predictions based on the coefficients from the 90% sample.  The results 
are generally consistent with the 90% sample.  The accuracy of predicting termination is 
slightly lower and the accuracy for predicting observations that did not terminate is 
slightly higher such that the overall predictive accuracy is 0.09% higher.  
Table 4.13 Classification Table for Holdout Sample 
TERMINATION Percentage Correct
1 0
1 628 1 0.16%
0 24,900 24,882 99.93%
Overall Percentage 97.47%  
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4.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
The hypothesized model tests the effects of volume pertaining to two dimensions 
of information exchange.  Statistically significant negative coefficients are estimated for 
both dimensions which brings forth the question of whether it is better to increase the 
volume of the transactional information exchange or the volume of the enhanced 
information exchange in order to affect the greatest decrease in the likelihood of 
termination.  To address this issue, a sensitivity analysis was conducted based on the 
estimated coefficients and average firm values from the dataset. 
The sensitivity analysis tested an independent change of 10% for each 
information exchange dimension.  At the average, a 10% increase in transactional 
information exchange volume decreases the likelihood of relationship termination by 
0.032%.  A 10% increase in the enhanced information exchange volume decreases the 
likelihood of relationship termination by 0.016%.  The difference in the effect of a 10% 
change in each dimension is in favor of transactional information exchange by a factor of 
two which is consistent with the difference in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients. 
4.5.4 Potential Alternate Hazard Measure 
The occurrence of the hazard event used in this study is the complete termination 
of information exchange.  While this certainly represents the most extreme detrimental 
relational performance, it is possible for a relationship to experience detrimental effects 
without complete termination of information exchange.  In such a case, a technology 
champion firm may continue exchanging information with a trading partner but at such a 
reduced level that for all intents and purposes the relationship is terminated.  As the 
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hazard is currently modeled, this occurrence is not identified.  An alternative 
operationalization of the hazard event would be to identify the relationship as terminated 
if it experiences a significant reduction in information exchange volume. 
This alternate hazard occurrence is modeled and tested using the Cox Proportional 
Hazard Model for a subset of the data.  Results in Table 4.14 are for Retailer E under 
both the original hazard classification of compete termination of information exchange 
and a 90% reduction in information exchange volume.  The results for the complete 
termination hazard are presented on the left side of the table and the results for the 90% 
reduction hazard are presented on the right side of the table. 
Table 4.14 Results of Alternate Hazard Specification 
Complete Termination 90% Reduction in Volume
TERMINATION Coef.     (Std Err) P>| t | sig
Coef.     
(Std Err) P>| t | sig




TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 17.1548  
(7.8796) 0.029 *
15.9609   
(7.7061) 0.038 *




ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 496.3032  
(158.0812) 0.002 *
491.8573   
(155.2014) 0.002 *





LR chi2 38.69 38.86
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Log Likelihood -634.09 -643.57
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level  
Results are consistent for the testing of Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.  The alternative 
specification of the hazard occurrence identified two additional trading partner 
relationships as terminated.  These two relationships were still transacting with the 
technology champion firm but at a significantly reduced volume.   
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This alternative operationalization of the hazard event captures an important 
phenomenon in business that is not recognized in the full termination measure.  It would 
not be unusual for a trading partner to provide a unique product that may require the 
technology champion firm to maintain the relationship even though all other transactions 
have been diverted to alternate relationships.   
4.6 Conclusion 
The study provided in Chapter 4 makes several contributions.  First, this study 
contributes to the supply chain literature by recognizing that all information is not equal.  
This study distinguishes between transactional information exchange and enhanced 
information exchanged as used to support interfirm relationships.  Second, these distinct 
information types are specifically measured and used in an empirical analysis of their role 
in relational performance.  Third, the empirical results give greater insight into the 
potential role of information exchange characteristics in relationship termination. 
These two longitudinal event analyses show consistent support for two of the 
three hypotheses and establish a foundation for further investigation into the role of 
information exchange in supply chain relationships.  Additionally, stratified analyses 
identify echelon level effects that contribute to a realization that the effects of 
information exchange on relationship performance may be conditional to the location of a 
firm within the supply chain.  Chapter 5 builds on theses results and extends the research 
by examining this data in a panel format where information exchange characteristics and 
firm level performance are modeled longitudinally. 
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Chapter 5: Supply Chain Performance 
5.1 Introduction 
Having examined the data on a firm-by-firm basis in Chapter 4, this study focuses 
on the effects of information exchange characteristics on the performance of the 
technology champion firm.  By considering the firm’s performance over time, both 
performance and the characteristics of how the firm manages its portfolio of trading 
partners can be analyzed.   
Recent research has shown that this “portfolio” approach to analyzing supply 
chain partners is very useful because it gives insight into how firms strategically leverage 
their set of trading partners instead of focusing on a specific buyer-supplier relationship.  
Research has recognized that not all supply chain relationships are equal but that the set 
of trading partner relationships is managed similar to an investment portfolio where a 
range of relationship structures coexist (Golicic and Mentzer 2006; Lambert et al. 1996a). 
Although the literature has recognized the benefits of information exchange in 
supply chain relationships, it has failed to explore how a firm’s leveraging of information 
exchange across their portfolio of trading partner relationships is associated with supply 
chain performance.  Additionally, information exchange has often been treated as a uni-
dimensional or binary measure (Croson and Donohue 2006; Whipple et al. 2002).  This 
study addresses this gap in the literature by developing and testing hypotheses related to 




In this chapter, several key hypotheses are developed from transaction cost 
economics theory and applied to the burgeoning literature on supply chain portfolios.  
Section 5.2 presents relative theory and five hypotheses, Section 5.3 explains the research 
methodology, and Section 5.4 provides empirical results which are discussed in Section 
5.5.  Section 5.6 provides a conclusion with potential applications and directions for 
future research.  
5.2 Development of Hypotheses 
Research has recognized that trading partner interactions can vary between 
discrete market-like transactions and closer integrated relationships (Frohlich and 
Westbrook 2001; Webster 1992; Williams 1994).  It is further noted that firms can signal 
their intention to maintain a relationship by firm resources to develop relationships with 
specific trading partners (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Anderson and Narus 1990).  When 
firms invest resources in selected trading partner relationships, this investment often 
cannot be used for other relationships.  This dedication of resources is noted for creating 
an environment where unique benefits accrue to that relationship.  The use of firm assets 
in for relationship-specific investments has been shown to result in alignment of interfirm 
transactions such that business process specificity is created (Subramani 2004).  Business 
process specificity means that participants in the relationship change their internal 
processes in order to coordinate their efforts with the partnering firm. 
In practice, business process specificity takes the form of supply chain 
relationships where interfirm processes are reengineered to meet the needs of a specific 
trading relationship.  At Ford’s Chicago Assembly plant, the supplier that makes the 
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upholstered ceiling panel (headline) for the car interior is now integrated to supply the 
entire headliner assembly.  By supplying the complete assembly, the unit is delivered to 
the Ford assembly plant with all accessories and wiring pre-installed.  Ford no longer 
stocks the headliner accessories for installation at the assembly plant but instead relies on 
their supplier to deliver the headliner assemblies ready for installation (Kerwin 2004).   
From an IT perspective, the value of closeness has grown out of the vendors-to-
partners thesis (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1993).  The vendors to partners thesis suggests 
that the use of IT in supply chains leads to closer buyer-supplier relationships.  Outcomes 
of these closer supplier relationships include improved quality, innovation, 
responsiveness, trust, and information sharing (Rozenzweig et al. 2003).  This strategic 
use of IT in the supply chain has been expanded empirically to associate the operational 
and strategic benefits of IT use for suppliers (Subramani 2004).  
The extant literature on the impact of close versus arms-length supply chain 
relationships on supply chain performance shows mixed results.  As described earlier in 
this dissertation, close relationships are characterized by a significant amount of 
information exchange.  This information exchange allows firms to coordinate their 
activities possibly to improve their supply chain performance.  For example, a supplier 
may be able to share forecast inventory information with their customer so that a 
customer may be able to delay purchasing materials and adopt an ordering policy that 
more closely resembles a “just-in-time” ordering policy.  Just-in-time ordering has been 
shown to increase supply chain performance by increasing inventory turnover.   
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The transaction cost economics literature also describes the fact that close 
relationships are much more prone to opportunism than arms-length relationships 
(Williamson 1975).  This may occur because the customers may not have much leverage 
over an important supplier.  For example, a firm may only source an input product from 
one close supplier.  If that supplier acts opportunistically, it may push some of its 
inventory on the customer or even refuse to fulfill a customer order because there is little 
leverage that would allows the customer to retaliate.  In these two cases, one would 
expect a customer’s supply chain performance to be negatively impacted.  The customer 
would experience a decrease in inventory turnover as a result of excess inventory that is 
being pushed by the supplier.  Inventory turnover would be adversely affected if the 
customer chooses to increase safety stock in order to account for likely under-fulfillment 
or non-fulfillment of its orders.  The development and maintenance of close trading 
partner relationships requires firm resources such that there is additionally a cost of 
having close relationships (Lambert et al. 1996a).  To be an effective use of scarce firm 
resources, the close relationship must provide subsequent benefits to offset the costs 
(McCutcheon and Stuart 2000).  So beyond the potential for opportunism, this cost-
benefit perspective further suggests that developing close relationships with all trading 
partners may not be in the best interest of the firm.  Since there is a lack of consensus in 
the existing literature, two hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 4:  The greater use of close trading partner relationships is positively 
associated with supply chain performance. 
Hypothesis 4 Alternative:  The greater use of close trading partner relationships is 
negatively associated with supply chain performance. 
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From a strategic purchasing perspective, research has focused on the benefits of 
long-term orientation between a firm and its suppliers (Chen et al. 2004).  Benefits accrue 
when a long-tem perspective fosters cooperation, reduces functional conflict, and 
improves decision making (Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Alternatively, a short-term 
relationship focus squanders relationship benefits as firms expend resources to protect 
themselves against opportunistic actions by their supply chain partners (Ghoshal and 
Moran 1996). 
When the portfolio of trading partners is unstable due to the continual termination 
of relationships and introduction of new relationships, resources are expended in setting 
up interfirm processes rather than reaping the benefits of the relationship.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 5:  Greater trading partner churn is negatively associated with supply chain 
performance. 
Firms choose whether to share information with their trading partners.  The ability 
to withhold information from customers and suppliers has been identified as a source of 
power in relationships (Shapiro and Varian 1998).  Conversely, the sharing of 
information has been associated with the development of stronger interfirm relationships 
(Frohlich and Westbrook 2001; Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Research into the development 
of close relationships notes that balanced dyadic information exchange is indicative of 
strong relationships (Lambert et al. 1999).   
In the context of electronically mediated information exchange, the flow of 
information is bi-directional.  Each participant in the network has the opportunity to send 
and receive information.  While transactions sent by one trading partner are always 
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received by another trading partner, there is no assumption that each trading partner sends 
the same volume of information that it receives within the dyad. 
A manufacturer may integrate its customer’s forecasts into its production 
scheduling process but they may not provide their production schedules back to the 
customer for input into the customer’s supply planning processes. 
Prior studies have identified the importance of information visibility in the 
creation of integrated supply chain relationships (Frohlich and Westbrook 2001; 
Rozenzweig et al. 2003).  Although the intensity of trading partner integration has been 
found to be positively related to business performance (Rozenzweig et al. 2003), the 
balance of the integration has not been fully developed and tested empirically.  Similarly, 
the specific exchange of information has been characterized by its width, breadth, and 
range (Williams et al. 1998) but with little attention to the directionality of information 
exchange.   
Prior research has recognized the detrimental effects of imbalance in the exchange 
of information in both the retaining of benefits by one participant (Cachon and Zhang 
2006) and deterring formation of a long-term orientation in the relationship (Corsten and 
Kumar 2005).  Thus, 
Hypothesis 6:  Greater asymmetry of information exchange is negatively associated with 
supply chain performance. 
The concentration of market share is of great interest in the industrial organization 
(IO) literature.  From an IO perspective, the concentration of market share between few 
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market participants is an indication of low competition.  The concentration of information 
exchange is similarly important in a supply chain context.  Although firms may exchange 
information with each of their trading partners, the information exchange need not be 
equally distributed across the portfolio of trading partner relationships.  Supply chain 
relationship literature suggests that performance is enhanced by building into the 
appropriate relationships while keeping others at arms-length (Lambert et al. 1996b).  
The trend of concentrating procurement activities with a smaller supply base has been 
copied from the Japanese and has been identified as a strategic procurement trend starting 
in the 1990s (Trent and Monczka 1998).  This is an adaptation of the keiretsu strategy 
implemented by the Japanese whereby firms work in closely knit groups characterized by 
cooperation, trust, and long-term relationships (Hanna and Newman 2007).  Focusing 
scarce firm information resources with fewer trading partner is a strategic effort to ensure 
that the information is used in the best interests of the firm.  Thus,   
Hypothesis 7:  Greater information exchange concentration is positively associated with 
supply chain performance. 
5.3 Research Methodology 
 
5.3.1 Data 
This study empirically assesses the impact of trading partner relationships on firm 
performance using longitudinal data.  Data for the characteristics of the trading partner 
relationships are gathered from the electronically mediated trading network described in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  Additional firm performance data is gathered from Standard and 
Poor’s Compustat database.  Compustat reports firm and industry level performance 
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measures based on publicly traded firms (firms filing a 10K with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission) and is often used in empirical research (Gaur et al. 2005; 
Silverman 1999).  
The unit of analysis for this study is the technology champion firm performance 
during each calendar quarter.  Quarterly data was selected as the time period for the study 
because it is the smallest discrete period provided by Compustat.  The information 
exchange network provides data on a monthly basis for each technology champion firm.  
In order to match the time periods, the monthly electronic network data is aggregated to 
the calendar quarter for years 2004 and 2005. 
Additionally, during the study period some of the firms completely migrated to 
other networks or technologies resulting in missing observations.  Missing observations 
were investigated with the network provider to identify their cause.  This resulted in 
exiting firms being included in the study up to the time they began migrating off the 
network.  The net effect is that not all firms include observations for all eight time 
periods. 
Financial data were collected from Standard and Poor’s Compustat database for 
the corresponding time periods (quarterly for 2004 and 2005).  Additional quarterly sales 
measures were collected for the two years prior to the study.  The additional sales data 
were required for calculating the sales forecast which is incorporated into a control 





Inventory turnover is a standard measure of asset productivity.  It is calculated as 
a ratio of a firm’s cost of goods sold to the firm’s inventory value during a specific 
period.  Inventory turnover is often used as a performance measure for empirical supply 
chain research (Droge and Germain 2000; Kalwani and Narayandas 1995; Lee et al. 
1999; Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995; Rajagopalan and Malhotra 2001). 
This study follows similar studies of firm performance by recognizing that the 
measuring of intermediate variables which are directly related to the process of interest is 
more appropriate than focusing on final performance measures such as return on 
investment (Lee et al. 1999).  Inventory turnover has been the firm performance measure 
of choice in studying the business value of EDI (Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995).  They found 
that EDI enabled coordination between a manufacturer and its suppliers resulting in a 
improvement of inventory turnover.  Similarly, inventory turnover has been used as an 
intermediate performance indicator when considering the firm level effects of 
eCommerce capabilities (Zhu and Kraemer 2002).  They found a positive relationship 
between a firms eCommerce capabilities and inventory turnover. 
Inventory levels as a performance measure have also been used in their raw form 
as just the value of inventory for a period (Droge and Germain 2000).  This study follows 
the previously cited studies which use the inventory turnover ratio since it reflects the 
efficiency by which the asset is used (Stevenson 2007).  The inventory turnover ratio 
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indicates how many times per period the inventory is sold, where higher ratios reflect a 
better use of the asset. 









Notably, the inventory turnover ratio is often calculated using an average measure 
of inventory in the denominator.  Use of an absolute inventory value can be problematic 
since period end inventory values can be manipulated by expediting shipments or 
delaying receipts.  This is most often an issue when yearend inventory is used to calculate 
the inventory efficiency for the firm.  In this study, quarterly values of inventory are 
provided from the Compustat database to calculate inventory turnover ratios.  Since 
quarterly values provide a more frequent assessment of inventory value they are assumed 
to produce adequate estimates of firm inventory efficiency.  
Relationship Closeness 
Research has recognized the movement of firms away from discrete market 
(arms-length) relationships toward what has been termed the extended enterprise where 
firms form ties with firms beyond their own firm boundaries (Bowersox and Daugherty 
1987).  This model has been tested empirically through an in-depth analysis of firms 
extending their connections beyond the boundaries of their firm (Edwards et al. 2001). 
This study found firms generally pursued one of two strategies with their supply chain 
relationships; traditional cost-based (arms-length) relationships or collaborative 
approaches.  A key characteristic of the relationships in the study was the amount of 
information shared.  Traditional relationships were noted for limited knowledge transfer 
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and inferior comparative performance.  Leading companies in the study took the 
collaborative approach where the exchanging of information was a standard practice. 
Using perceived measures of information exchange, the strategic and operational 
effects have been captured (Fawcett et al. 1996).  The use of information exchange was 
found to contribute to both operational flexibility and strategic planning.  This research 
was expanded by specifically looking at logistics related processes whereby information 
connectivity was found to occupy a mediating role between a firm’s logistics program 
and performance outcomes (Closs et al. 2005). 
For the purposes of this study, a firm’s use of close trading partner relationships is 
measured based on their information exchange characteristics.  The information exchange 
matrix presented in Figure 2.2 characterizes the distinction between trading partner 
relationships based on their transactional information exchange volume and their 
enhanced information exchange volume.    From an information exchange matrix 
perspective, close trading partner relationships would be found in the II Close 
Relationships quadrant.   
The proportion of a technology champion firm’s trading partner relationships that 
are assigned to the II Close Relationships quadrant is used in this study as a measure of 
the firm’s use of close trading partner relationships.  This operationalization of trading 
partner relationship closeness is an extension of the perceived measures used in survey 
research (Edwards et al. 2001; Fawcett et al. 1996). 
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Trading Partner Churn Rate 
The churn rate is a measure of the instability in the trading partner portfolio.   
Similar to measures of termination in Chapter 4, the trading partner churn rate is the ratio 
of terminated relationships to the total number of relationships with the champion firm 








Symmetry of Information Exchange 
Information exchange in an electronically-mediated network can be measured 
directionally.  From the perspective of the technology champion firm, each transaction is 
either sent by the champion firm or received by them.  EDI transactions exchanged on the 
network are coded with the sending and receiving participant’s mailboxes.   The 
technology champion firm’s strategy of withholding and receiving information is 
characterized by the balance between the volume of information transactions received 
and the volume of information transactions sent during the period.  
As shown in Equation 5.3, the resulting ratio is a measure of the balance between 
information received from trading partners and information sent to the trading partners.   
By taking the absolute difference of the received and sent volume divided by the total 
volume, a measure of balance or symmetry is provided.  As the value approaches “1” 
there is greater imbalance or asymmetry.  When the value approaches zero, there is 
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balance between the sending and receiving of information by the technology champion 




Receive_Volume - Send_Volume  
ASYMMETRY =                              [5.3]
Total_Volume
 
  Information Exchange Concentration 
Concentration measures are used in industrial organization and strategy literature 
to measure how market share is allocated between market participants (Collins and 
Preston 1969; MacDonald 1987).  In these studies, the measure identified if a market is 
highly concentrated or highly fragmented.  A fragmented market has many participating 
firms with relatively equal shares of the market.  In a fragmented market, competition is 
expected to be higher.  Conversely in a concentrated market, there is relatively little 
competition as the market is dominated by fewer large participants (Waldman and Jensen 
1998).  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measures the market concentration by 
taking into account both the number of firms participating in the market and the 
inequality of the market shares.   HHI uses the sum of the squares of the market share of 
all firms in the market or industry.  The resulting value is multiplied by 10,000.  Using 
this approach, HHI approaches zero for perfectly competitive markets and equals 10,000 
for a monopoly. 
As a descriptive measure, researchers have captured concentration as it applies to 
the trading partner portfolio (Hewett et al. 2002).  Through use of a survey instrument 
they found that industrial buyers in their sample on average purchase 58.9 percent of their 
goods from their most important seller.  Similarly, the sellers in their sample indicated 
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that on average 45.1 percent of their sales were with one buyer. Although this measure of 
concentration is not as precise as the HHI, it provides a strong indication that exchange 
for these companies is highly concentrated.  Although the role of trading partner 
concentration in a firm’s strategy is observed, it has not been objectively measured or 
developed as an explanatory measure in supply chain performance. 
Concentration of procurement with suppliers is addressed in marketing literature 
as it relates to dependency (Krapfel et al. 1991).  As the percentage of exchange with a 
trading partner increases, it becomes more difficult to divert the business to alternate 
trading partners (Heide and John 1988). 
Applying the HHI approach to the information exchange practices of the 
technology champion firm provides a measure of whether information is being 
exchanged equally with all trading partners in the firm’s portfolio (fragmented) or if 
information exchange is focused (concentrated) on relatively few trading partners.  Using 
the same convention as the HHI measure, concentration is a function of the sum of the 
squares of each trading partner’s information share for the period.  Multiplying the 
resulting sum by 10,000 conforms to the industrial organization literature where values 
that approach zero represent fragmentation and values approaching 10,000 represent high 
concentration. 
2





Studies have recognized that larger firms experience economies of scale in their 
inventory turnover such that there is a positive correlation between inventory turnover 
and firm size (Gaur et al. 2005).  Controlling for firm size can minimize the confounding 
effects.  Firm size may be measured as total assets, sales, and the number of employees 
which have been found to be highly correlated (Zhu and Kraemer 2002).  For the 
purposes of the study, firm total assets reported quarterly in the Compustat database is 
used as the measure of firm size. 
Sales Surprise 
Unexpected demand events affect a firm’s inventory turnover.  If sales are higher 
than anticipated, then average inventories will be driven down during the period resulting 
in a higher reported inventory turnover ratio.  Similarly, if sales are lower than 
anticipated, inventories will be inflated during the period resulting in a lower reported 
inventory turnover.   
The effects of sales surprise were specifically addressed and found to be 
significantly positively related to inventory turnover performance (Gaur et al. 2005).  
Sales surprise is a function of the difference between management’s forecast of sales and 
the actual sales experienced during a specific time period.  Unfortunately, a firm’s sales 
forecast is not publicly reported requiring that an appropriate forecast be used as a proxy.  
This study uses a moving average forecast to estimate the sales for each quarter.  A full 
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treatment of the development and selection of this forecast method is included in 
Appendix F.    
Sales surprise has been measured as the simple ratio of actual observed sales for a 
period to the sales forecast for the period (Gaur et al. 2005).  The resulting measure 
indicates the relationship between forecast and actual sales.  Sales surprise values 
between zero and one indicate that the actual sales were greater than the forecast.  In this 
case, the forecast overestimated actual sales for the period.  Sales surprise values of one 
indicate that the forecast exactly estimated sales and values greater than one indicate that 
the forecast underestimated actual sales for the period.   





SURPRISE = Actual_Sales  
Seasonality 
Depending on the focal industry, inventory turnover can be affected by the 
seasonality of sales.  In retail trade, firms may intentionally build up inventory in 
anticipation of large selling seasons such as the winter holidays.  For the purposes of this 
study, dummy variables are used to control for quarterly seasonality.  Three binary 
dummy variables are used to identify first, second, and third quarter.  The fourth quarter 
is used as the base period. 
Prior Period Inventory Turnover 
One of the greatest drivers of inventory turnover during a given period is the 
inventory turnover in the prior period.  This firm level effect is controlled by including 
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the prior period inventory turnover as a control variable in the regression.  Use of this 
lagged variable controls for any unobserved heterogeneity. 
5.3.3 Panel Data Analysis 
Panel data analysis supports the study of longitudinal datasets where multiple 
observations are included for each participant.  Panels are made up of cross-sections of 
firm level observations that are then repeated for multiple time periods which allows for 
the analysis of firm actions over time.  This combination of cross-section and time series 
allows for analysis not supported by standard regression tools due to a violation of the 
assumption of independence of observations.  A panel data set allows for this by 
controlling time-specific and firm-specific effects and has been used in prior longitudinal 
studies where multiple observations of a firms occur within each cross-section (Hitt 1999; 
Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995).  This study uses subscripts to account for time-specific (t=1, 
…., 8) and company-specific (i=1,…, 39) effects.  Since both the dependent and 
independent variables are focused on the operational level of the firm, all explanatory 
variables are measured in the same quarter with no lagging.   
it it 2 it
n
3 it 4 it i it
i=0
log(ASYMMETRY )+ log(CONCENTRATION )+ ControlVariables





For simplicity, the model is first estimated using an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression.  The OLS assumptions of homoskedasticity and independence of observation 
are often violated in panel datasets.  To test the assumption of homoskedasticity, the 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Lagrange multiplier test is used (Breusch and Pagan 
1979; Greene 2002).  This test provides a test statistic of 29.63 based on a χ2 distribution.  
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The null hypothesis of constant variance is rejected at a statistical significance level of 
less than one percent.   
An additional test for the existence of serial correlation in the residuals is also 
recommended.  The Wooldridge procedure provides a test of the null hypothesis that no 
serial correlation exists (Wooldridge 2002).  Results of the Wooldridge procedure 
showed the presence of serial correlation based on an F-statistic of F=110.351 which is 
statistically significant at the less than one percent level.  Greene (2003) recommends the 
use of a generalized least squares (GLS) procedure to estimate the model when 
preliminary tests indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
The GLS specification allows for the estimation of both random and fixed-effect 
estimators.  In the fixed effects model (fe), the constant term is adjusted for the panel and 
time period.  The random effects model (re) assumes that the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity is independent of the regressors.  The random effects model is preferred 
due to its avoidance of large numbers of dummy variables which decreases the degrees of 
freedom allowed for statistical testing.  Although preferred for efficiency, the random 
effects model produces inconsistent coefficient estimates when the panel and time effects 
are in fact correlated with the regressors.  The Hausman specification test compares the 
fixed and random effects under the null hypothesis that random effects are uncorrelated 
with other regressors (Greene 2002; Hausman 1978).  If the individual effects are 
correlated, a random effects model will produce biased estimates.  
The Hausman test provides a Wald test statistic (W) based on a χ2 distribution 
with K-1 degrees of freedom.  For this panel dataset, the result of the Hausman test is 
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W=50.68 which is significant at the one percent level.  The null hypothesis that the 
difference in the coefficients is not systematic is rejected supporting the use of a fixed 
effects specification. 
5.3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 summarizes explanatory variables for firms in the sample.  The 
variables are presented in their unlogged form to simplify the interpretation of the 
descriptive statistics.  As noted in Chapter 4, explanatory variables have been modeled 
using a natural log translation to adjust for kurtosis and skewness.  In this sample, all four 
explanatory variables (CLOSE, ASYMMETRY, CONCENTRATION, and 
CHURN_RATE) were not within an acceptable range of kurtosis and skewness in order 
to be considered as normally distributed.  Natural log transformations were used to 
correct for this prior to modeling the variables through regression. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Unlogged Variables 
N Mean S.D. Min Max
INVENTORY_TURNOVER 191 8.3588 14.4869 1.2630 94.5590
CLOSE 191 0.4662 0.2209 0.0192 0.8724
CHURN 191 0.0744 0.0716 0.0072 0.5862
ASYMMETRY 191 0.3362 0.2129 0.0032 0.9291
CONCENTRATION 191 1,100.98 1,093.15 51.36 6,440.91
Control Variables
FIRMSIZE 191 18,303.71 15,501.83 1,003.35 63,076.00
SALES_SURPRISE 191 1.0577 0.1551 0.6936 1.7553
INVX_LAG 191 1.7008 0.7263 0.2270 4.5492
SEASON1DUMMY 191 0.1780 0.3835 0.0000 1.0000
SEASON2DUMMY 191 0.3298 0.4714 0.0000 1.0000
SEASON3DUMMY 191 0.3141 0.4654 0.0000 1.0000  
The firms in the study vary in inventory turnover between 1.26 and 94.56.  This is 
a result of the wide range of industries included in the sample, particularly within the 
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manufacturing segment.  Manufacturing firms represent both the highest and lowest 
inventory turnover measures.  The two high-technology manufacturing firms in the 
sample have inventory turnover greater than 60 for each of the reported quarters.  
Pharmaceutical manufacturers represent the lowest reported inventory turnover of less 
than two for all reported quarters.  
Wholesale and retail trade firms in the sample show clustered results with respect 
to inventory turnover.  The average inventory turnover for wholesale trade and retail 
trade firms was 6.43 and 4.56 respectively.  Both are clearly below the overall mean of 
8.3588 which is being inflated by the higher average inventory turnover of manufacturing 
firms. 
The percentage of trading partner relationships characterized by high levels of 
both transactional and extended information exchange ranges from zero to eighty-nine 
percent.  The measure is the proportion of trading partner relationships identified as close 
so a mean of 0.4662 and standard deviation of 0.2209 indicate that the firms are spread 
across the range of values between zero and 0.8724.  A firm with a CLOSE measure of 
0.45 has close relationships with forty-five percent of its trading partners. 
The turnover of trading partner relationships is measured by the CHURN variable.  
The average trading partner turnover ratio is seven percent and ranges from zero to fifty-
nine percent.  
The ASYMMETRY measure captures the scaled difference between the volume 
of information that a technology champion firm sends to the volume of information that 
they receive.  This value could range from zero to 1.00.  As the measure approaches zero 
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it indicates a balanced approach to the sending and receiving of information.  As the 
measure approaches 1.00, firms are showing a greater imbalance or asymmetry between 
the volume of information sent and volume of information received.  The mean of this 
sample is 0.3362 which reflects that overall, the technology champion firms trend toward 
a balance of sending and receiving volumes.  Technology champion firms in the sample 
reported values ranging from zero (a completely balanced strategy) to 0.89 which 
indicates a high asymmetry of information exchange.  These descriptive statistics support 
the notion that technology champion firms vary in the level of asymmetry between the 
volume of information they send and receive. 
The CONCENTRATION of information exchange within the trading partner 
portfolio is an additional measure of how the firm leverages its use of information.  The 
values can range from zero to 10,000 with higher values identifying strategies where 
information exchange is concentrated with few trading partners rather than shared equally 
across the trading partner portfolio.  The mean value for information exchange 
concentration is 1,100 which is closer to a fragmented strategy; however, the actual 
values range from 51 (highly fragmented) to 6,440 (concentrated). 
The potential number of observations in the panel dataset is 312 (39 technology 
champion firms for 8 quarters).  The actually number of observations in the final model is 
191 which is a result of missing values.  Specifically, 40 observations are lost due to the 
lagging of inventory turnover since the inventory turnover for the period prior to quarter 
1 is not included.  Nine observations are lost due to the dependent variables 
(INVENTORY_TURNOVER) not being available from the Compustat database.  





participating in the EDI network during select quarters.  An additional 49 observations 
are dropped due to the log transformation of explanatory variables with values of zero.  
The remaining 191 observations are included for the calculation of descriptive statistics, 
pairwise correlations, and the coefficient estimates. 
The correlation matrix for the explanatory variables provided in Table 5.2 
identifies three statistically significant relationships among the explanatory variables.  
The use of close trading partner relationships (CLOSE) shows a positive and statistically 
significant correlation with information exchange asymmetry (ASYMMETRY).  This 
correlation is at the fourteen percent level.  Information exchange concentration 
(CONCENTRATION) is positively correlated with the churn rate (CHURNRATE) at a 
twenty-five percent level.  Information exchange concentration is negatively correlated 
with information exchange asymmetry at the twelve percent level.  












ASYMMETRY 0.1432 0.0871 1
0.0480 0.2610
191 191 191
CONCENTRATION 0.0986 0.2564 -0.1230 1
0.1750 0.0003 0.0900
191 191 191 191
FIRM_SIZE -0.0992 -0.1297 -0.1897 -0.0442 1
0.1721 0.0736 0.0086 0.5440
191 191 191 191 191
SALES_SURPRISE -0.1362 -0.0386 0.0623 -0.0887 0.0379 1
0.0603 0.5957 0.3918 0.2222 0.6030
191 191 191 191 191 191
INVX_LAG -0.1973 0.1442 0.1374 0.0606 -0.1133 0.1722 1
0.0062 0.0465 0.0581 0.4050 0.1186 0.0172
191 191 191 191 191 191 191
SEASON1_DUMMY -0.0510 -0.0679 0.0003 0.0566 0.0414 -0.1615 0.0682 1
0.4834 0.3505 0.9963 0.4367 0.5696 0.0256 0.3486
191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191
SEASON2_DUMMY 0.0558 0.0710 -0.0149 -0.0312 -0.0313 -0.0851 0.0236 -0.3265 1
0.4433 0.3292 0.8374 0.6678 0.6671 0.2417 0.7358 0.0000
191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191
SEASON3_DUMMY -0.0104 0.0285 0.0205 -0.0123 -0.0206 -0.0965 -0.0595 -0.3149 -0.4748 1
0.8865 0.6958 0.7782 0.8660 0.7772 0.1842 0.4134 0.0000 0.0000




Table 5.2 Pairwise Correlations 
The levels of correlation between explanatory variables are below the level at 
which multicolinearity would bias coefficient estimates.  An additional test of the 
variance inflation factors (VIF) for the independent variables was conducted.  Results 
from the VIF test shown in Table 5.3 indicate that inflation is less than two for each of 
the explanatory variables.  The VIF for two of the seasonality control variables are 
greater than two, however, since the coefficients of the seasonality variables will not be 
interpreted in order to test the hypotheses the marginally high VIF is not detrimental to 
the model.  A VIF of less than two is within the acceptable range to assume that 
multicolinearity is not adversely affecting the coefficient estimates.   












Mean VIF 1.43 
 
5.4 Results 
The GLS regression provides coefficient estimates for all modeled explanatory 
and control variables as reported in Table 5.4.  The model fit is statistically significant 
based on a F-statistic of 36.40 and a χ2  distribution.  The explanatory power of the model 




The coefficient for the logged measure of trading partner closeness log(CLOSE) 
is statistically significant and negative.  The coefficients for the remaining three 
explanatory variables are not statistically significant.  Statistically significant and positive 
coefficients were estimated for the logged sales surprise log(SURPRISE) and lagged 
inventory turnover log(INVX_LAG) control variables.  A statistically significant 
negative coefficient was estimated for the seasonality control variable for the second 
quarter of each year (SEASON2DUMMY).    The statistically significant positive 
coefficient for the logged sales surprise control variable log(SURPRISE) is interesting.  
The positive coefficient indicates that greater levels of surprise are positively related to 
increases in inventory turnover.  Since SURPRISE is measured as the ratio of actual sales 
to forecasted sales, this indicates that when actual sales are greater than expected the 
inventory turnover is improved.  Intuitively this makes sense since having sales greater 
than expected may drive inventory to artificially low levels.  As noted by Gaur et al. 
(2005) these unexpected events can affect inventory performance measures and should be 
controlled for separately in the regression. 
This study finds an important result showing a relationship between the nature of 
supply chain relationships and supply chain performance.  Since the literature does not 
have a clearly hypothesized relationship between these two variables, this study has 
proposed hypotheses in both directions.  The results support Hypothesis 4 Alternative:  
The greater use of close trading partner relationships is negatively related to supply chain 
performance.  This helps confirm some of the prior literature on this subject that describe 
the benefits of arms-length relationships to supply chain management (Lambert et al. 
1996b; Lambert et al. 2004; McCutcheon and Stuart 2000) and contradicts other literature 
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that describes the benefits of close relationships (Anderson and Narus 1990; Goffin et al. 
2006; Webster 1992). Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7 are not supported. 
 












(Std Err) P>| t | sig Hypothesis Testing
Explanatory Variables
(log)CLOSE -0.0197  
(0.0086) 0.024 *
H4: Not Supported           
H4 Alternative: Supported
(log)CHURN_RATE 0.0002  
(0.0032) 0.950 ns H5: Not Supported
(log)ASYMMETRY 0.0015    
(0.0043) 0.727 ns H6: Not Supported
(log)CONCENTRATION 0.0142   
(0.0086) 0.101 ns H7: Not Supported
constant 0.2862   
(0.3302 0.388 ns
Control Variables
(log)FIRMSIZE 0.0108   
(0.0328) 0.742 ns
(log)SALES_SURPRISE 0.0343  
(0.0166) 0.041 *
(log)INVX_LAG 0.7158   
(0.0410) 0.000 **
SEASON1DUMMY -0.0101   
(0.0065) 0.126 ns
SEASON2DUMMY -0.0107  
(0.0055) 0.056 +
SEASON3DUMMY -0.0087   
(0.0056) 0.121 ns
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level  
 
5.5 Discussion 
The support of Hypothesis 4 Alternative is a significant contribution of this 
dissertation.  Through the use of multi-firm archival data, the negative relationship 
between firm performance and the use of close trading partner relationships supports 
research on the detrimental performance effects in relationships where opportunism may 
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be more prevalent.  Marketing literature has noted a similar situation where close 
relationships create an atmosphere where trading partners become complacent (Wathne 
and Heide 2000).  This passive form of opportunism is described as shirking and may 
occur when trading partners fail to perform because the relationship is not seen as being 
at risk. 
This contribution to the literature is a significant finding of the dissertation.  An 
additional post-hoc analysis is provided to further refine the impact of close relationships 
by considering the effects separately for three echelons of the supply chain 
(manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers). 
Since this electronically-mediated network includes technology champion firms 
from three echelons of the supply chain, additional regressions were generated to 
separately evaluate the echelon effects.  As shown in Table 5.5, all three regressions are 




Table 5.5 Coefficient Estimates: Echelon Model 
Manufacturers Wholesalers Retailers
(log)INVENTORY_TURNOVER Coef.  
(Std Err) P>| t | sig
Coef.  
(Std Err) P>| t | sig
Coef.  
(Std Err) P>| t | sig
Explanatory Variables




-0.0339   
(0.0236) 0.161 ns






















0.8937   
(0.3516) 0.015 *
Control Variables






















-0.0218   
(0.0104) 0.043 *










-0.0148   
(0.0088) 0.101 ns
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level
Regression Statistics
n 104 30 57
groups 23 5 11
R-square within 0.8033 0.8450 0.8677
R-square between 0.9982 0.9831 0.8550
R-square overall 0.9976 0.9751 0.8436
F 29.00 8.18 23.62
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000  
The inventory performance of manufacturers is negatively affected by the use of 
close trading partner relationships as measured by (log)CLOSE.  This result may be 
related to the particular supply needs of manufacturers.  Research into the relationship 
between buyers and suppliers has recognized that the complexity of inputs affects the 
governance of the relationship and how electronic integration is implemented (Hess and 
Kemerer 1994; Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995).  When more complex or specialized inputs 
are required, asset specificity may become a factor where the close relationships create an 
environment for opportunistic behavior for the trading partner (Williamson 1975). 
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The stability of the trading partner portfolio, as measured by the 
(log)CHURN_RATE variable,  has a negative effect on inventory turnover for 
manufacturing firms.  Again this may be related to the types of inputs and processes used 
by manufacturers that are unique from those used in other echelons of the supply chain.  
The investment in time needed for relationships to develop in order to maintain 
appropriate flow and quality of inputs for manufacturers may be adversely affected by 
high levels of instability in the trading partner portfolio.  The positive coefficient 
estimates for (log)SALES_SURPRISE and (log)INVX_LAG are not surprising as 
discussed previously for the full network model results. 
The wholesaler echelon model is also statistically significant based on an F-test; 
however, the coefficients estimated for the explanatory variables were not statistically 
significant.  The coefficient for the lagged inventory turnover variable, (log)INVX_LAG, 
is statistically significant and positive as previously discussed for the full network model 
results.  The lack of statistically significant coefficient estimates for the explanatory 
variables is very likely related to the small number of wholesalers included in the sample. 
The results from the retailer model are statistically significant based on an F-test, 
with coefficient estimates that vary from those for the manufacturing echelon.  The 
retailers do not show a significant relationship between the use of close trading partner 
relationships and inventory turnover.  Unique to the retailer echelon, the balance of 
sending and receiving information, (log)ASYMMETRY, is positively related to 
inventory turnover.  Contrary to the results for manufacturers, retailers are found to have 
a positive relationship between the (log)CHURN_RATE and inventory turnover.  This 
positive relationship may be related to the type of inputs used by retailers.  Since retailers 
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often resell standard products, retailers may be more price driven such that instability in 
the trading partner portfolio allows them to constantly renegotiate prices with their 
suppliers.  This position may be complimented by the findings that close relationships do 
not have a statistically significant effect on inventory turnover but the asymmetry of 
information has a positive effect.  The positive coefficient indicates that receiving more 
information than they send is beneficial to inventory turnover.  The asymmetric 
availability of information has been noted for allowing firms to disproportionately retain 
the benefits of the relationship (Clemons and Hitt 2004).  Research has found that 
asymmetries of information driven by the more powerful retailer might be overcome by 
the supplier as a level dependency develops (Narayandas and Rangan 2004).  However, 
the retailer may not become dependent on individual suppliers if the churn rate of their 
trading partner portfolio is high as indicated by results from this sample.  The retailers 
also show a statistically significant negative effect for two of the seasonality control 
variables.  Both SEASON1DUMMY and SEASON2DUMMY are negative for the 
retailer model.  This indicates that retailer inventory turnover is lower due to timing 
effects of first and second quarter.  The manufacturer model also showed negative 
seasonal significance but only for the second quarter.  It appears that retail trade is more 
sensitive to quarterly seasonality. 
To further test the effects of information asymmetry for retailers, the measure was 
recalculated using an alternate operationalization.  The modified asymmetry measure 
allows for a directional measure by removing the absolute value for the difference 
between the receive volume and the send volume for each technology champion firm and 
quarter.  This modified measure allows the resulting ratio to provide negative and 
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positive values.  A negative ratio indicates that the technology champion firm is sending 
more information to its trading partners during the quarter relative to the volume 
received.  A positive ratio indicates that they are receiving more information than they 





ASYM_DIRECTION =                              [5.7]
Total_Volume
Receive_Volume - Send_Volume  
The resulting coefficient estimate for the directional asymmetry measure is 
positive and statistically significant for retail firms.  This finding indicates that for 
retailers it is better to receive information from their trading partners than to send 
information to their trading partners.   
The value of this insight that the effect of closeness of trading partners varies 
depending on the firm’s location in the supply chain has an important implication for the 
supply chain management literature.  First, it demonstrates that when examining supply 
chain performance, one should include measures that describe the level of closeness of 
the trading partners and control for the location of the focal firm within the supply chain.  
As this study finds, there is support for a negative association between trading partner 
closeness and supply chain performance for manufacturers but not specifically for 
wholesalers or retailers.  Second, the study helps with the literature on vendor managed 
inventory (VMI).  Subsequent VMI studies may want to include whether or not VMI 
helps in light of the additional power that a vendor may have over the customer.  The 
effects of closeness may be moderated by other relational factors.  These factors may 
 133 
 
include the age of the relationship, the level of dependence, and the asymmetry of 
information exchange.  Third, this finding highlights the importance of market forces in 
increasing supply chain performance.  Research that models supply chain partners as 
monopolies (i.e. the Beer Game) may overstate the problems of supply chain 
performance because they do not consider the benefits of market forces.  In real-world 
settings, such as the context of this dissertation, firms may use arms-length relationships 
to increase their supply chain performance. 
The negative impact of close trading partner relationships on supply chain 
performance may be explained by opportunism.  Opportunistic behavior by close trading 
partners had been described in complimentary research.  Passive forms of opportunism 
can occur when close trading partners become complacent and do not see the relationship 
as being at risk.  As a result they may not put forth the effort to meet and exceed 
expectations which has been described as shirking (Wathne and Heide 2000).  A more 
aggressive form of close trading partner opportunistic behavior occurs when information 
gained through the relationship is misappropriated.  This behavior has been described as 
poaching (Clemons and Hitt 2004).    
This important finding of the study linking the value of arms-length relationships 
to supply chain performance has managerial implications.  First, managers may not want 
to create close relationships with too many trading partners.  Over time, this may only 
increase the power of the trading partner.  Managers may be most sensitive to this power 
as it relates to more unique inputs such as those used by manufacturers compared to 
retailers.  However, managers may consider that relationship closeness can also result in 
higher inventory costs when close trading partners become complacent and might not 
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work as aggressively to find new efficiencies.  Second, if a manager does rely on close 
relationships with trading partners, he may want to structure his contracts such that they 
include incentives to encourage supply chain performance improvements.  For example, a 
manager may ask a supplier for a “service level agreement” that specifies the minimum 
supply chain performance level or else be subject to penalties.  Furthermore, the customer 
can give financial incentives if the supplier helps them achieve higher levels of supply 
chain performance.  Third, it may give managers a reason to shy away from “sole-source” 
contracts.  When looking to procure new material and services, a supply chain manger 
may want to ensure a plurality of suppliers to allow for the benefits of market forces to 
help improve supply chain performance. 
5.5.1 Alternative Explanatory Variables 
Although Hypothesis 4 Alternate was supported in the overall model, results for 
the other three hypotheses in this study were not significant.  Future research may 
consider alternative specification of the variables in order to understand these 
relationships in more detail.  For example, the hypothesis that describes trading partner 
churn rate could consider churn among the close and arms-length trading partners 
separately.  If close relationships hurt supply chain performance—a hypothesis that is 
supported by the results of this study—then customers may use a process of continual 
evaluation of their close relationships and use the threat of ending this relationship if the 
customer thought the trading partner was acting opportunistically.  Another possible 
operationalization of the churn rate variable may only consider the fraction of 
information exchange that are new in each quarter instead of the fraction of new trading 
partners.  This alternative operationalization may give more appropriate weight to the 
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close trading partner relationships.  Similarly, the information asymmetry and 
information concentration measures were for the entire technology champion firm.  
Future research could measure these variables just for trading partner relationships 
identified as close.  As shown in the post-hoc analysis, it is also important to include the 
echelon effects when modeling supply chain interaction. 
Since strong negative results were found the manufacturer’s use of close trading 
partner relationships, additional research could focus on how manufacturers manage their 
portfolio of trading partners.  Specifically, measures can be developed that compare the 
balance between the use of close and arms-length relationships.  To this end an additional 
post-hoc analysis is provided to begin exploring this extension of the dissertation.  
Focusing on the diagonal axis between quadrant II Close Relationships and quadrant III 
Arms-length Relationships, a measure of how manufacturing firms balance their trading 
partner portfolio is calculated.  The preliminary measure (AXIS_DIFFERENCE) tests the 
difference between the percentage of trading partners characterized as close and the 
percentage of trading partners characterized as arms-length.   This new measure is 
substituted into the previous performance model as shown in Equation 5.8. 
it it 2 it
n
3 it 4 it i it
i=0
log(ASYMMETRY )+ log(CONCENTRATION )+ ControlVariables





The modified model is then regressed using the manufacturing subset of the panel 
dataset.   Initial results from this model do not provide an improvement on the previous 
model.  The coefficient estimated for the portfolio balance measure 
(AXIS_DIFFERENCE) is not statistically significant, however, this next step moves the 
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research further in testing the portfolio perspective introduced with Hypothesis 4 
Alternative.   
Similarly, the operationalization of the CLOSE variable is proposed as a relative 
measure for each technology champion firm in the dataset.  As noted previously, a 
technology champion firm is determined to be closet to its trading partner on the 
champion’s average volume of transactional and enhanced information exchange (see 
Figure 2.2).  An alternative to using the firm mean values is to use the echelon mean 
values to calculate the percentage of transactions with close trading partners.   The 
echelon-based alternative operationalization of the CLOSE variable is substituted into the 
original regression model shown in Equation 5.6.  The coefficient estimate for the 
alternative measure of the CLOSE variable is negative and statistically significant.  This 
result is consistent with the original operationalization of the CLOSE variable. 
Although additional work is needed, these analyses illustrate that the existing 
archival dataset can provide additional measures of how a firm’s portfolio of trading 
partners is leveraged and potentially affects firm performance.  Future research should 
seek additional methods of operationalizing these measures. 
5.5.2 Alternative Lagged Explanatory Variables 
The current model and hypothesis associate explanatory variables and the 
independent variable from the same time period.  Extant research focusing on operational 
performance and operational activities supports the time period matching used in this 
study (Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995).  Research in the area of IT investment has supported 
that there are lagged effects of investments on performance (Brynjolfsson et al. 1994).  
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To incorporate this perspective, each of the explanatory variables is modeled using a one 
period lag.  Summary results are provided in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 Alternate Lagged Model 
n 225
groups 39








(log)CLOSE_LAG -0.0090   
(0.0087) 0.300 ns
(log)ASYMMETRY_LAG 0.0048   
(0.0041) 0.231 ns
(log)CONCENTRATION_LAG 0.0140   
(0.0080) 0.080 +
(log)CHURN_RATE_LAG 0.0007   
(0.0030) 0.809 ns
constant 0.3401   
(0.3301) 0.304 ns
Control Variables
(log)FIRMSIZE 0.0020   
(0.0336) 0.952 ns
(log)SALES_SURPRISE 0.0646   
(0.0168) 0.000 **
(log)INVX_LAG 0.7350   
(0.0392) 0.000 **
SEASON1DUMMY 0.0031   
(0.0064) 0.630 ns
SEASON2DUMMY 0.0026   
(0.0052) 0.623 ns
SEASON3DUMMY -0.0003  
(0.0052) 0.953 ns
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level  
The results in Table 5.6 show changes in the model fit and the estimated 
coefficients.  The alternative lagged model is statistically significant based on the F-
statistic but shows a slight decrease in the R-square measuring the explanatory power of 
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the model.  The trading partner closeness variable (CLOSE) is not statistically significant 
in the logged model.  Additionally, the information exchange concentration measure 
(CONCENTRATION) is now statistically significant and positive which supports 
Hypothesis 7: greater information exchange concentration is positively associated with 
supply chain performance.  Since Hypothesis 7 is only supported in the lagged model, 
this suggests that prior trading partner portfolio activities may contribute to performance 
in future periods. 
5.5.3 Alternative Dependent Variables 
Inventory turnover was selected for use as the primary performance measure in 
this study due to its prominent use in extant supply chain literature and theorized 
association with information exchange.  Alternative performance measures are tested for 
comparison.  The Compustat database provides additional quarterly firm performance 
measures that may be considered for supply chain research. 
Specifically, receivables turnover and net income are tested as alternative 
dependent variables in the original model.  Summary results and model statistics are 
included in Appendix G.  The net income performance (NET_INCOME) dependent 
variable provides similar coefficient estimates to the original model.  The measure of 
trading partner closeness (CLOSE) is positive and statistically significant.  The 
receivables turnover performance (RECEIVABLES_TURN) does not provide 
statistically significant coefficient estimates for any of the explanatory variables.  As a 
further test of the potential relations between the relations between the alternative 
dependent variables, a correlation matrix is provided in Table G.3 of Appendix G.  There 
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is no statistically significant correlation between inventory turnover performance and 
either of the alternative dependent variables.  There is a statistically significant negative 
relationship between receivables turnover performance and net income.  This correlation 
is at the 18% level.  Further study beyond this dissertation is needed to gain 
understanding of how this negative relationship can be interpreted.  
Although the use of net income provides similar coefficient estimates, the R-
square statistics are lower in the alternate model.  This is not surprising since net income 
is affected by many factors beyond the operation of the supply chain.  It is not surprising 
that the operation of the supply chain has some effect on firm net income.  
5.5.4 Additional Future Research Notes 
Future research may also focus on reconciling the disparate positions of 
Hypotheses 4 and Hypothesis 4 Alternative.  The potential balance between the use of 
close and arms-length relationships could be tested as a non-linear relationship where too 
close and too arms-length is detrimental to inventory turnover.  The use of a squared 
variable of closeness could be developed to identify a u-shaped relationship between 
relationship closeness and firm performance (Steckel et al. 2004).  Additionally, the 
seasonality control variable may be expanded.  The current control variable controls for 
overall seasonality across the year but does not account for seasonality within a firm.  A 
possible alternative would be to use the sales variations between quarters as a firm 
measure of seasonality. 
Additional firm level measures may support the control of firm effects.  The 
currently modeled lagged inventory turnover measure captures much of the heterogeneity 
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of firms.  The firm’s experience, strategy, and effectiveness in managing inventory are 
captured within this control variable.  The development of additional measures could 
control individually for these sources of variation.  A survey instrument targeting the 
technology champion firms could provide additional firm-level data that may improve the 
control variables used in the model. 
In this study, the roles of buyer and supplier have not been identified.  Inclusion 
of this information could improve the generalization of any results.  The archival data 
was analyzed to identify the roles with the network, however, results were inconsistent.  
Supply chain research has recognized that a firm is both a buyer and supplier depending 
on whether it is securing inputs or distributing outputs (Stevenson 2007).  In practice this 
can occur when a manufacturer such as 3M the supplier of adhesive products to a 
wholesaler such as W.W. Grainger.  The roles reverse when W.W. Grainger supplies 
parts to support the maintenance of 3M’s production equipment.  A survey instrument 
may be better suited for collecting data on the primary role of each party in a dyadic 
relationship. 
The initial model included all three echelons of the supply chain for hypotheses 
testing.  As supported by the post-hoc echelon models, future research may develop and 
test hypotheses based on distinct echelon characteristics.  Retail firms in particular are 
unique because their electronically mediated trading partner relationships are exclusively 
suppliers.  The customers of retail firms do not interact with the technology champion 
firm through the use of an EDI network.  Conversely, the portfolio of electronically 
mediated trading partners for manufacturers and wholesalers includes both suppliers and 
 141 
 
customers.  These distinctions could be measured and then tested by regressing subsets of 
the data based on the location in the supply chain. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Overall, this study highlights the growing importance of supply chain context on 
supply chain performance.  Although much of the literature suggests that close 
relationships in the supply chain are always desirable, there may be contextual issues that 
require some relationships to remain arms-length (Webster 1992).  Through case 
analyses, researchers suggest that supply chain relationships are best when developed at 
the appropriate level of closeness depending on the context of the relationship (Goffin et 
al. 2006; Lambert et al. 2004).  This supports that although the benefits of close 
relationships are known, not all interfirm exchanges can support close relationships.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Contribution 
The contribution of this dissertation is four-fold.  First, from a measurement 
standpoint, this dissertation uses existing theory to develop unique objective measures of 
information exchange to examine inter-firm relationships and performance.  Previous 
literature has been limited to perceived measures of information exchange or modeling to 
examine the effects of information exchange.  This unique dataset supported the 
development of objective measures of information exchange.  Second this dissertation 
has extended the supply chain literature by building knowledge of the performance 
effects of interfirm relationships.  Firm performance and trading partner performance are 
examined based on supply chain interaction through information exchange.  Third, this 
dissertation incorporates methodology from strategic management to examine 
relationship termination as a measure of trading partner performance. Fourth, this 
dissertation extends theory through empirical evidence to improve the understanding of 
the relationship between trading partner closeness and firm performance.   
By using multiple units of analysis and measures of performance, two important 
results are found from each study.  From the termination study presented in Chapter 4, a 
u-shaped relationship is found between the volume transactional information exchange 
and relationship termination.  Although it has been common practice to expect 
relationships to survive when transactional exchanges are occurring, it is counter-intuitive 
to suggest that at higher levels of transactional exchange the likelihood of termination 
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increases.  Additionally, a u-shaped relationship is also found between the volume of 
enhanced information exchange and relationship termination.   
Two additional results come from the performance study in Chapter 5.  First, 
close relationships can be detrimental to the technology champion firms as measured by 
inventory turnover.  This finding is consistent with other research into the management of 
trading partner relationship portfolios (Lambert et al. 1996b; Lambert et al. 2004), which 
finds merely having close relationships with trading partners is not sufficient.  It is more 
important to have the right balance of trading partner relationships within the firm’s 
portfolio of trading partners.  Second, a firm’s position in the supply chain matters.  The 
relationship characteristics and inputs may be unique for firms depending on their 
location within the supply chain.  Inputs for manufacturers may be more specific and 
require stable relationships and close coordination to support production processes.  
These two factors together may have conflicting effects on inventory turnover.  
Conversely, retailers may benefit from the price mechanism effects of switching trading 
partners often but gain little value from close relationships due to the commodity nature 
of their inputs. 
6.2 Managerial Implications  
From both the results of this dissertation and extant literature, the exchange of 
information is shown to have performance implications.  The way in which firms 
exchange information has significance beyond transactional data processing efficiency. 
The exchange of information has long-term implications because of its effects on  the 
competitive position of the firm.   
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Managers may consider the use of information exchange to stabilize supply chain 
relationships.  Stability in a relationship has the benefit of allowing trading partners to 
focus on long-term valuing adding initiatives.  When firms are unsure of future 
transactions, they may be reluctant to make investments in the relationship (Bensaou and 
Anderson 1999).  Conversely, stability in the trading partner portfolio may lead to 
complacency where trading partners focus on other relationships without fear of 
termination.  New trading partners may allow the firm to achieve lower input prices, new 
partners may be more sensitive to customer services, and new relationships may allow for 
new ideas and perspectives.  However, forming new trading partner relationships has its 
costs.  There is often a significant fixed cost with establishing a new relationship.  This 
can come in the form of investments in communication or transaction technology or even 
the cost of contracting.  Overall, the stability or instability of supply chain relationships is 
an important strategic question for managers to address. 
Managers should consider the benefits of the firm’s portfolio of suppliers as it 
relates to the supply chain performance of a firm.  First, it may be possible to find some 
win-win situations where both the firm and its trading partner can benefit.  This may be 
because of increased sharing of forecasting and inventory information.  Second, it may be 
possible to change the allocation of the value between a firm and its trading partner.  As 
this dissertation indicates, the value may be greater for the supplier than for the customer 
when there is a close relationship between the two.  Overall, managers may consider their 
network of relationships with its trading partners similar to the way it views an 
investment portfolio.  Diversification between close and arms-length relationships may 
have great strategic advantages.  If the manager relies too much on arms-length 
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relationships and market forces, then the firm will face the costs related to continually 
adjusting to new trading partner relationships.  On the other extreme, too much reliance 
on close relationships may lead to reduced supply chain performance captured by 
inventory turnover.  Accordingly, a balance of close and arms-length relationships can 
help where each relationship is developed based on its contribution rather than a singular 
pursuit of close relationships. 
6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
 Supply chain performance has many dimensions.  This dissertation has relied on 
two important measures (avoidence of termination and inventory turnover) ; however, 
future research may consider other measures.  Each trading partner may have their own 
specific expectations of benefits from interfirm information exchange.  As mentioned 
earlier in the dissertation, some qualitative information was drawn upon in order to 
describe more precisely the research setting.  However, none of this data was used in the 
actual empirical testing of the hypotheses in Chapters 4 and 5.  Accordingly, use of a 
survey tool to supplement the current objective data could provide validation of these 
measures as well as identification of additional performance variables.  Similar studies of 
interfirm performance have focused on sales growth (Dyer and Singh 1998), agility 
(Sambamurthy et al. 2003), and innovation (Bailey et al. 2007).  Including additional 
performance measures or a combined index of performance may recognize that firms 
seek performance in different aspects depending on their strategies. 
A key aspect of this dissertation is its use of a unique dataset that provides 
objective observations of the interfirm exchange of information.  Future research may 
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incorporate subjective measures that complement these objective measures of 
information exchange.  Supplementing the objective network data would additionally 
allow for the collection of additional information exchange measures.  Such measures 
could include the use of alternate information exchange channels, experience with 
technologies, and the use of technology intermediaries.  Additional perceived relational 
measures often used in relational marketing literature include trust, commitment, and 
long-term orientation (Ganesan 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994). 
In spite of potential areas for future research, the significance of this dissertation 
is still evident.  The theory, methodology, empirical testing, and results have extended the 
supply chain management literature and addressed important gaps.  In so doing, this 
dissertation has raised some important questions and opened up new possible research 
streams.  As supply chains become increasingly dependent upon information exchange 


















 APPENDIX A Sample ANSI X12 and EDIFACT Message Types 
The following tables provide examples of standard EDI transaction types defined 
for business documents.  Column one describes the type of information included in the 
business document and column two provides the code number used to identify that 
business document. 
Table A.1 ANSI X12 Message Types and Descriptions 
Description Type 
Motor Carrier Pick-up Manifest 211 
Rail Waybill Request 425 
Requisition 511 
Project Schedule Reporting 806 
Invoice 810 
Remittance Advice 820 
Inventory Report 846 
Purchase Order 850 
Purchase Order Change Request 860 
Purchase Order Change Acknowledgement 865 
Production Sequence 866 
Order Status Inquiry 869 
Grocery Products Purchase Order 875 
Grocery Products Invoice 880 
Item Maintenance 888 
Promotion Announcement 889 
Warehouse Shipping Advice 945 
 
Table A.2 United Nations EDIFACT Message Types and Descriptions 
Description Type 
Invoice INVOIC 
Purchase Order ORDERS 
Purchase Order Change ORDCHG 
Remittance Advice REMADV 
Credit Advice Message CREADV 
Data Maintenance Status Report DMSTAT 
Financial Statement of an Account Message FINSTA 
General Purpose Message GENRAL 
Extended Payment Order Message PAYEXT 
Product Data Message PRODAT 
Payment Order Message PAYORD 
Quality Data Message QALITY 
Quote Message QUOTES 
Receiving Advice RECADV 
Remittance Advice REMADV 
Sales Forecast SLSFCT 
Sales Report SLSRPT 
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APPENDIX B Transactional Information Types 
The following table lists all standard EDI transaction types identified in this 
dissertation as transactional information exchange.  Column one displays the EDI 
transaction code and column two provides the standard description.  Numeric transaction 
codes are from the ANSI X12 standard.  Alphabetic transactions codes are from the 
United Nations EDIFACT standard. 
  Table B.1 Transactional Information EDI Types 
Type Description
107 Request for Motor Carrier Rate Proposal
110 Air Freight Details and Invoice
141 Product Service Claim Response
142 Product Service Claim  
210 Motor Carrier Freight Details and Invoice
223 Consolidators Freight Bill and Invoice
310 Freight Receipt and Invoice (Ocean)
511 Requisition
810 Invoice
811 Consolidated Service Invoice Statement
812 Credit/Debit Adjustment
820 Payment Order / Remittance Advice
821 Financial Information Reporting
822 Account Analysis
823 Lockbox
827 Financial Return Notice
828 Debit Authorization
829 Payment Cancellation Request
836 Procurement Notices
838 Trading Partner Profile
840 Request for Quotation
843 Response to Request for Quotation
850 Purchase Order
855 Purchase Order Acknowledgement
857 Shipment and Billing Notice
859 Freight Invoice
860 Purchase Order Change Request - Buyer Initiated
865 Purchase Order Change Acknowledgement - Seller Initiated
869 Order Status Inquiry
870 Order Status Report
875 Grocery Products Purchase Order
880 Grocery Products Invoice
BANSTA Banking Status Message
DIRDEB Direct Debit Message
FINSTA Financial Statement of an Account Messsage
INVOIC Invoice
ORDCHG Purchase Order Change Request Message
ORDERS Purchase Order Message
ORDRSP Purchase Order Response Message
OSTRPT Order Status Report Message
PAYEXT Extended Payment Order Message
PAYMUL Multiple Payment Order Message
REMADV Remittance Advice Message  
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APPENDIX C Enhanced Transaction Types 
 
The following table lists all standard EDI transaction types identified in this 
dissertation as enhanced information exchange.  Column one displays the EDI transaction 
code and column two provides the standard description.  Numeric transaction codes are 
from the ANSI X12 standard.  Alphabetic transactions codes are from the United Nations 
EDIFACT standard. 
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Table C.1 Enhanced Information EDI Types 
Type Description
104 Air Shipment Information
109 Vessel Content Details
140 Product Registration
180 Return Merchandise Authorization and Notification
204 Motor Carrier Load Tender
211 Motor Carrier Bill of Lading
212 Motor Carrier Delivery Trailer Manifest
213 Motor Carrier Shipment Status Inquiry
214 Transporation Carrier Shipment Status Message
215 Motor Carrier Pick-up Manifest
217 Motor Carrier Loading and Route Guide




311 Canadian Customs Information
313 Shipment Status Inquiry
315 Status Details (Ocean)
322 Terminal Operations and Intermodal Ramp Activity
404 Rail Carrier Shipment Information
418 Rail Advance Interchange Consist
440 Shipment Wieghts
501 Vendor Performance Review
527 Material Due-In and Receipt
601 U.S. Customs Export Shipment Information
753 Request for Routing Information
830 Planning Schedule with Release Capability
832 Price / Sales Catalog
841 Specifications / Technical Information
841 Specifications / Technical Information
842 Nonconformance Report
844 Product Transfer Account Adjustment
845 Price Authorization Acknowledgment / Status
846 Inventory Inquiry / Advice
848 Material Safety Data Sheet
849 Response to Product Transfer Acount Adjustment
852 Product Activity Data
853 Routing and Carrier Instruction
854 Shipment Delivery Discrepancy Information
856 Ship Notice / Manifest
858 Shipment Information
861 Receiving Advice / Accpetance Certificate
862 Shipping Schedule
863 Report of Test Results
866 Production Sequence
867 Product Transfer Resale Report
879 Price Information
882 Direct Store Delivery Summary Information
888 Item Maintenance
889 Promotion Announcement
894 Delivery / Return Base Record
940 Warehouse Shipping Order
943 Warehouse Stock Transfer Shipment Advice
944 Warehouse Stock Transfer Receipt Advice
945 Warehouse Shipping Advice
947 Warehouse Inventory Adjustment Advice
990 Response to a Load Tender
CUSDEC Customs Declaration Message
DELFOR Delivery Schedule Message
DELJIT Delivery Just In Time
DESADV Dispatch Advice Message
IFCSUM Forwarding and Consolidation Summary Message
IFTMAN Arrival Notice Message
IFTSTA International Multimodal Status Message 
INSDES Instruction to Dispatch Message
INVRPT Inventory Report Message
PRICAT Price / Sales Catalog Message
QALITY Quality Data Message
RECADV Receiving Advice Message
SLSRPT Sales Data Report Message  
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 APPENDIX D Logistic Regression Results  
 
The following tables provide the full logistic regression results.  Column one of 
the table provides the variable name, column two shows the value of the coefficient 
estimate, column three the standard error, column four the z-score for the coefficient 
estimate, column five the p-value, and column six the level of statistical significance.  
Statistical significance is noted as ** for p<0.01, * for p<0.05, and + for p<0.1.    
This Appendix includes four tables of regression results.   Table D.1 provides 
regression results for the full dataset.  Tables D.2 through D.4 provide stratified dataset 
results detailing the coefficient estimates when each echelon of the supply chain is 
regressed individually (manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers).   Each table of regression 
results is followed by a summary of the overall model statistics. 
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Table D.1 Full Results of Logistic Termination Study 
TERMINATION Coef. Std. Err Z P>|z| sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -6.2809 0.7646 -8.22 0.0000 **
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 0.6102 0.0764 7.98 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME -10.2760 2.1512 -4.78 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 3.2679 0.8111 4.03 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_TRANSACTIONAL RATIO 4.41E-06 1.98E-05 0.22 0.8240 ns
constant -3.9163 0.1402 -27.93 0.0000 **
Control Variables
MONTH_DUMMY1 -1.9548 0.1093 -17.89 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY2 -1.4380 0.0958 -15.01 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY3 -0.9738 0.0864 -11.26 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY4 -0.2453 0.0758 -3.24 0.0010 *
MONTH_DUMMY5 -1.0162 0.0899 -11.31 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY6 -1.4781 0.1024 -14.44 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY7 -1.2878 0.0978 -13.17 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY8 -1.5088 0.1050 -14.37 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY9 -1.4866 0.1047 -14.19 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY10 -1.4329 0.1061 -13.51 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY11 -0.8034 0.0881 -9.12 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY12 -0.4853 0.0838 -5.79 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY13 -0.6199 0.0875 -7.09 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY14 -0.5578 0.0867 -6.44 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY15 -0.9474 0.0978 -9.69 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY16 0.2326 0.0763 3.05 0.0020 *
MONTH_DUMMY17 -0.7576 0.0972 -7.80 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY18 -0.4795 0.0902 -5.32 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY19 -0.1827 0.0862 -2.12 0.0340 *
MONTH_DUMMY20 -0.8474 0.1027 -8.25 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY21 0.0207 0.0828 0.25 0.8020 ns
MONTH_DUMMY22 1.0205 0.0712 14.32 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY1 2.1181 0.1964 10.78 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY2 0.1024 0.1794 0.57 0.5680 ns
FIRM_DUMMY3 1.0591 0.1562 6.78 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY4 2.4658 0.1729 14.26 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY5 0.7430 0.1515 4.90 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY6 0.8048 0.3034 2.65 0.0080 *
FIRM_DUMMY7 1.6421 0.1424 11.53 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY8 1.9996 0.1996 10.02 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY9 0.4023 0.1556 2.58 0.0100 *
FIRM_DUMMY10 0.6752 0.2336 2.89 0.0040 *
FIRM_DUMMY11 0.1020 0.2267 0.45 0.6530 ns
FIRM_DUMMY12 3.2476 0.1493 21.75 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY13 1.0706 0.1324 8.08 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY14 0.4226 0.2199 1.92 0.0550 +
FIRM_DUMMY15 1.0010 0.1661 6.03 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY16 1.0935 0.1571 6.96 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY17 -0.1623 0.4686 -0.35 0.7290 ns
FIRM_DUMMY18 3.2401 0.1715 18.89 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY19 1.1590 0.1612 7.19 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY20 1.5779 0.1635 9.65 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY21 1.5814 0.2020 7.83 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY22 1.6268 0.1885 8.63 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY23 1.3632 0.3038 4.49 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY24 1.1411 0.1295 8.81 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY25 0.2153 0.4321 0.50 0.6180 ns
FIRM_DUMMY26 1.7749 0.1624 10.93 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY27 2.4315 0.1432 16.98 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY28 -0.8318 0.1744 -4.77 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY29 -0.5542 0.1769 -3.13 0.0020 *
FIRM_DUMMY30 0.1233 0.1429 0.86 0.3880 ns
FIRM_DUMMY31 0.2340 0.2595 0.90 0.3670 ns
FIRM_DUMMY32 -0.3435 0.3174 -1.08 0.2790 ns
FIRM_DUMMY33 2.1859 0.2203 9.92 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY34 2.1901 0.1597 13.71 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY35 0.5480 0.1355 4.04 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY36 0.5393 0.1397 3.86 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY37 1.4211 0.2872 4.95 0.0000 **






Log Likelihood -27,150.29  
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Table D.2 Stratified Logistic Results: Manufacturers 
TERMINATION Coef. Std. Err Z P>|z| sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -5.7153 2.2169 -2.58 0.0100 *
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 6.8415 2.3809 2.87 0.0040 *
ENHANCED_VOLUME -6.8762 3.7239 -1.85 0.0650 *
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 10.2529 12.5015 0.82 0.4120 ns
ENHANCED_TRANSACTIONAL RATIO -2.96E-04 0.000536 -0.55 0.5800 ns
constant -2.0442 0.1416 -14.44 0.0000 **
Control Variables
MONTH_DUMMY1 -5.4571 0.3196 -17.07 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY2 -4.9835 0.2647 -18.83 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY3 -3.2939 0.1499 -21.97 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY4 -4.1806 0.2058 -20.32 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY5 -4.4166 0.2277 -19.40 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY6 -4.0832 0.2009 -20.32 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY7 -3.1121 0.1496 -20.80 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY8 -4.1728 0.2143 -19.47 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY9 -4.4068 0.2360 -18.67 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY10 -4.4447 0.2406 -18.47 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY11 -3.8019 0.1907 -19.93 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY12 -3.1931 0.1587 -20.13 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY13 -4.1703 0.2386 -17.48 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY14 -2.7055 0.1449 -18.68 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY15 -3.4377 0.1949 -17.64 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY16 -2.6947 0.1529 -17.62 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY17 -2.3876 0.1441 -16.57 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY18 -1.6914 0.1241 -13.62 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY19 -3.4607 0.2509 -13.79 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY20 -3.1426 0.2178 -14.43 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY21 -0.8175 0.1097 -7.45 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY22 -1.9169 0.2019 -9.49 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY1 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY2 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY3 2.9327 0.2058 14.25 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY4 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY5 3.4181 0.1857 18.40 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY6 0.9032 0.3125 2.89 0.0040 *
FIRM_DUMMY7 1.7586 0.1503 11.70 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY8 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY9 2.3415 0.2142 10.93 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY10 0.7357 0.2410 3.05 0.0020 *
FIRM_DUMMY11 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY12 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY13 0.1322 0.2319 0.57 0.5690 ns
FIRM_DUMMY14 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY15 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY16 0.4550 0.2258 2.01 0.0440 *
FIRM_DUMMY17 -0.2171 0.4765 -0.46 0.6490 ns
FIRM_DUMMY18 4.2632 0.1870 22.80 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY19 1.2986 0.1669 7.78 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY20 1.8601 0.1710 10.88 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY21 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY22 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY23 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY24 1.8672 0.2157 8.66 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY25 0.1817 0.4440 0.41 0.6820 ns
FIRM_DUMMY26 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY27 2.1767 0.1709 12.74 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY28 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY29 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY30 -0.8822 0.1772 -4.98 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY31 0.3047 0.2656 1.15 0.2510 ns
FIRM_DUMMY32 -0.3646 0.3223 -1.13 0.2580 ns
FIRM_DUMMY33 2.8559 0.2302 12.41 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY34 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY35 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY36 2.8616 0.1699 16.85 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY37 1.8093 0.3020 5.99 0.0000 **






Log Likelihood -4,851.56  
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Table D.3 Stratified Logistic Results: Wholesalers 
TERMINATION Coef. Std. Err Z P>|z| sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -23.0539 4.8015 -4.8 0.0000 **
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 2.1515 0.5459 3.94 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME -5.4869 4.3961 -1.25 0.2120 ns
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 1.6330 1.7376 0.94 0.3470 ns
ENHANCED_TRANSACTIONAL RATIO 1.72E-05 1.44E-05 1.19 0.2330 ns
constant -2.9665 0.2050 -14.47 0.0000 **
Control Variables
MONTH_DUMMY1 -2.0382 0.4008 -5.08 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY2 -2.2843 0.4497 -5.08 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY3 0.2012 0.2239 0.90 0.3690 ns
MONTH_DUMMY4 -0.8873 0.2843 -3.12 0.0020 *
MONTH_DUMMY5 -1.6555 0.3679 -4.50 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY6 -0.9450 0.2920 -3.24 0.0010 *
MONTH_DUMMY7 -0.8235 0.2841 -2.90 0.0040 *
MONTH_DUMMY8 -1.1341 0.3131 -3.62 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY9 -0.6172 0.2714 -2.27 0.0230 *
MONTH_DUMMY10 -0.1328 0.2441 -0.54 0.5870 ns
MONTH_DUMMY11 -0.5886 0.2742 -2.15 0.0320 *
MONTH_DUMMY12 -1.0154 0.3125 -3.25 0.0010 **
MONTH_DUMMY13 -1.4678 0.3676 -3.99 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY14 -1.5623 0.3824 -4.09 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY15 -0.9068 0.3065 -2.96 0.0030 *
MONTH_DUMMY16 -0.2242 0.2558 -0.88 0.3810 ns
MONTH_DUMMY17 -1.1337 0.3348 -3.39 0.0010 *
MONTH_DUMMY18 -0.8981 0.3125 -2.87 0.0040 **
MONTH_DUMMY19 1.7698 0.2008 8.81 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY20 0.1324 0.2495 0.53 0.5960 ns
MONTH_DUMMY21 0.1390 0.2510 0.55 0.5800 ns
MONTH_DUMMY22 -0.4283 0.2920 -1.47 0.1420 ns
FIRM_DUMMY1 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY2 -0.9616 0.1588 -6.06 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY3 -0.0316 0.1320 -0.24 0.8110 ns
FIRM_DUMMY4 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY5 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY6 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY7 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY8 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY9 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY10 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY11 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY12 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY13 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY14 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY15 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY16 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY17 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY18 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY19 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY20 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY21 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY22 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY23 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY24 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY25 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY26 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY27 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY28 -1.6738 0.1552 -10.78 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY29 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY30 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY31 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY32 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY33 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY34 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY35 -0.5798 0.1108 -5.23 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY36 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY37 -- -- -- -- --











Table D.4 Stratified Logistic Results: Retailers 
TERMINATION Coef. Std. Err Z P>|z| sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -10.5603 1.2327 -8.57 0.0000 **
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 3.4942 0.4076 8.57 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME -25.0600 5.4516 -4.6 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 15.5237 3.1330 4.95 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_TRANSACTIONAL RATIO 4.14E-05 0.0003 0.15 0.8850 ns
constant -2.2066 0.1547 -14.27 0.0000 **
Control Variables
MONTH_DUMMY1 -1.7880 0.1201 -14.89 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY2 -1.2072 0.1046 -11.54 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY3 -1.3271 0.1098 -12.09 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY4 0.0004 0.0837 0.00 0.9960
MONTH_DUMMY5 -0.7825 0.0990 -7.90 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY6 -1.5111 0.1221 -12.38 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY7 -1.7109 0.1319 -12.97 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY8 -1.4961 0.1233 -12.14 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY9 -1.5111 0.1245 -12.14 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY10 -1.6169 0.1349 -11.99 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY11 -0.6880 0.1000 -6.88 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY12 -0.3558 0.0952 -3.74 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY13 -0.3355 0.0959 -3.50 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY14 -0.5487 0.1014 -5.41 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY15 -0.8824 0.1135 -7.78 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY16 0.4428 0.0856 5.17 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY17 -1.0281 0.1269 -8.10 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY18 -1.0324 0.1255 -8.23 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY19 -1.2072 0.1375 -8.78 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY20 -1.0290 0.1274 -8.08 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY21 -0.8270 0.1202 -6.88 0.0000 **
MONTH_DUMMY22 0.8671 0.0823 10.54 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY1 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY2 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY3 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY4 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY5 -0.8483 0.1618 -5.2400 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY6 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY7 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY8 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY9 -1.1958 0.1657 -7.2200 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY10 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY11 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY12 1.4977 0.1598 9.3700 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY13 -0.5082 0.1441 -3.5300 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY14 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY15 -0.5912 0.1756 -3.3700 0.0010
FIRM_DUMMY16 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY17 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY18 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY19 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY20 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY21 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY22 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY23 -0.2683 0.3092 -0.8700 0.3860
FIRM_DUMMY24 -0.4889 0.1413 -3.4600 0.0010
FIRM_DUMMY25 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY26 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY27 0.6439 0.1539 4.1800 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY28 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY29 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY30 -1.4896 0.1538 -9.6900 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY31 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY32 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY33 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY34 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY35 -1.0844 0.1469 -7.38 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY36 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY37 -- -- -- -- --






Log Likelihood -18,130.01  
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APPENDIX E Hazard Model Results 
The following tables provide the full Cox Proportional Hazards Model results.  
The tables are formatted as described in Appendix D.  This appendix includes four tables 
of results.   Table E.1 provides regression results for the full dataset.  Tables E.2 through 
E.4 provide stratified dataset results detailing the coefficient estimates when each echelon 
of the supply chain is regressed individually (manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers).   




Table E.1 Full Hazard Model Results 
TERMINATION Coef. Std. Err Z P>|z| sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -9.7162 0.8996 -10.80 0.0000 **
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 0.9230 0.0877 10.53 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME -17.5925 2.5864 -6.80 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 5.5218 0.9024 6.12 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_TRANSACTIONAL RATIO 8.43E-06 1.87E-05 0.45 0.6510 ns
Control Variables
FIRM_DUMMY1 2.6801 0.1909 14.04 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY2 0.1610 0.1776 0.91 0.3650 ns
FIRM_DUMMY3 1.1573 0.1540 7.51 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY4 3.2461 0.1684 19.28 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY5 0.8390 0.1497 5.61 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY6 0.8967 0.2981 3.01 0.0030 *
FIRM_DUMMY7 1.8111 0.1404 12.90 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY8 2.2715 0.1943 11.69 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY9 0.4247 0.1539 2.76 0.0060 *
FIRM_DUMMY10 0.7200 0.2300 3.13 0.0020 *
FIRM_DUMMY11 0.1540 0.2244 0.69 0.4930 ns
FIRM_DUMMY12 4.3805 0.1452 30.17 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY13 1.1625 0.1310 8.87 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY14 0.4473 0.2171 2.06 0.0390 *
FIRM_DUMMY15 1.0853 0.1637 6.63 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY16 1.1711 0.1547 7.57 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY17 -0.0991 0.4647 -0.21 0.8310 ns
FIRM_DUMMY18 4.2302 0.1644 25.73 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY19 1.2230 0.1585 7.71 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY20 1.7141 0.1603 10.69 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY21 1.8070 0.1974 9.16 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY22 1.6454 0.1837 8.96 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY23 1.4555 0.2955 4.93 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY24 1.2282 0.1281 9.58 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY25 0.2680 0.4273 0.63 0.5310 ns
FIRM_DUMMY26 1.9740 0.1593 12.39 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY27 3.1201 0.1407 22.18 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY28 -0.8274 0.1732 -4.78 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY29 -0.5375 0.1755 -3.06 0.0020 *
FIRM_DUMMY30 0.1311 0.1415 0.93 0.3540 ns
FIRM_DUMMY31 0.2916 0.2567 1.14 0.2560 ns
FIRM_DUMMY32 -0.3518 0.3150 -1.12 0.2640 ns
FIRM_DUMMY33 2.6658 0.2131 12.51 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY34 2.6980 0.1563 17.26 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY35 0.5511 0.1341 4.11 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY36 0.6300 0.1383 4.56 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY37 1.6061 0.2800 5.74 0.0000 **





Log Likelihood -69,576.74  
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Table E.2 Stratified Hazard Model Results: Manufacturers 
TERMINATION Coef. Std. Err Z P>|z| sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -7.2445 2.2283 -3.25 0.0010 *
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 7.2641 2.1074 3.45 0.0010 *
ENHANCED_VOLUME -9.0192 3.4302 -2.63 0.0090 *
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 16.2170 9.8837 1.64 0.1010 ns
ENHANCED_TRANSACTIONAL RATIO -3.77E-04 0.000531 -0.71 0.4770 ns
Control Variables
FIRM_DUMMY1 3.7529 0.1988 18.88 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY2 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY3 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY4 4.5169 0.1810 24.95 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY5 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY6 0.8887 0.2965 3.00 0.0030 *
FIRM_DUMMY7 1.9408 0.1433 13.54 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY8 2.7067 0.2016 13.42 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY9 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY10 0.7311 0.2301 3.18 0.0010 *
FIRM_DUMMY11 0.1571 0.2250 0.70 0.4850 ns
FIRM_DUMMY12 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY13 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY14 0.4488 0.2173 2.07 0.0390 *
FIRM_DUMMY15 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY16 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY17 -0.1504 0.4651 -0.32 0.7460 ns
FIRM_DUMMY18 5.5959 0.1800 31.09 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY19 1.2202 0.1587 7.69 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY20 1.9859 0.1610 12.33 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY21 1.8074 0.2003 9.02 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY22 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY23 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY24 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY25 0.2353 0.4278 0.55 0.5820 ns
FIRM_DUMMY26 2.5102 0.1628 15.42 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY27 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY28 -0.8495 0.1734 -4.90 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY29 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY30 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY31 0.3429 0.2567 1.34 0.1820 ns
FIRM_DUMMY32 -0.3482 0.3150 -1.11 0.2690 ns
FIRM_DUMMY33 3.6088 0.2186 16.51 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY34 3.6377 0.1639 22.20 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY35 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY36 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY37 1.8328 0.2806 6.53 0.0000 **





Log Likelihood -11,757.96  
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Table E.3 Stratified Hazard Model Results: Wholesalers 
TERMINATION Coef. Std. Err Z P>|z| sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -34.7517 5.4582 -6.37 0.0000 **
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 3.2472 0.5900 5.50 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME -8.7122 5.2078 -1.67 0.0940 +
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 2.6181 1.8341 1.43 0.1530 ns
ENHANCED_TRANSACTIONAL RATIO 2.33E-05 1.49E-05 1.56 0.1190 ns
Control Variables
FIRM_DUMMY1 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY2 -0.9459 0.1547 -6.11 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY3 0.0500 0.1269 0.39 0.6930 ns
FIRM_DUMMY4 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY5 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY6 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY7 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY8 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY9 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY10 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY11 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY12 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY13 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY14 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY15 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY16 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY17 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY18 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY19 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY20 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY21 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY22 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY23 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY24 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY25 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY26 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY27 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY28 -1.6967 0.1517 -11.18 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY29 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY30 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY31 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY32 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY33 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY34 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY35 -0.5020 0.1070 -4.69 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY36 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY37 -- -- -- -- --





Log Likelihood -6,419.96  
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Table E.4 Stratified Hazard Model Results: Retailers 
TERMINATION Coef. Std. Err Z P>|z| sig
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME -15.0735 1.4312 -10.53 0.0000 **
TRANSACTIONAL_VOLUME^2 4.5713 0.4082 11.20 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME -51.6863 7.4789 -6.91 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_VOLUME^2 30.8093 4.1358 7.45 0.0000 **
ENHANCED_TRANSACTIONAL RATIO 1.67E-04 0.000321 0.52 0.6030 ns
Control Variables
FIRM_DUMMY1 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY2 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY3 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY4 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY5 -0.7456 0.1563 -4.7700 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY6 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY7 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY8 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY9 -1.1698 0.1604 -7.2900 0.0000
FIRM_DUMMY10 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY11 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY12 2.5306 0.1520 16.6500 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY13 -0.4184 0.1386 -3.0200 0.0030 *
FIRM_DUMMY14 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY15 -0.5060 0.1697 -2.9800 0.0030 *
FIRM_DUMMY16 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY17 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY18 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY19 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY20 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY21 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY22 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY23 -0.1775 0.2989 -0.5900 0.5530 ns
FIRM_DUMMY24 -0.3869 0.1358 -2.8500 0.0040 *
FIRM_DUMMY25 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY26 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY27 1.2830 0.1475 8.7000 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY28 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY29 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY30 -1.4972 0.1484 -10.0900 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY31 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY32 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY33 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY34 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY35 -1.1059 0.1413 -7.82 0.0000 **
FIRM_DUMMY36 -- -- -- -- --
FIRM_DUMMY37 -- -- -- -- --









APPENDIX F Calculating Sales Surprise 
This study evaluates two standard forecasting methods based on historical data to 
calculate the sales surprise.  Although alternative forecasting methods are available, the 
two methods selected provide robust forecasts for evaluation and are commonly used in 
practice. 
A moving average forecast uses actual data values from prior periods to generate 
a forecast.  A moving average forecast is generated using the following equation: 
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Where  is the forecast for time period t , MAtF n identifies the number of periods 
included in the moving average window, At-1 is the actual value in period t-1, and n is the 
number of data points in the moving average (Stevenson 2007).  The moving average 
forecast can include as many data points as desired; however, since it is averaging or 
smoothing the historic values increasing the number of data points decreases the 
responsiveness of the forecast to recent changes.  Similarly, decreasing the number of 
data points increases the sensitivity of the forecast to recent changes.  Moving average 
forecasts are popular in practice but require the decision maker to determine the 
appropriate number of periods to include in the forecast. For the purposes of this study, 
moving average forecasts were calculated for all firms based on the inclusion of two, 
four, and eight periods.  
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Exponential smoothing (also called Single Smoothing or noted “SS”) is a more 
sophisticated averaging forecast method which can incorporate large amounts of historic 
data points while placing emphasis on the more recent events.  The exponential 
smoothing forecast adds a percentage of the difference between the prior period forecast 
and the actual value observed during the prior period.  An exponential smoothing forecast 
is generated using the following equation: 
[ ]1 1t-1+ A                             F.2t t tF F Fα− −⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∧ ∧ ∧
 
Where Ft is the forecast for period t, 1tF
∧
−  is the forecast for the prior period, α is a 
smoothing constant, and At-1 is the actual value observed during the prior period 
(Stevenson 2007; Tersine 1993).  This forecast method is generated over time, such that 
the forecasts and forecasting error in each of the previous periods are incorporated into 
the current forecast, the model is more generally stated as: 
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Where is the forecasted demand level for period , tF t 0F
∧
is the forecasted 
demand level for the initial period, and 1tA − is the actual demand for period .  The 
smoothing constant represented by α incorporates a percentage of the previous forecast 
error into the new forecast.  The responsiveness of the forecast is then driven by the 




slower the forecast will adjust for forecasting error in the prior period.  A smoothing 
constant closer to 1.00 will be very responsive to recent forecast error. 
In practice, the smoothing constant is selected based on judgment of the decision 
maker or trial and error.  Smoothing constants commonly range from 0.05 to 0.50 
depending on the underlying demand behavior and business responsiveness needs.  For 
the purposes of this study, smoothing constants of 0.05, 0.25, and 0.50 were used to 
estimate forecasts for all firms.  Results of these forecasts will be discussed at the end of 
this section. 
Since the exponential smoothing forecast uses the historic period error to 
calculate the current forecast, a starting forecast must be identified.  An average of the 
first several periods is often used to generate the starting forecast (Stevenson 2007).  For 
the purposes of this study, a moving average forecast based on the four quarters of 2003 
was used to generate a starting forecast for first quarter of 2004.  The exponential 
smoothing forecast was then run starting in first quarter (Q1 2004) through the next seven 
periods to the end of the study (Q4 2005). 
The resulting six forecasts (MA2, MA4, MA8, SSα=0.05, SSα=0.25, SSα=0.50) are then 
compared to identify the best fit for estimating sales.  A key measure used to select 
forecast methods is forecast accuracy (Stevenson 2007).  Forecast accuracy is 
operationalized as the difference between the actual observed value during a period and 
the forecasted value for the period (error). 





Where et is the forecasting error for period t based on the difference between the actual 
observed value for the period (At) and the forecast for the period ( tF
∧
).  A larger value of 
error indicates greater inaccuracy in the forecast.  Positive error then is the result of a 
forecast that was too low, negative error is the result of a forecast that was too high 
relative to the actual observed value for the period. 
Forecast error is aggregated using one of two standard measures.  The two 
measures are; the mean squared error (MSE) and mean absolute deviation (MAD).   
[ ]                         F.5eMAD
n
= ∑  




The MAD is the average absolute difference between the forecast and observed 
values for each period-firm combination.  By using the absolute value of the difference, 
the canceling effects of negative and positive error are eliminated.  Similarly, the MSE 
method eliminates the canceling effects of positive and negative error by squaring the 
period-firm error.  The difference in the two methods is that the MAD treats all error 
equally where the MSE weights the errors based on their squared values.  In either case, 
lower aggregate results identify less error in the forecasting method (Stevenson 2007). 
As shown in Table F.1, the moving average methods produce lower error than the 
exponential smoothing methods.  The lowest overall error is produced by the moving 
average 4-period and moving average 4-period specifications.  This holds for both the 
mean squared error and mean absolute deviation methods of calculating forecast error. 
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TABLE F.1 Forecast Accuracy by Forecast Method 




Moving Average - 2 Periods 262,994,910 170,127
Moving Average - 4 Periods 211,310,507 156,971
Moving Average - 8 Periods 351,056,626 210,372
Exponential Smoothing α=0.05 648,074,453 274,312
Exponential Smoothing α=0.25 1,436,286,821 371,650
Exponential Smoothing α=0.50 4,312,283,372 547,632  
For the purposes of this study, moving average 4-period is used to calculate the firm-




APPENDIX G Alternative Dependent Variable Results 
The following tables provide model fit statistics and coefficient estimates for two 
alternative model specifications.  Table G.1 provides output for the alternative Net 
Income dependent variable.  Table G.2 provides output for the alternative Receivables 
Turnover dependent variable.  Table G.3 includes the pairwise correlations for the 





TABLE G.1 Alternative Dependent Variable: Net Income 
n 170
groups 39









(Std Err) P>| t | sig
Explanatory Variables
(log)CLOSE 0.5085   
(0.2819) 0.074 +
(log)ASYMMETRY -0.2039   
(0.1342) 0.131 ns
(log)CONCENTRATION 0.1429  
(0.3047) 0.640 ns
(log)CHURN_RATE -0.0917   
(0.0949) 0.336 ns
constant 25.8130  
(10.5323) 0.016 *
Control Variables
(log)FIRMSIZE -2.3305  
(1.1113) 0.038) *
(log)SALES_SURPRISE 2.7638  
(0.6295) 0.000 **
(log)NET_INCOME_LAG 0.0004   
(0.0976) 0.997 ns
SEASON1DUMMY 0.5500  
(0.2019) 0.007 *
SEASON2DUMMY 0.2888  
(0.1767) 0.105 ns
SEASON3DUMMY 0.3513   
(0.1760) 0.048 *
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level  
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TABLE G.2 Alternative Dependent Variable: Receivables Turnover 
n 1
groups 37










(Std Err) P>| t | sig
Explanatory Variables
(log)CLOSE -0.0188   
(0.0127) 0.143 ns
(log)ASYMMETRY 0.0151  
(0.0065) 0.022 ns
(log)CONCENTRATION 0.00003  
(0.0149) 0.998 ns
(log)CHURN_RATE 0.0001  
(0.0049) 0.979 ns
constant -0.1247  
(0.5191) 0.811 ns
Control Variables
(log)FIRMSIZE 0.0792   
(0.0511) 0.123 ns
(log)SALES_SURPRISE 0.0548  
(0.0254) 0.033 *
(log)REC_TURN_LAG 0.7409  
(0.0373) 0.000 **
SEASON1DUMMY -0.0027   
(0.0098) 0.781 ns
SEASON2DUMMY 0.0074  
(0.0084) 0.382 ns
SEASON3DUMMY 0.0014   
(0.5191) 0.811 ns
**<.01   *<.05  +<.1 significance level  










RECEIVABLES_TURN -0.0783 -0.1871 1
0.1866 0.0013
286 294 294
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